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Abstract 
This thesis studies how attempts to carry out the policy of economic planning 
outlined in the Labour Party's 1945 manifesto failed during the Attlee Governments 
1945-51. It considers the structure of the civil service and ministerial machinery 
created to oversee planning and the changes made to it. It covers the debate among 
officials and ministers over what planning meant and which economic tools could be 
used to implement it. In particular the thesis focuses on the most tangible 
manifestations of the planning policies: the annual economic surveys and the 
Long-Term Programme drawn up as part of the European Recovery Programme 
process. 
The thesis seeks to gauge how far planning added "value" to the economy or 
the workings of the Civil Service. It asks whether the new planning bodies fitted 
successfully into Whitehall and if British government was sufficiently adaptable to the 
new economic challenges it faced. It questions the extent to which planners were able 
to foresee the economic problems Britain encountered and consequently whether 
ministers were able to successfully combat them. The thesis also seeks to assess the 
power of initiative of leading civil servants. Furthermore it investigates when planning 
was superseded by Keynesian demand management and how far planning was in fact 
incompatible with the capitalist British economy. Overall this thesis demonstrates how 
planning, an important economic policy, failed to be implemented in the immediate 
post-war years. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
When the Labour Party came to power in 1945 it was with a range of policies 
which aimed to change radically the shape of Britain's economy and society. These 
policies were based on three main pillars: nationalization, the welfare state and 
economic planningl. Historians have often focused on the blunting of the Labour 
Governments' objectives between 1945-51 by the economic problems the country 
faced. Planning, which particularly suffered this way, and is usually seen as the least 
successful of the three key policy approaches, forms the focus of this work. 
Economic planning held an important position in Labour's canon of policies. 
The 1945 manifesto committed a Labour Government to "plan from the ground up"2. 
Though economic planning was often presented as a policy which was distinctive to 
socialism,, in fact, support for it at that time stretched across the political spectrum3. 
As a policy option planning had become increasingly popular since attempts in the 
1920s and 1930s to find remedies to the economic hardships caused by the end of the 
Great War and the Depression. It was argued that laissez-faire capitalism had failed 
to respond both to people's needs and the demands of industry for modernization, 
greater productivity and improved efficiency. As Hobsbawra notes, both the U. S. SK 
and Germany, which successfully combated the Depression of the 1930s, pursued 
economic planning policies4. Support for planning came not only from Labour 
members and sympathizers such as Hugh Dalton, Barbara Wootton and G. D. H. Cole5 
but can also be found in the Liberal Party's 1928 Britain's Industrial Future and from 
some Conservatives, most notably Harold Macmillan6. 
The experience of a state-controlled economy during the Second World War7, 
demonstrated that greater government intervention in industry could not only be 
possible, but successful. Virtually all the senior members of the post-war Labour 
Government had served in the wartime coalition, They aimed to transform the face of 
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the British economy and society, and to prove that democratic socialism could work 
for the benefit of the nation. Planning, which had grown in popularity in the inter-war 
years and in practicality in wartime, offered the means. 
A major question for this thesis is why planning failed to achieve the objectives 
envisaged for it as a policy. One factor was that economic planning was affected by 
the problems which rocked the economy such as the fuel and convertibility crises of 
1947; the need to devalue in 1949; and the Korean War and subsequent rearmament 
programme in 1950-1. The uncertainties of the time meant that it appeared impossible 
even to predict accurately the economy's likely development. Sir Alec Caimcross 
states that during 1945-51 instead "of a smooth and continuous recovery to ever 
higher levels of activity, one finds a succession of major crises at two-year intervals 
and the years between are never free from anxiety"8. Andrew Shonfield holds a 
similar view,, claiming that "the whole operation of Labour planning when it worked at 
all, was directed to strictly short-term objectives"9 rather than longer-term ones. 
The U. K. economy had suffered far more during the war than either British or 
American politicians or officials had realised". It had been sustained since 1941 by 
U. S. Lend-Lease aid totalling $27 billion (f6.75 billion). Britain had sold El billion of 
foreign investments and run up sterling balances of 13 billion. These balances were 
debts with countries, predominantly of the Empire, for goods and services supplied on 
credit during the war. By comparison the whole welfare state in 1949-50 cost L1.8 
billion1l. However,, despite granting independence to the Indian subcontinent Britain 
intended to maintain avast empire and a leading position in world affairs. TheU. S. A. 
expected Britain to rapidly become a strong trading partner. The British economy was 
incapable of sustaining these roles. A shortage of dollars and a poor balance of 
payments with the U. S. A. was a continual problem. As time passed wartime 
experience became more distant and the view among senior officials and ministers that 
controls and hands-on planning were both necessary and feasible faded12 
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Economic planning was also plagued by the lack of a firm understanding of 
what it actually meant. The historians Bernard Alford, Rodney Lowe and Neil 
Rollings believe that "anything which induces a conscious move away from a free 
competitive market can be described as planning"13. However, they distinguish 
between manipulation of economic regulators to mitigate the effects of the market and 
true planning with a specified outcome in terms of economic activity14. Shonfield 
claims that "the Labour Government of the 1940s never understood 'planning"'15. 
Lord Plowden,. Chief Planning Officer 1947-53, describes the policy as "unthought-out 
and nebulous"16. Plowden headed the Central Economic Planning Staff (C. E. P. S. ) 
which was established in 1947 as the main Civil Service body for overseeing econom ic 
planning. 
Keith Middlemas suggests that Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to 
the Treasury 1945-56, drew on the inter-war "Balfour-Haldane" approach which 
defined planning as "the accumulation of knowledge as a preliminary to skilled 
management of national resources, carried out in a way best calculated to maximise 
government aims without eroding democratic freedom, social justice or a fair standard 
of living"17. Bridges stated that he saw "no real distinction between the working out 
of a national plan on the line suggested and the task of devising a full employment 
policy"18. 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps saw a more positive task 
for planning, which was to "guide production into the necessary channels, according 
to the plans which we have formulated"19 through "'agreement, persuasion, 
consultation and other free democratic means"20. Cairncross claims that to "most 
ministers the need for controls seemed obvious and the use of them constituted 
planning. i'21. Christopher Dow writes that economic planning "was to be an inti-mate 
mixture of cajolery and compulsion"22. Similarly Plowden later viewed it "as a 
mixture of physical controls, nationalisation and exhortation, laced with a dash of 
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Keynesianism and a liberal dose of wishf 1,23 ul thinking Such varied portrayals 
indicate the uncertainty about what constituted planning. 
At the time Plowden felt economic planning was a short-term activity, effective 
simply for post-war reconstruction, rather than as a permanent policy. He believed it 
would be replaced by fiscal and monetary tools. Austin Robinson, a professional 
economist and a leading member of the C. E. P. S., "saw a plan as a means to adjust the 
available resources to the desiderata of the nation" but "made the general point that 
the main objective of planning should be to make planning unnecessary"24. Such 
attitudes held by many officials differed from the writings of the 1930s. 
Caimcross states that: 
"The Economic Surveys and the budgetary and other decisions based 
on them were about as close to economic planning as post-war 
governments ever got. vo25 
Certainly these annual surveys produced from 1946 onwards were the clearest 
example of attempts at planning. The first to be published was the Economic Survcýy 
for 194726. Though the economic targets in these surveys became less specific as time 
progressed, they form the main "plans" that can be seen from this period, and were the 
public face of the process. Equally important was the Long-Term Programme,. 
produced for the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O. E. E. C. ) as 
part of the share-out of Marshall Aid in October 194827. This exercise was carried 
out by all the countries of the O. E. E. C. and represents planning forced upon Whitehall 
from outside28. 
Despite the declining fortunes of planning as a policy approach, particularly 
-a after 1948,, ministers and officials continued to believe in the need for an efficient 
planning machine. This was achieved slowly. For example, questions of foreign trade 
were only gradually integrated fully into broader economic planning. Officials, 
employers and sections of the workforce who were opposed to planning also 
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hampered its use. The Government was unable to overcome such obstructions, partly 
due to the uncertainty of what economic planning entailed. 
Core Questions 
Below I outline a number of groups of questions generated by the secondary 
literature which I intend to set against the primary material to help determine the 
nature of British planning. The first question is whether planning "added value" to the 
running of the British economy by bringing greater efficiency, a new direction or 
greater knowledge in economic matters to the work of the Government and the Civil 
Service. 
My second question focuses on the position of the new planning bodies such as 
the C. E. P. S. and the Economic Planning Board (E. P. B. ), the tripartite body 
established to discuss planning issues, in relation to the Civil Service. Did they fit 
comfortably with the established economic machinery or did tensions arise because of 
their novelty? How were these planning bodies perceived by ministers, M. P. s, officials 
and the media? When did they arouse most interest? 
My third set of questions revolves around Caimcross's view that "the economic 
problems encountered by the government were not, as a rule, those which it had 
expected. Equally the solutions to the problems were rarely of the government's 
devising"29. This implies that the planning bodies failed to forecast economic trends 
and,, that they were unable to cope with problems when they were encountered. I shall 
ask whether they were indeed caught unawares by each of the successive crises and if 
so, why was this the case? Was it due to defective statistical information? Did 
officials and ministers not ask the right questions of the information available or fail to 
use it sensibly? Were officials unable to persuade ministers to carry out the necessary 
policies? 
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My fourth question derives ftom Caimcross's statement that "commonly 
ministers were the reluctant pupils of their officialsot30. Did this mean that ministers 
were restrained from innovation by an inherent conservatism and pro-free market 
stance on the part of leading civil servants? David Marquand writes of a "negotiated 
inertia,, 31 between the post-war Labour Government seeking state-led change and 
Whitehall's culture and assumptions. Jim Tomlinson, however, has suggested that 
planning was hampered more by the assumptions that Labour brought with it32 
Shonfield states that "[a]dministrative discretion which is meat and drink to the 
French is anathema to the British official" and as a consequence despite "in practice" 
having such discretion, "officials hold deliberately to the pretence that they have no 
initiative of their own" explaining that it resides with " some masterminding 
minister"33. I would argue that leading economic officials were certainly involved in 
shaping the nature and fate of the planning process. The two Directors of the Cabinet 
Office's Economic Section, James Meade and Robert Hall, as well as Bridges were 
engaged with planning throughout the Labour period. Plowden, holding a special 
position in Whitehall,. was the most important planning official. Working closely with 
Hall he formed an influential front for influencing ministers' opinions on economic 
issues. 
Alford et al highlight concerns at the time about the power civil servants were 
wielding on Whitehall's economic committees34. Most controversial was the 
Investment Programmes Committee (I. P. C. ) formed in August 1947. It was chaired 
by Plowden until December 1947 and then by his deputies. The I. P. C. 's aim was to 
find possible cuts in planned investment in order to reduce imports and ensure 
investment did not exceed the available resources. Alford et al claim that it was felt 
that this implied officials were making strategic decisions properly left to ministers, for 
example on the housing programme which was dependent on imported timber35, 
Nfinisters remained free to reject the I. P. C. 's proposals, as they did in November 1947 
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to investment cuts suggested following the failure of convertibility. This showed that 
such worries were unfounded36. 
Despite concerns over Civil Service power, in Hall's words, Plowden could 
only be the "prophet", and not the "master" of economic plans37. Plowden eschewed 
what he saw as the kind of power his French counterparts wielded and retained a 
concern for the proprieties of the British administrative machine in the face of different 
attitudes. For example, despite Plowden's unease, Cripps was happy for officials to 
meet jointly with outsiders such as French civil servants to discuss long-term 
y38 planning . 
There were a few instances of planning officials taking the initiative such 
as the pressure Hall and Plowden brought to bear on ministers in 1949 to devalue39. 
Another example comes from Plowden's position in 1951 as one of the three 
"Wise Men" of the Executive Board of the Temporary Council Committee (T. C. C. ) of 
N. A. T. O. in 1951. This was established to scrutinize the rearmament programmes of 
N. A. T. O. countries. Plowden's role put him in the position of cross-examining the 
Chancellor,, Hugh Gaitskell, on Britain's plans40. 
My fifth group of questions focuses on the differing views of the time on how 
the economy should be managed. Most historians accept that a Keynesian approach to 
the economy developed in this period. Did Keynesianism displace a more "socialist", 
if short-lived,, interventionism? Did they run parallel? Did Keynesianism simply prove 
more acceptable to civil servants or more suited to the prevailing economic 
circumstances? Dow claims that the "role of budgetary policy in the post-war years 
grew gradually as controls were removed: only then was the full importance of the 
'Keynesian revolution' revealed"41. Plowden writes that "ministers were soon 
convinced that to try to plan the economy in minute and elaborate detail over the 
long 
term and outside a war situation was in error". They felt any efforts to circumvent the 
price mechanism or "to retain controls for their own sake" would "result only 
in 
42 
frustration on the part of the consumer and failure on the part of the government 
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Plowden suggests that "after 1947 planning came to be expressed in terms of the 
management of demand in a Keynesian macroeconomic manner in order to 
counterbalance the natural cyclical behaviour of the economy"43. Alan Booth 
characterises 1947 as the year in which attempts at planning were swept away and 
replaced by demand management44. In contrast, highlighting Plowden's appointment 
and the development of a stronger planning machine in 1947 Caimcross portrays 
British planning as catching its "second wind"45. 
This issue leads to a consideration of the relative influence of so-called 
Gosplanners, named after the Soviet planning agency, Gosplan, and the 
-Thermostatters, whose sobriquet 
derived from the 1944 White Paper, Employment 
Policy which spoke of "'thermostatic"' control of the economy46. The former favoured 
a clear cut, quantitative plan involving controls, the latter, Keynesian-style fiscal and 
financial "tinkering" of the economy. Hennessy highlights how Meade condemned 
Richard "Otto" Clarke,, an under secretary at the Treasury, as a Gosplanner for 
favouring the continuation of direct controls47. Meade also wrongly applied this 
description to Cripps and Robinson48. The issue of continuing direct controls was 
partly an ideological one of restricting consumer choice, possibly so that it could be 
fitted with a plan. However, as Cairncross notes, it was also a question of practicality 
as controls were complex and unwieldy. Jacques Leruez shows that the departments 
involved in direct controls were large. The Board of Trade had nearly 10,000 staff 
and the Ministry of Supply, over 34,000 whereas the Treasury of the time 
had 
1,60049. Consequently, despite the impact of the Korean War which temporarily 
provoked the restoration of some controls, by 1951 there was nothing to prevent the 
move away from controls to demand management5o. 
Economic planning and demand management do seem to have been able to co- 
exist as government policy, possibly partly due to the imprecise views of planning and 
Keynesianism held by politicians and officials. Shonfield writes: 
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to 
... we 
have seen people in authority who believe themselves to have 
penetrated the truths of Keynesian econon-fics, being guided by quite 
other and contradictory policies. "51 
Hennessy has suggested that this just reflected the normal "paradox and incoherence" 
of a party which embraced a "wide swathe" of political opinionS52. Those politicians 
who favoured. economic planning appeared to lack a clear vision of how to implement 
the policy. Others,. including some officials, saw Keynesianism as the option least 
disruptive to business and above all far easier for the Civil Service to operate, 
53 
particularly in the face of inflatiow . 
The sixth question is drawn from David Marquand's The Unprinciple 
SoCie , tV54 which considers 
long-term British economic weaknesses. He argues that the 
"attitudes and patterns of behaviour" which were "stamped indelibly" by the Industrial 
Revolution persisted55. Such "assumptions born of successful adaptation in the past 
impede adaptation to more recent changes"56. This left Britain unable to become a so- 
called "developmental state", that is one able to change institutions and behaviour to 
cope with new circumstances, for example in the immediate post-war years to cope 
with economic dislocation and modernize industry. Shonfield likewise has claimed 
that "the old instinctive suspicion Of Positive goverm-nent" was "as vigorous as ever" 
among "ministers who refused to plan" and officials keen to avoid "the responsibilities 
of making choices"57. 
Many of the politicians and officials who had worked in the wartime machine 
retained positions post-war, yet seemed unwilling to or incapable of maintaining 
its 
innovations in peacetime. Did the absence of a statist tradition discourage the use of 
administrative and economic "levers and wires" to make planning work? 
Caimcross 
suggests that: 
"It took a long time to learn, if it [the Government] ever did, that the 
'commanding heights' of the British economy lay not in the steel 
industry, but in the balance of payments and energy supply. it58 
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This implies that the planners focused on the wrong economic tools. 
My final question comes from the economist Friedrich von Hayek. in his 1944 
book The Road to Serfdom" he claims that planning is incompatible with a free 
society. This view is reiterated by John Jewkes, a former Director of the Economic 
Section and wartime civil servant, in his 1948 book, Ordeal by Plannineo. These men 
believe that planning naturally curtailed freedoms, as in the U. S. S. R.. However, 
British planners did not envisage their work as a threat to freedom or democracy. 
More relevantly, von Hayek suggests that economic planning was doomed to be 
unsuccessful in a largely capitalist economy anyway". He maintains that there would 
be unresolvable tensions between government planners and business managers62. 
Helen Mercer makes it clear that such tensions existed partly because the 
Labour Party and businessmen lacked ideas on how to advance British industry. 
Labour's industrial thinking had focused on nationalization and for a wider perspective 
they had to adopt the ideas of a non-socialist, Keynes. Industrialists were smug about 
wartime output levels despite having used outdated methods and exhausted 
equipment. They did fear nationalization and Mercer states that they pursued "damage 
limitation" to fend off peacetime governmental intervention especially where it sought 
to restructure and supervise industry63. Nick Tiratsoo and Tomlinson show that this 
resistance extended to goverm-nent attempts to improve industrial efficiency through 
management training and American methodS64. By 1950-1, the Federation of British 
Industry (F. B. I. ) and British Employers' Confederation (B. E. C. ) had been able to halt 
the spread of Development Councils. These bodies were established in 1947 on the 
initiative of Cripps, President of the Board of Trade. They included trades union and 
employer representatives plus independent experts and aimed to investigate ways to 
improve efficiency in specific industries65. 
Leruez shows that the Government was heavily dependent on trade 
associations to operate allocations and price controls. Ministries used advisers 
drawn 
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from the relevant industries, for example in allocating newsprint and nickel, The 
Central Price Regulation Committee and the Capital Issues Committee66 were filled 
with businessmen who retained links to their companies and oversaw policies which 
were beneficial to their profits. Leruez claims employers' bodies engaged in 
"involuntary sabotage"67 of the control machinery by administering a system they 
wanted to see abolished. Subtle pressure was exerted to accelerate decontrol. Thus 
the use of economic tools necessary for implementing plans was curtailed68. 
The Nature of the Work 
My thesis has been based on government records held at the Public Record 
Office (P. R. O. ) at Kew. It has also drawn on F. B. I. and Trades Union Congress 
(T. U. C. ) files held at the Modem Records Centre (M. R. C. ) at Warwick University to 
allow an examination of the tripartite aspect of planning. In addition I have been able 
to interview seven of the people working in economic planning at the time, who have 
been able to bring a personal view of the work, not available when drawing simply 
from written sources. Consequently I have been able to produce a comprehensive 
analysis of the attempts at economic planning 1945-51, in particular probing in detail 
the production of the various economic surveys which formed the most high profile 
and tangible element of the policy. In addition, I have made extensive use of 
newspapers and periodicals of the time to gauge the response of the press and, to 
some extent,, of the public to the surveys and economic planning in general. 
The economic policies of the Labour Governments of 1945-51 have proven 
popular areas of research, as is shown by the secondary material available. In 1983 
Andrew Chester produced a Ph. D. which tackled a similar area Planning. the-Labour 
Goverment and British Economic PoliQy 1943-5169. My work differs from Chester's 
in concentrating on the organizational side rather than economic theory. 
In addition 
my thesis is not concerned with the inter-war intellectual debate on planning which 
has 
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now been dealt with thoroughly in secondary workS70. Chester did not use material 
from the M. R. C. and similarly it was barely mentioned by Chick in his thesis on 
investment under the Labour Governments7l. The greatest overlap between my work 
and any other comes between my Chapter III produced in 1995 and Chapter 6 of Jim 
Tomlinson's Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: the Attlee YearS72, 
published in 1997. My thesis recognises Tomlinson's work, but unsurprisingly, given 
that we both consulted the same files, - our conclusions are very similar. My thesis 
explores the issues in greater depth and has made use of additional sources. 
Chapter 11 considers the whole planning machine from its early post-war focus 
on the Lord President's Committee (L. P. C. ) through the changes wrought in 1947 by 
the creation of the C. E. P. S. to the subsequent absorption of the planning machine into 
the Treasury later that year. It will also look at the relationship between the planners 
and other official and ministerial bodies,. as well as trades unions and employers' 
associations particularly through the'Econonfic Planning Board (E. P. B. ). 
Chapter III will look at what those ministers and officials involved in planning 
thought it represented and what their objectives were. A key issue was how plans 
could be implemented and this forms the basis for Chapter IV. It will consider what 
tools,, such as direct controls and fiscal measures, were available to British planners, 
and those economic instruments they were unable or unwilling to use. In particular it 
will investigate the failure to develop a differential wages policy and labour controls to 
influence employment patterns. 
The remainder of the thesis investigates the most obvious examples of British 
planning: the economic surveys. Chapter V covers the annual surveys produced for 
1946-51,. their compilation and amendments, who was involved in their preparation 
and the surveys' conclusions. In addition, the chapter seeks to ascertain their impact 
within government and upon the public. Chapter VI turns to the longer-term surveys 
and the work of planners on Britain's submission to the O. E. E. C. for Marshall Aid. 
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Chapter VII concludes the thesis by considering the overarching questions. It seeks to 
establish what my work has revealed about the issues embraced by the core questions 
identified above. 
This study focuses on the machinery of government rather than the 
personalities of the politicians involved. Consequently. it does not encompass private 
papers. The thesis concentrates, therefore, on the interlocking circles of insider 
policy-making and decision-taking as delineated by the deposits at the P. R. O.. 
However,, naturally, the views of individual ministers and civil servants are revealed, 
often vividly and powerfully through the official record. In addition the thesis makes 
use of the wealth of biographies available about the key participants in the process. 
These include autobiographies by Lords Plowden and Roll, Hugh Dalton and Douglas 
Jay, the diaries of James Meade and Robert Hall as well as biographies of Austin 
Robinson, Clement Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Hugh Dalton, Hugh Gaitskell, Herbert 
Morrison and Harold Wilson73. 
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Chal2ter 11 
Th Plannnnimg Machine 
Introduction 
Peacetime economic planning was portrayed by the Labour Government as a 
new departure, yet the governmental machine established to administer it was far fi7om 
a radical development. Plowden states that this machine was "co-ordinated 
ineffectually and was incapable of meeting the necessities of Britain's desperate 
plight"'. Throughout 1945-51 one can discern three basic elements: a ministerial 
committee, an official committee and a staff of officials involved in inter-departmental 
work, primarily supplying information. Attempts to extend the machine into a range 
of departments in 1947 were ineffective and soon abandoned. 
During the war the emphasis was on labour and raw materials. Finance and 
thus the Treasury were eclipsed and the Chancellor was outside the Cabinet until the 
end of the war. For the next two years the Treasury maintained what Caimcross 
views as an inappropriately subordinate role. However, as the influence of the Lord 
President over domestic economic affairs waned the Treasury was able to regain its 
status and extend its influence into more areas than it had done between the warS2. By 
late 1947 the combination of the short-lived post of Minister for Economic Affairs 
with that of Chancellor signalled the recognition of the widened scope of the 
Government's and particularly the Treasury's involvement in the economy3. From the 
start of 1948 the Treasury progressively absorbed the planning machinery. The final 
stage came in 1953 when it took over the Economic Section from the Cabinet Office. 
Augusl 1945 - March 1947 
The Government intended "to preserve and develop" the economic machinery 
established by the wartime Coalition Government4. This had operated through 
physical controls, especially the allocation of labour and raw materials, to which 
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monetary and financial concerns were subordinate. Physical controls had developed 
outside the Treasury, for example in the ministries of Supply, Production, Aircraft 
Production,, Labour and Food and at the Board of Trade5. These departments 
"sponsored" different sectors of industry. The Lord President had acted as overseer 
on the home front. Planning in the first two years of peace developed in a similar way. 
The economic planning machine established in 1945 was focused on the Lord 
President's Committee (L. P. C. ), a ministerial Cabinet Committee. Herbert Morrison 
was Lord President from 1945 until becoming Foreign Secretary in March 195 1. Dow 
considers that up until early 1947, Morrison played "a role somewhere between 
overlord and senior co-ordinator"6. However, he lacked a department. His Office of 
the Lord President was just a small personal staff including his close adviser, Secretary 
to the Lord President, 
., 
Max Nicholson, who had worked in the Ministry of War 
Transport 1942-57. Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and 
other leading civil servants were resentful of Morrison and his "personal cronies" 
especially Nicholson and Clem Leslie, head of the Economic Information Unit 
(E. I. U. ), who they saw as taking on too much responsibility8. As during war, the 
L. P. C. handled econornic and domestic issues to lessen the burden on the Cabinet. Its 
eleven members included important economic ministers: the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade and the ministers of Fuel and Power, 
Supply and Labour9. 
The L. P. C. was assisted by the Cabinet Office's Economic Section and Central 
Statistical Office (C. S. O. ), both set up in 1941 to supply econon-fic information to 
whichever departments needed it". Cripps had hoped that these two bodies would 
form an economic planning unit under the Board of Trade. Morrison, backed by the 
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, successfully resisted this. They were worried that 
such a move would mean the bodies would become mired in departmental concerns 
rather than remaining free to act inter-departmentallyll. 
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Attlee created the Industrial Sub-Committee (L. P. (I. ) Sub-Committee) of the 
L. P. C. which was designed to relieve the full committee of some of its work. It 
consisted of the Lord President the Chancellor,, the President of the Board of Trade 
and the Minister of Labour, with others co-opted on as necessary. Importantly it 
could report directly to Cabinet. Its concerns included the reconversion of industry to 
peacetime production and the balance between the demands of the domestic and 
export markets12. Thus from the start it included the foreign trade element which 
tended to be handled separately from the home economy at this stage. Given the 
L. P. C. 's workload",, the L. P. (I. ) Sub-Committee, soon developed into a full 
committee14 and dealt with issues such as export trade, production efficiency and 
Development Areas'5- It was scrapped in April 1946, with most of its work devolving 
to the L. P. C. and the Sub-Committee on the Distribution of InduStry16. Its planning 
role had already been assumed by the Ministerial Conunittee on Economic Planning 
(M. E. P. ), chaired by Morrison, which had been set up in January 194617, This was 
directed by Attlee, "'to exercise constant supervision over central economic 
planning"'18 and brought the nucleus of four ministers from the L. P. (I. ) Committee on 
to an explicit planning committee. In March 1947 the Paymaster-General, 11ilary 
Marquand, and in August the Lord Privy Seal, Arthur Greenwood, were added". 
Both men were effectively deputies for the Lord President. 
These ministerial committees were supported by a main official committee. In 
September 1945 Attlee asked Bridges to develop an official machine to advise 
ministers on the most effective use of the nation's resources. The Official Steering 
Committee on Economic Development (E. D. Committee) was created, chaired by 
Bridges himself". It met irregularly2l even during periods of economic upheaval22. 
It brought together permanent secretaries from the key economic departments. The 
E. D. Committee oversaw five sub-committees23 covering investment, balance of 
payments, manpower, statistics, and economic development which was chaired 
by 
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James Meade, Director of the Economic Section24. Morrison also tried to keep in 
touch informally direct with officials involved in economic policy25. 
Morgan describes planning in what one might call the Morrison period of 
August 1945-March 1947, as "half-hearted, indirect and in many ways 
unsuccessful "26. It took economic crises to promote change27. Dow claims that only 
"'a limited amount of economic planning'was superimposed" by Morrison onto the ad 
hoc measures and financial controls that he saw as a priority28. Robert Hall, Director 
of the Economic Section from 1947, added that it was "very doubtful if Morrison 
could understand the long briefs we [the Economic Section] gave him"29. Nlichael 
Cunningham states that Morrison was unable to devote much time to planning, ' owing 
to his greater concern with nationalization" and his thrombosis in the first half of 
194731. By January 1947, as a result of this, the M. E. P. had become moribund32 and 
ministers' thoughts turned to reforming the system. 
The Creation of New Planning Bodies 
The failure to provide sufficient coal across the country to keep industry 
running during the fuel crisis of January to March 1947 exposed the need for a 
strengthened planning machine. March 1947 witnessed the beginning of what 
Cairricross perceives as a fresh attempt at economic planning33. Both Nicholson and 
Bridges subsequently put forward suggestions34 which Plowden and Caimcross now 
view as laying the pattern for the new planning machine35. In early 1947, with the fuel 
crisis still raging GEN 169, an ad hoe ministerial committee, chaired by Attlee and 
titled simply as a "Meeting of Ministers [sic]", was established to examine the 
structure of British planning. Ministers adopted Bridges's and Nicholson's suggestions 
and created the Central Economic Planning Staff (C. E. P. S. ) and the 
Economic 
Planning Board (E. P. B. )36. Being ill, Morrison was not present at the meetings. By 
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1948, however, changes initiated by GEN 169 had handed his planning responsibilities 
to the Treasury. 
Nicholson blamed the Caretaker Government for dismantling the wartime 
machinery at the national, regional and local level, believing this had overloaded 
ministries with detail. The "few loosely knit committees with practically no whole- 
time staff' had proved to be "completely inadequate". He called for a staff skilled in 
planning drawn from outside the Civil Service which itself had little spare capacity. 
Nicholson advocated reviving the inter-war Economic Advisory Council, which 
partially resembled the E. P. B., The Council had had twenty members including five 
ministers,, seven employers, three economists and two trades unionists, plus an 
economic staff. It was underfunded and met only between January 1930 - January 
193237. Nicholson's suggestions for the machine to stretch down to regional and 
district level were disregarded38. Similarly the model advocated in Parliament by the 
Labour backbencher, Ellis Smith, M. P. for Stoke-on-Trent and 1945-6 Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Trade, was ignored. Smith sought a national planning 
commission which would prepare five-year plans, co-ordinate their execution and 
allocate the necessary resources39. 
Public lectures discussing the planning machine given at the time by Sir John 
Anderson and Sir Oliver Franks are detailed in Chapter III. Anderson was an 
Independent M. P., inter-war Permanent Secretary at the Home Office and a wartime 
Lord President and Chancellor of the Exchequer; Franks was a former Permanent 
Secretary to the Ministry of Supply. In his May 1946 Romanes Lecture at Oxford, 
Anderson recommended the establishment of a body which should include experienced 
executives from industry who would advise the government on a part-time basis4o, an 
approach also suggested by Franks4l. Both Franks and Anderson opposed the 
creation of a small "Economic General Staff' with qualified officials 
free from 
departmental ties and under the general supervision of a non-departmental minister. 
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Franks believed such a unit would lack sufficient "levers of power" and would grow 
out of touch with industry and political life. In addition it would reduce initiative in 
the economic departments and lead to inevitable conflict between them. However, the 
appointment of Plowden as Chief Planning Officer did fulfil Franks's call for additional 
Second Secretaries to chair planning bodies42. Anderson presented his Stamp 
Memorial Lecture in Aprfl 1947 as an addendum to Franks's lectures. Despite having 
formerly advised against an Economic General Staff43 he welcomed the establishment 
of the C. E. P. S. which he saw as sensibly flexible allowing ininisterial control but 
preventing the Lord President becoming bogged down in detail. Anderson believed 
that the Government had finally leamt from wartime and immediate post-war 
experiences44. 
Cripps had long cherished the objective of an economic "general staff'. In the 
Economic Survey for 1947 he advocated: 
"an organization with enough knowledge and reliable information to 
assess our national resources and to formulate the national needs. "45 
this would be: 
"a central staff, working with representatives of the Govemment 
departments concerned, under an official Committee"46 
In fact the C. E. P. S. represented the "small permanent nucleus" planning body, without 
executive functions,, working closely with the Economic Section and the C. S. O. that 
had been suggested by (later Sir) John Maud, Secretary in the Office of the Lord 
PresidentV, as early as 194548. 
The Central Economic Planning Staff (C. E. P. S-ý 
On 27th March 1947, Attlee announced the appointment of Sir Edwin 
Plowden as Chief Planning Officer and the creation of the C. E. P. S., which Plowden 
was to head49. He held this post until 195350 with rank equivalent to a 
Second 
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Secretary of the Treasury5l. He had been brought back from industry to which he had 
returned after leaving his post as Chief Executive of the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production in 1946. Being only forty, Plowden was seen by some as young for the 
job52. Plowden's salary was L6,500 per year, compared to L5,000 for the Chancellor, 
0,750 for Bridges, Head of the Civil Service, and L2,000 for the Directors of the 
Economic Section and C. S. O., Robert Hall and Harry Campion, respectively53 
The C. E. P. S. lasted until 1956 when it was amalgamated into the Home and 
Overseas Planning Staff (RO. P. S. ) of the TreaSury54. It is possible to identify thirty- 
five people, the bulk of them civil servants, who were members of the C. E. P. S. at 
some time between 1947-5 1. At any one time there were no more than twenty-five to 
thirty members, sometimes as few as sixý5 . 
Most of the staff held senior 
administrative grades56. Mimicking wartime Civil Service practice, the C. E. P. S. 
seconded staff from other departments and from outside Whitehall. Its size and nature 
was similar to the Economic Section,, but without its college atmosphere, 57. Plowden 
already knew many of his staff from the war and chose them for their wartime planning 
experience, particularly in the ministries of Production and Aircraft Production. 
Others were recommended to him. Alfred Le Maitre, for example, was suggested by 
Sir John Woods, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade. Personal relationships 
were important for this small unit. Consequently, people Plowden felt he could not 
work with, such as Le Maitre, were soon transferred58. 
Staff brought from elsewhere within Whitehall included Douglas Allen (later 
Lord Croham) from the Board of Trade. He became Plowden's private secretary and, 
after 1949, an ordinary member of the staff'59. John Croome60 and Eric Roll came 
from the Ministry of Food6l; Kenneth Mackenzie from colonial finance in Kenya and 
Frank Turnbull from the India Office62. Le Maitre was recruited from the Admiralty 
and Frederick Smith from the Ministry of WorkS63. Both became 
division heads 
within the C. E. P. S., Alan I-litchman, who had been Ernest Bevin's Private 
Secretary at 
-29- 
the Ministry of Labour during the war, became the so-called Assistant to the Chief 
Planning Officer, that is Plowden's deputy, 1948-964. William Strath, a former 
Ministry of Aircraft Production official who joined the C. E. P. S. in 1947, was 
Hitchman's successor in the post, 1949-5565. 
The proportion of staff from outside the Civil Service was small. 7 
but 
important. Sir Robert Sinclair, Chairman of Imperial Tobacco, and former Chief 
Executive of the Ministry of Production, had been offered Plowden's post first. He 
declined it, but remained as Industrial Consultant66. Lord Croham states that his 
contributions soon faded out but that he was important in advising on the 
establishment of the E. P. B. 67. Plowdeds first deputy, Hugh Weeks, had previously 
been in the NEnistry of Production, but had gone to work for the chocolate company, 
J. S. Fry & SonS68. Neville Blond,, who had worked for his family's textile firm before 
the war, was lent to the C. E. P. S. by the Board of Trade69. The economist, Austin 
Robinson, as an official at the Board of Trade had been important to that department's 
interest in planning in 1945-6. He was summoned back from Cambridge University to 
work for the C. E. P. S.. He brought with him three young Cambridge economists-. 
Robin Marris and Kenneth Berrill., who had come top of their years, (Ber-rill with the 
L. S. E., then housed in Cambridge); and Patricia Brown who had studied under 
Robinson's wife, Joan70. None of the other academics,, nor the senior military or naval 
officers suggested for the C. E. P. S. were employed, possibly because Plowden did not 
have the personal connection with them that he so valued7l. 
Part of Plowden's success came from his ability to work well with people 
around him, especially Cripps and the permanent secretaries in the economic field: 
Bridges at the Treasury, Woods of the Board of Trade, Sir Godfrey Ince in the 
Ministry of Labour and Sir Archibald Rowlands at the Ministry of Supply. Plowden 
was also able to facilitate informal contacts for ministers with industry through the 
dinners he arranged. The Labour Government could rely on its informal contacts with 
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trade unionS72 but had a far less intimate relationship with business. Croham claims 
that there was tension between Plowden and Hugh Gaitskell as Chancellor. Gaitskell 
lacked the industrial background of Cripps, but as an economist he was keener to 
intervene in the day-to-day running of the C. E. P. S. 73. 
Nfiddlemas describes the C. E. P. S. as "an early think tank"74. However, its role 
was to provide information rather than to consider policy, a function left more to the 
Economic Section's discussion papers. The C. E. P. S. had its own tasks. For example, 
it produced the important paper on investment cuts in late 1947. However,, it also 
worked closely with other bodies, particularly the Economic Section and C. S. O.. 
Plowden emphasises the importance of his relationship with Hall, who became 
Director of the Economic Section soon after Plowden's appointment. Hall not only 
revived the Economic Section, which had been drifting badly since Meade had fallen ill 
early in 1947, but he also restored Plowden's faith in planning. As early as Autumn 
1947,, Plowden had felt the C. E. P. S. was being ignored and threatened to resign75. 
Croham states that at the regular meetings between them, Hall, as an economist, was 
able to influence Plowden's thinking on many crucial issues76. Hall,, however,, did not 
like all the members of the C. E. P. S.. He preferred Hitchman and Roll to Weeks and 
Robinson on a mixture of personal and ideological grounds77. 
The C. E. P. S. was divided into two or three main divisions. Initially there were 
three- Progressing and Planning, headed by Weeks; Progressing by Smith and General 
Administration and Co-ordination by Le Maitre78. Reflecting the move away from 
long-term plans to "'trouble shooting"' in late 1947, these were reorganized into two 
broad divisions, one each for overseas and domestic issues. When the C. E. P. S. 
formally joined the Treasury in January 1948, Weeksretained his post, but beside him 
was only Smith who now covered progressing, special investigations and raw material 
allocationS79. By 195 1, the organization had widened a little, with the Assistant to the 
Chief Planning Officer, equivalent to a Third Secretary in the Treasury, standing over 
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three divisions. Each of these was headed by an under secretary, with one or two 
assistant secretaries as their deputies, assigned to particular topics. Frank Turnbull's 
division handled raw materials, agriculture and investment; J. A. C. Robertson's dealt 
with overseas issues, the economic surveys, food, and import programmes and 
Edward Shillito's division tackled defence, productive capacity and manpower8o. 
Inter-departmental co-operation was at the heart of the C. E. P. S. 's work. 
Plowden chaired the Investment Programmes Comnfittee (I. P. C. ) and the Official 
Steering Committee on Economic Development Working Party. By 1950 he was 
deputy chairman of the Economic Steering Committee (E. S. C. ) of permanent 
secretaries. Moreover, he sat on the Official Coal Committee and the Government 
Organization Committee amongst others". Fhs three successive deputies, Weeks, 
Hitchman and Strath, had no fewer responsibilities than Plowden. The C. E. P. S. 
supplied information to the Budget Committee of high ranking officials involved in 
finance which made recommendations to the Chancellor on the Budget82. Bridges had 
recognised the difficulties in getting the Treasury to make its financial policy coincide 
with the needs of a plan and saw Plowden's membership of the Budget Committee as 
essential for the implementation of plans83. 
Almost all members of the C. E. P. S. sat on at least one inter-departmental 
committee. Alford el a] state that the C. E. P. S. "maintained an active representation" 
on all the committees with which they were involved84. They were associated with, 
amongst others, the Materials Committee, the Programmes Committee, the Food 
Distribution Committee, the Fuel Allocation Committee, the Import Diversion 
Committee,, the Productive Capacity Committee and the Raw Materials Committee. 
Thirteen members of the C. E. P. S. were secretaries of economic committees and sub- 
committees and formed the whole secretariat of the I. p. C. 
85. The C. E. P. S. supplied 
staff and the secretariat for the Economic Survey Working Party (E. S. W. P. ). This 
was an offshoot of the E. D. Committee which co-ordinated production of the annual 
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economic surveys and other similar reports and included the Directors of both the 
Economic Section and the C. S. 0.86 
At the time Allen claimed that there were "practically no aspects of economic 
policy in which the C. E. P. S. may not have an interest"87. Much of the C. E. P. S. 's 
function was to advise and co-ordinate; "virtually no work" was "done by the C. E. P. S. 
onitsown"88. Such activity, Plowden conceded in 1951,, meant that the C. E. P. S. had 
not been able to do much on long-term planning". He says now that most of its focus 
was on crisis management and analysing how the abrupt developments were affecting 
the economy90. Given Plowden's belief that recovery of the economy would make 
planning obsolete", he does not appear to have been hostile to the C. E. P. S. adopting 
a purely analytical role. As Chapter VI I shows, some C. E. P. S. members were 
transferred from domestic concerns into work for international bodies. From 1949, 
Rofl,, Robinson and others worked for the O. E. E. C. in pariS92. In 1951 Plowden and 
Roll became involved with N. A. T. O. 's planning for rearmament93. 
The C. E. P. S. was portrayed publicly as an interdepartmental body, even after it 
transferred into the Treasury94. However, by August 1948, officials described it as 
"not an interdepartmental organisation but part of the staff of the Chancellor"95. This 
was demonstrated when it refused to advise other ministries as this might undermine 
the Chancellor in Cabinet. Plowden now states that he was keen that the C. E. P. S. 
became a full part of the Civil Service machine and fully supported its integration into 
the Treasury96. Caimcross feels strongly that this was the correct move, believing that 
planning could not work effectively when separated from the Treasury. The 
amalgamation of planning and finance in 1948 gave "a coherence to the goverm-nent's 
planning that was previously lacking"97. While the C. E. P. S. became basically an 
advisory body to the Chancellor alone, the Economic Section continued to make 
information available to any department which required it98. 
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The C. E. P. S. 's main tasks were "administrative" and "supplementary" to that of 
economic departments. The unit oversaw co-ordination between departments on 
economic issues and prepared briefs for ministers and senior officials. Its work was 
usually tied to actual economic trends, rather than being speculative. There were 
issues on which the C. E. P. S. held a watching brief, such as the production and 
allocation of coal and manpower levels in the industry; timber, tourism, agricultural 
production, foods like eggs and rice, and financial issues such as wage and price 
policies". Some work was generated by short-term demands such as studying the 
potential for fuel from slurry and the conversion from coal to oil burning, between late 
1947 and mid-1948. Trade and inflation issues were highlighted by the convertibility 
crisis of 1947 and devaluation in 1949100. Other tasks included assessing the supplies 
of raw materials and manpower, the requirements of industry and general issues of 
national income and expenditurel". Work on the annual economic surveys involved 
many in the C. E. P. S. each winter from 1947 onwards102. The C. E. P. S. also provided 
material for briefings for one-off conferences such as the Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers! Conference and the Washington talks with the U. S. A. and Canada in 
1949103 
The investment programme was the main one which the C. E. P. S. was involved 
in administering rather than just giving advice. However, Plowden resisted Ministry of 
Labour and Board of Trade suggestions in 1950 that the C. E. P. S. should take a 
stronger r6le in this'04. He would not let it become an arbitration body for 
disagreements between different departments105. In fact,. the limits to the C. E. P. S. 's 
power in this field were revealed in disputes as early as 1947. Gaitskell, the Minister 
of Fuel and Power, felt that the C. E. P. S. had been taking decisions on investment in 
fuel that were his responsibility Unlike them he was accountable to Parliament 
for the 
approach adopted. This argument was accepted by the C. E. P. S. and the programme 
was reconsidered106. Similarly, following the convertibility crisis 
in August 1947,, 
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Weeks put forward a programme of sweeping cuts in consumption and the closure of 
factories to create a pool of labour as counter-measures to the loss of British 
reserveS107. This strong package angered Attlee and was droppedIO8. 
Despite such limitations, as early as 1948, the C. E. P. S. was designated as the 
centre of administration for industrial production in the next war, which was expected 
to be imminent. Officials were not eager to recreate the Ministry of Production and 
preferred to strengthen the peacetime inter-departmental system109. There was a 
desire within Whitehall that in the event of any war the Treasury should retain "central 
economic control - finance and materials",, rather than to fade into the background as it 
had done during the Second World War"O. Despite its supposed importance in such 
a structure, in October 1948 the C. E. P. S. was merely allocated an advisory position to 
the Joint War Production Staff (J. W. P. S. )II1 which was responsible to the Minister of 
Defence112. It was not until March 1950 that the C. E. P. S. had its own representative 
on the j. W. p. S. 113. Though the C. E. P. S. did scrutinize the armed forces' production 
programmes114, its main role in rearmament was to assess its impact on the domestic 
economy, in particular in terms of labour demands115. It also investigated where 
production for home consumption could be reduced to allow for increased 
manufacture for defence and export purposesI16. Most of the major statistical work 
was handled by the Ministries of Supply and Labour but the C. E. P. S. acted as a 
channel for explaining the demands of rearmament, as revealed by these figures, to 
117 industrialists 
The Egonomic Planning oard (E. P. B. ) 
The other main new development in Summer 1947 was the establishment of 
the E. P. B.. The idea took root in April 1947118, but the Board was not constituted 
until that July119. The E. P. B. stood beside the other larger tripartite bodies: the 
Nfinistry of Labour's wartime National Joint Advisory Council (N. J. A. C. ), which had 
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been reconstituted in 1946, and the Board of Trade's National Production Advisory 
Council on Industry (N. P. A. C. I. ), set up in 1939120. Despite some early attempts to 
bring all three bodies under a broader umbrella,, they remained separate and retained 
121 different memberships 
The E. P. B. 's stated objectives were to give advice on the realisation of a long- 
term economic plan and on remedial measures to counteract immediate problems122. 
One central aim was to transmit information to workers and employers directly from 
the Government. The E. P. B. was also supposed to act "as a support to ministers to 
get difficult and unpopular policies accepted"123. This was an important element for a 
government which relied heavily on exhortation to promote its planning policies. The 
C. E. P. S. expected that the E. P. B. would bring views based on the "practical 
experience on the board or on the bench" 124 to the Government's deliberations. 
Middlemas regards the E. P. B. as a "talking shop", Caimcross "a fifth wheel", 
but Plowden describes it as "an adjunct to policy making"125. Though the 
Government went directly to the Trades Union Congress (T. U. C. ) on issues such as 
wage restraint126, the E. P. B. did provide a channel for views on a range of policies 
including the Agricultural Expansion Programme, capital investment and the balance 
of payments127. The Federation of British Industries (F. B. 1) also submitted papers to 
128 
the Board, particularly on investment, animal feed and electricity consumption 
The E. P. B. discussed a wide range of issues, but particularly important were the 
economic surveys, the investment programme and the balance of payments129. Thus 
the Board provided an erratic commentary on the Government's approaches to the 
economy. 
The nature of the E. P. B. caused concern in Whitehall. Hall and Plowden 
agreed that: ýZ" :) 
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"The [Economic] Planning Board was really a new constitutional 
development and quite contrary to all Civil Service practice: 
however, it seemed that ministers had intended this. 11130 
It is not apparent from the files that ministers had intended this or that they had really 
thought out the E. P. B. 's position in government. Ministers attended the E. P. B. only 
very rarely which added to the E. P. B. 's anomalous position. Consequently Hall felt 
uncomfortable about it voicing criticisms: 
"--- [1] said I thought that we ought not to be discussing the failings 
of the Government with outsiders unless we had first told 
ministers. 11131 
However, Cripps made it clear that he was willing to allow the E. P. B. to continue 
132 even if it was critical of ministers 
Plowden. was the chairman of the Board until October 1953 and a member 
until 1960133. The other officials included the permanent secretaries of the ministries 
of Labour and Supply and the Board of Trade. Ince was very unhappy about the 
inclusion of such senior officials134. Initially Le Maitre, Stnith and Weeks attended, 
though C. E. P. S. membership declined as the number of other officials was 
increased135. 
The non-officials were nominated by the T. U. C. and jointly by the two 
employers' bodies: the F. B. I. and the British Employers' Confederation (B. E. C. )136. 
This contrasted with the N. J. A. C. which had only B. E. C. representatives and the 
N. P. A. C. I. included only F. B. I. ones. All the T. U. C. nominees were drawn from its 
the General Council. The first two nominated were Vincent Tewson, the T. U. C's 
General Secretary, and Jack Tanner, President of the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union. 137. The F. B. I. and the B. E. C. jointly nominated Sir Graham Cunningham, 
Chairman of Triplex Safety Glass, and W. Reginald Verdon Smith, a director of the 
Bristol Aeroplane Company. Both had worked with Plowden during the war138. 
Cunningham was to be the longest continually serving member of the E. P. B. 
139 sitting 
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on it from its conception until it was disbanded in 1962 following the creation of the 
National Economic Development Council (N. E. D. C. ) the previous year140. 
Pressure from the F. B. I. and B. E. C. led Morrison in June 1947 to increase 
employer and union representation to three eachl4l. Sir William Coates, a deputy 
director of I. C. I,,, was added for the employers142 and Andrew Naesmith of the 
Amalgamated Weavers' Association for the unions143. Coates resigned in June 1948 
but was not replaced until the following January when Sir Cuthbert Clegg, Chairman 
of the Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Association, was appointed144. Naesmith 
resigned in January 1949 and was replaced almost immediately by Lincoln Evans, 
General Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation145. Aside from Verdon 
Smith who was only thirty-four, Plowden, and Hall at forty-six, were the youngest 
leading members of the Board, most of whom were in their fiffies. Coates was sixty- 
fi 146 ve 
From Morrison's announcement of the formation of the E. P. B. in July 1947 
onwards there was regular pressure from M. P. s and interest groups to change the 
pattern of non-officials on the Board. Such pressure demonstrated how powerful the 
E. P. B. was perceived to be. There were demands to include representatives from the 
National Union of ManufacturerS147, small manufacturers148, agriculturaI149 and 
Scottish interests"O. boards of the nationalized industries151 and in particular, the 
Co-operative CongressI52, The constant response was that E. P. B. members attended 
in their own right rather than as representatives of any particular organization and that 
it was essential that the Board was kept smaII153. 
Individual official members were replaced as their jobs changed but Plowden 
also altered the membership to represent particular aspects of the economy. Hall was 
seriously included simply to prevent there being an "unlucky 13" memberS154. In 
September 1947, Sir Bernard Gilbert, Second Secretary to the Treasury, was added to 
introduce broader knowledge on finance and the balance of paymentS155. In August 
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195 1, Hitchman, by this time Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Materials, was 
156 brought in to reflect the demands of rearmament . The number of members 
remained at fifteen, as apart from Plowden, Strath was now the sole C. E. P. S. 
memberI57. The majority of the E. P. B. were officials. By 1951 the -ratio was three 
civil servants to two non-officials. The E. P. B. met fourteen times in the second half of 
1947, with ., 
sixteen times throughout 1948 and ten times each in 1949 and 1950,. 
meetings becoming more irregular and often cancelled because of members' other 
comrnitmentsl58 
There is no apparent evidence that the T. U. C. paid much attention to the 
E. P. B. 's work, though all the minutes and papers were kept meticulously159. T. U. C. 
representatives initially felt uncomfortable on a board without ministerial 
representation and wanted it to discuss policy as well as plans160. However, the 
Board's terms were accepted and leading trade unionists nominated. Given the 
T. U. C. 's larger representation on both N. J. A. C. and N. P. A. C. I. and the fact that 
ministers were happy to meet the T. U. C. 's General Council fairly regularly161 
involvement with the ERB. must have seemed margina1162 
Writing in November 1951 to the new Conservative Chancellor, R. A. Butler, 
Plowden described the E. P. B. as having provided useful economic and "politico- 
industrial" advice. He emphasised the importance of the T. U. C. link. Supplying 
leading trade unionists with information on the economy enabled them to pass on 
unpalatable facts to their members. In return there was the apparent psychological 
benefit of rank-and-file members feeling that their leadership was playing a part in 
shaping government policy. Plowden stated that the T. U, C. representatives and Ince 
163 
shared this view 
Plowden portrayed the link with the employers' associations as similar though 
to a lesser degree. While the B. E. C. appears to have given little consideration to the 
E. P. B. 's work, the F. B. I. 's important Home Economic Policy Committee saw 
it as a 
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useful channel for influencing governmental attitudes and putting forward industry's 
case'64. Verdon Sn-fith, who chaired the committee, said in 1949 that he believed the 
F. B. I. could feel satisfied with its representations through the E. P. B.. He felt that they 
had shaped that year's Budget, economic survey and especially the investment 
programme which industrialists saw as the most crucial part of planning. The F. B. I. 
felt the programme had now adopted the proper ranking with industrial investment 
ahead of social serviceS165. However, such a shift is not apparent from reading the 
survey itself. 
The F. B. I. believed that in planning the economy, the "maximum practical 
liberty must be allowed to the natural forces of economic self-adjustment". Its main 
criticism was that the Government's investment priorities kept changing. They had 
-C! - urst focused on a broad front of renewal, then specifically on housing, which was 
subsequently reduced. Additional demands such as for agricultural investment had 
followed. Planning had become "no more than an attempt to patch and repair the 
distribution of the national economy", a "policy of despair" which left industry as the 
11 residual legatee" 166. 
The F. B. I. attacked economic policies dear to Labour such as nationalization 
and the five-day working week167. They constantly called for the reduction of the 
"high and crippling" level of taxation and the "vast and menacing" amount of 
168 government expenditure Some leading F. B. I. members even felt that the 
Government was behaving unconstitutionally, threatening industry with legislation if it 
did not comply with policies such as Development Councils169. 
Sir Graham Cunningham was the most outspoken of the E. P. B. members and 
fl. 
faced dismissal from it for making negative comments about the Government's 
economic policies to the press in January 1948170 and November 1949171. In 1948 
Cripps defended the freedom of the E. P. B. members to express views different to the 
Government'S172. By late 1949, even he was angered by Cunningham's comments and 
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considered having him removed173. However,, within their own organization, the 
F. B. I. members of the E. P. B. were a voice of reason counter-balancing extreme 
colleagues. Cunningham tried to raise the quality of debate about the Government's 
policies by referring to secret papers that had been circulated at the E. P. B. revealing 
174 the true state of the economy 
An F. B. I. report on the E. P. B. was produced in June 1950. The Board was 
seen as a significant gesture by the Government and a phase in the evolution of 
planning by consent. The F. B. I. had had doubts whether it could succeed and had put 
the E. P. B. on three years' probation. The Federation was disappointed by the Board's 
limited remit, particularly as it did not discuss tax. The E. P. B. also had had to fit in 
with the Government's timetable. The report felt the Board just gave an industrial 
perspective to policy which was already under development. It did consider that the 
E. P. B. was "at least a useful equivalent in the economic field to the N. J. A. C. and the 
N. P. A. C. 1.11. It was seen as especially important in promoting the claims of 
manufacturing industry against those of social services, pressing for decontrol and 
allowing industrialists to study the O. E. E. C. 's work. The F. B. I. felt it had had many of 
its recommendations accepted yet it believed that the E. P. B, 's "most significant 
achievements" were that the early "high hopes" had failed. This was satisfactory as it 
left planning "to be solved by those with more experience and knowledge of the 
problems with which they are coping in their day-to-day contact with the affairs of the 
175 moment", that is industrialists 
Private F. B. I. support for the E. P. B. did not prevent employers complaining at 
its ineffectuality. The limits to the E. P. B. 's powers became apparent in August 1947 
following the convertibility crisis. The Board felt that the Cabinet's proposals for 
tackling the deteriorating balance of payments were grievously insufficient. The 
E. P. B. cited Morrison's statement that they would be involved in suggesting remedial 
solutions to current crises and felt this was a suitable opportunity. 
Plowden wrote that 
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such a contribution was impossible unless the E. P. B. sat almost continuously as a 
Cabinet sub-committeel76. This statement implied that the E. P. B. 's scope could not 
stretch beyond the "'set-pieces"' such as the economic surveys. By 1948 Plowden had 
recognised that the ERB. would not live up to the original expectations and only a 
purely official committee could properly consider the "semi-technicalities" of many of 
177 the economic issues 
The employers made further complaints about the E. P. B. 's impotence in early 
1950. The three employer representatives told Plowden that the Board had made no 
worthwhile contribution throughout 1949. They particularly noted that the question 
of devaluation had not been brought to the E. P. B., though this was unsurprising given 
the degree of secrecy surrounding the issue. They felt, quite accurately, that the 
Government paid little attention to the Board's recommendations. The standard 
Cabinet Office-style minutes did not reveal their dissent clearly. To them, Plowden 
seemed only to want approval for the documents presented to the Board, rather than 
being wiffing to countenance amendmentsl78. 
Plowden, eager to avoid resignations close to the election, emphasised how 
important the Board had been in influencing policy, for example in preventing some 
cuts in dollar imports the Government had planned for and in having the 1949 and 
1950 surveys re-written. Both Plowden and Bridges highlighted the Board's 
importance in transmitting the economic message to the trade unions179,, a useful 
channel which would be lost if the E. P. B. was dissolved. The officials overstated the 
case given the Government's other trade union links, but the employers were placated 
and agreed to continue with the Board"O. 
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1he Economic Planning (Official) Committee E. P. (O-)C-) 
Ideas for strengthening the planning machine were not restricted to the 
creation of the C. E. P. S, and E. P. B.. Cripps also wanted to reinforce planning in the 
economic departments themselves181. Nicholson envisaged re-introducing chief 
executives on the wartime model, assisted by two or three "henchmen'% to work on 
allocations, priorities and programmes and to relieve the burden of permanent 
secretaries,, especially at the Board of Trade and the ministries of Fuel and Power, 
Labour and Suppl y 182. Bridges was sympathetic to the scheme18-3. However, the 
departmental planning staffs which were announced in Parliament by Cripps in March 
1947 and referred to by Attlee the following month184 were never formed, probably as 
they lacked a clear role and enough officials with the fight skills. Consequently the 
planning liaison groups within the Board of Trade and ministries of Fuel and Power 
and of Food soon faded185. 
The other innovation for strengthening planning at a departmental level was 
E. P. (O. )C. 186, which probably would have acted like the E. D. Committee, but just 
tied to planning. The committee, chaired by Plowden and including Weeks, Blond and 
Le Maitre from the C. E. P. S., met four times between May and October 1947. It 
brought together officials from the Admiralty, Board of Trade, Lord President's Office 
and ministries of Fuel and Power,. Health, Labour, Supply, Transport and Works. It 
was to consider both the long-term plan and immediate remedial measures187. Other 
officials and a representative of the Iron and Steel Federation were co-opted and its 
main October meeting had twenty-four members188. It covered practical planning 
issues such as the level of priority for the transport of various goods and materials and 
the consequences of increasing the length of the working week189. The last meeting 
was an informal one in late October. By April 1948, officials admitted that E. P. (O. )C. 
had ceased operation190, but Plowden was keen for this to be kept secret from 
M. P. 091. Richard Barker suggests that the committee's problem was that Whitehall 
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was unused to the level of co-ordination that its structure implied192. E. P. (O. )C. 
probably failed as it almost duplicated the E. D. Committee,, but with lower ranking 
staff and little power to make decisions. Its work could be done as well by the 
Economic Section or C. E. P. S. or through ad hoc official meetings. 
Further Changes in 1947 
As 1947 progressed Nicholson felt that the Lord President's responsibilities 
had become too extensive,, especially as he had no ministry under him, Aside from 
being Deputy Prime Nfinister and Leader of the House of Commons, his portfolio 
included general scientific and information policy, plus the wide scope of the 
L. P. C. 193. His remit had swollen with the addition of the C. E. P. S. and in April, of the 
E. I. U. 194. As early as February 1947, during Morrison's illness, Hilary Marquand, the 
Paymaster-General, had effectively become his deputy. He was added to the 
L. P. C. 195 and was charged with overseeing econon-& planning, a subject which 
interested him196. Marquand was to see drafts of plans prepared by the E. D. 
Committee at an early stage. However, he never enjoyed the status of the Lord 
President197,, for example, in relation to the C. S. O., the Economic Section or the E. D. 
Committee's sub-committees198. Senior Treasury officials, like Bridges and Leslie 
Rowan, preferred Marquand's confinement to specific tasks199. By Summer 1947, the 
Paymaster-General's involvement in planning was rendered redundant by the 
appointment of the Chief Planning Officer2OO. 
The increased economic burden on the Lord President, exacerbated by the 
failure of convertibility, led to the creation of two new ministerial conunittees in 
October 1947: the Economic Policy Committee (E. P. C. ) and the Production 
Committee. The E. P. C., originally entitled the Economic Planning Committee201,. was 
the "most important in the system,, 202. Its task was to discuss economic policy below 
Cabinet level203. It covered topics such as Marshall Aid, devaluation, full employment 
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and the economic consequences of rearmament. Attlee intervened to preserve the 
L. P. C. 204. Stripped of its economic concerns, the committee focused on other 
domestic issues and took over the work of the Social Services Committee and the 
205 Land Usage Committee 
The Lord President still sat on the E. P. C. but was joined for the first time on 
an economic committee by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary reflecting a 
concern, particularly after the convertibility crisis206,, for trade and overseas financial 
issues as well as domestic economic ones. The E. P. C. superseded both the Committee 
on Overseas Economic Policy'207 and M. E. P.. During the Korean War, the Nfinister of 
Defence was added208. 
As Kenneth Harris notes, for Attlee "sometimes the minister's personality 
would outweigh the secondary importance of their job" when assembling 
committeeS209. For example he kept the President of the Board of Trade, Harold 
Wilson, and Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Phillip Noel-Baker, off 
the E. P. C. so he could include the Lord Presideq, Morrison and Lord Privy Seal,, now 
Lord Addison210. Attlee had worked closely with Addison in the 1930s, and believed 
he represented the "model of how ministers should behave"211. Wilson was co-opted 
on to most E. P. C. meetings and was added to its membership, along with Gaitskell, 
the new Minister of State for Economic Affairs, in March 1950212. Later Attlee 
adjusted the E. P. C. 's membership to retain Dalton213 and Bevan214 on the committee 
when they changed posts in 1950 and 195 1, respectively. The E. P. C. received reports 
directly from the C. E. P. S. and from the Official Committee on Economic 
Development (E. D. Committee), which dropped "steering" from its title in November 
1947215. 
The Production Committee was to be chaired by Cripps as Minister for 
Economic Affairs, subsequently as Chancellor, and included ministers from all the 
production departments. Attlee effectively gave it the L. P. C. 's economic portfolio. Its 
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focus was on production programmes for exports and the domestic market, plus all 
questions of internal economic poliCy216. Later the First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
Paymaster-Genera1217 and Minister for Civil Aviation218 were added. Douglas Jay 
claims that the Production Committee was where "the real work was done"219. Its 
scope was broad and covered issues such as food, coal, oil, power stations and 
housing220. Despite Cripps keeping discussion to a minimum,, disputes between 
ministers on such vital programmes now occurred at its meetings rather than in 
Cabinet as previously221. 
The final changes in 1947 came from the creation of two new posts - the 
Nfinister for Economic Affairs and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. The 
former arose as a result of Attlee's attempts to stem Cripps's burgeoning ambition 
rather than to create an effective new planning element. Morgan states that in the fight 
of the convertibility crisis, Cripps and Morrison had been critical of what they saw as 
Attlee's lack of drive on increasing dollar 'exports and believed that Bevin was a 
feasible replacement. Cripps was active in pushing for Attlee's removal, but Bevin 
remained loyal. Cripps was bought off with the post of Minister for Economic Affairs, 
announced at the end of September 1947. Harold Wilson, at thirty-one, the youngest 
222 Cabinet minister, replaced him as President of the Board of Trade Attlee 
emphasised to Wilson that with the existence of the Minister for Economic Affairs, he 
223 
would not have the status that Cripps had held as President 
Though never voiced, in theory Cripps would have become overlord above 
both Morrison and Dalton, the Chancellor224. This would have satisfied an 
enthusiasm of Cripps's since the early post-war days - to create a real economic and 
industrial department. If this had been fully realised it would have represented the 
most radical alteration to the machine since the war. The experiment was short-lived 
as in November., six weeks after Cripps's appointment, Dalton resigned because he 
had 
leaked Budget details to a journalist before outlining them in Parliament. Cripps 
-46- 
succeeded him, merging his own Post with that of Chancellor225- This gave little time 
for tensions to develop between the Treasury and the Office for Economic Affairs. 
In fact, writing in 1962 Dalton shows that he was supportive of these changes in 
government machinery. He perceived the development of a partnership between the 
two ministers: 
... I strongly urged Attlee to insist, with Morrison, on Cripps 
becoming Minister of Production, offering my firm and harmonious 
co-operation with Cripps on our new joint field. ' This was in fact 
the field to which Cripps succeeded, when I resigned from the 
Treasury in November. "226 
In his post as Nfinister for Economic Affairs, the C. E. P. S. and E. I. U. came 
under Cripps's direct control. The Economic Section and C. S. O. remained nominally 
part of the Cabinet Office, as they had when under the Lord President. From 
September 1947 they were responsible first to the Minister for Economic Affairs and 
subsequently the Chancellor. Though they remained outside it until 1953, Dow claims 
that they were part of the Treasury in "all but name"227, All of these were small units 
and without executive powers. The minister was far from being the "'economic 
dictator"' some had feared. Like the Lord President before him, the Nfinister for 
Economic Affairs had the Paymaster-General, Marquand, as deputy228 and only a 
small office of his own. The Permanent Secretary of the Office for Economic Affairs 
was Leslie Rowan229,, but with the amalgamation into the Treasury, he returned to 
Second Secretary rank230. The Office did include responsibility for N. P. A. C. I. and 
Regional Boards for Industry which Cripps brought from the Board of Trade231. 
The new minister's membership of Cabinet Committees was an important 
aspect of his increased powers. In most cases, however, Cripps was not appointed to 
anything he would not have sat on had he remained President of the Board of Trade. 
He was appointed to the E. P. C., in addition to Dalton. Cripps was to chair the 
Production Committee, which also included the Chancellor, though he was expected 
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be represented by the Financial Secretary, William Glenvil Hall. The Materials and 
Fuel Allocations Committees were brought under the auspices of the Minister for 
Economic Affairs, with Marquand replacing Gaitskell, still Minister of Fuel and 
Power, as their chairman232. Cripps joined the Defence Committee. He was also on 
the Manpower Sub-committee, now under the Production Committee, which did not 
233 include the Chancellor 
With the Chancellor still in charge of the Budget, it is difficult to envisage 
clearly Cripps's supposed role. If one considers the powers he received, it is apparent 
that his department represented neither a rival to the Treasury nor a reconstitution of 
the Ministry of Production. Attlee explained this in Parliament by referring to the fact 
that the state's concern in the economy impinged on so many departments that no one 
minister could oversee such a broad portfolio. However, he suggested that it would 
be constitutionally difficult for departments to surrender sovereignty to an economic 
overlord. Consequently, the position would be one of co-ordination, ensuring that all 
234 the diverse agencies were working towards economic recovery 
Plowden claims that by amalgamating the posts of the Minster for Economic 
Affairs and Chancellor in November 1947,, Cripps became "the first of the modem 
chancellors" 235. The Chancellor now took explicit responsibility for the economic as 
well as financial aspects of goverm-nent policy236. The status of President of the 
Board of Trade was also restored237. To assist the Chancellor, in mid-December, 
Douglas Jay, was made the Economic Secretary, with a new division within the 
Treasury. The E. I. U. and C. E. P. S. were transferred into this in January 1948238. By 
1950 the E. I. U. had simply become the Information Division of the TreasUry239. The 
Economic Secretary was to be concerned with general economic policy including 
planning, but also Treasury supply work and overseas financial negotiations240. He 
replaced the Paymaster-General on a number of committees such as the Production 
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Comn-fittee and Information Services Committees, ' and the Chancellor on the Overseas 
241 Reconstruction Committee 
Jay felt himself to be the second junior at the Treasury, after the Financial 
Secretary, Glenvil Hall, both below the Parliamentary Secretary and Chief Whip, 
William Whiteley. Jay replaced Glenvil Hall in February 1950242. Jay knew Plowden 
from before the war and Robert Hall from the wartime Ministry of Supply. Hitchman 
had been Jay's closest Ministry of Labour contact. This allowed a "harmonious 
partnership" between the new minister and the planners, perpetuating the characteristic 
personal links243. 
With Cripps's appointment as Chancellor, Middlemas has stated: 
"[flrom. 1948 one can date the emergence of the Treasury as a 
citadel ... without a 
direct sponsorship of responsibility for anything 
but the financial sector, [it] took an overarching interest in seeing 
that other sponsors did their job ... 
11244 
It cannot be disputed that the Treasury was recovering its inter-war strength, which 
was natural given the return to greater economic normality. These changes certainly 
ended any rivalry to its supremacy in the economic field. Until 1948, the Treasury had 
been keen to keep economic planning separate from general economic policy245. Now 
with the Treasury's concern for finance rather than production, bringing planning 
under its control was liable to lead to the greater use of fiscal tools. This began with 
Dalton's November 1947 Budget, but the move towards Keynesianism was certainly 
pursued by Cripps246, Some officials felt uneasy at the power which had accrued to 
the Treasury but Woods wrote from the Board of Trade to the Cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Norman Brook,. that the "historical accidents" that had made the Treasury the leading 
economic department had to be accepted247. 
Despite all the changes, the basic structure of the planning machine had not 
been disturbed. The C. E. P. S. 's work rarely touched on long-term plans and much of 
its co-ordination work could have been handled by the Cabinet Office or the 
Economic 
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Section. By absorbing the new elements of the machine, the Treasury helped to 
reassert its own pre-eminence. The creation of the Economic Secretary also reflected 
its broader scope, but this was a natural development from the greater involvement of 
the state in the economy. 
Post- 1947 
Following the reorganization of 1947, further changes in the administration of 
economic affairs minimally affected those involved in planning. The changes were 
intended to make the flow of information more effective, rather than to alter the 
relationship between the different elements of the planning machine. Though the 
C. E. P. S. 's identity was gradually dissolving into the Treasury, it worked on the same 
types of tasks, such as preparation of the annual economic surveys. The E. P. B. 
continued as before. In May 1949, a Working Group of the E. D. Committee was 
established under Plowden's chairmanship. This was a smaller body to tackle issues 
which did not need the full committee248. The E. D. Committee, consisting of so many 
high level civil servants, no doubt found meetings difficult to arrange. 
After only eighteen months as Chancellor, Cripps fell ill. As a result, Hugh 
Gaitskell became Minister of State for Economic Affairs in March 1950, so-called 
"Vice-Chancellor of the Exchequer"249. Initially Gaitskell's focus was on the external 
economic position, but his scope grew until he became Chancellor on Cripps's 
retirement in October 1950250. The Minister of State effectively superseded the 
Economic Secretary. However, on Gaitskell's promotion to Chancellor, the post of 
Economic Secretary was restored and given to John Edwards251. October 1950 saw 
the final re-organization of the economic planning machine under Labour, in response 
to the Korean War. The consequent rearmament programme and the sharp rise in 
prices, especially of raw materials, had a great impact on the British economy. 
The 
E. D. Committee and its Working Group were dissolved and effectively reconstituted 
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as the Economic Steering Committee (E. S. C. ). Alford et al see the E. S. C. as more 
active than its predecessors. It met weekly rather than irregularly as the E. D. 
Committee had done252. Bridges was its chairman, Plowden his deputy. It took 
reports, not only from the economic departments, but also from the Foreign and 
Cabinet offices and the Ministry of Defence253. Yet again this did not deviate from 
the established pattern. The existing machine was made a little more effective at 
tackling the immediate issues. By now, as Chapter VI shows, Britain's receipt of 
Marshall Aid was coming to an end and along with it the impetus for long-term 
planning. 
Conclusions 
The failure to create a strong planning machine at the centre of government 
1945-51 reflects the re-assertion of the Treasury's ascendancy, and a recognition of the 
new scope of governmental involvement in the peacetime economy. It is clear that 
such planning bodies which existed were preoccupied by short-term issues rather than 
long-term planning. Barnett highlights what he terms the "'elephantiasis"' of Cabinet 
committees and sub-committees under the Attlee Governments. He suggests that 
these often overlapped254. It is clear that the planners were involved in numerous 
inter-departmental committees, but with clear intentions and powers this should not 
have been an obstacle. Such conuifittees, in general, handled their particular spheres 
effectively enough. 
Barnett also complains that decisions were centralised leaving committees 
below Cabinet or senior ministerial level only with the role of passing information 
255 
upwards through the chain and administering the minutiae of economic controls 
Given the traditions of Whitehall it is unsurprising to see a lack of initiative away from 
the Cabinet. Though the economic planning machine was comparatively 
straightforward, it did suffer from a lack of clear guidance on what planning should 
-51- 
involve. In addition,, there was no department to carry out plans or effectively 
co-ordinate between the different ministries, - especially all of those which "sponsored" 
industries. The range of such ministries led to what Barnett terms f1many-headed 
collective responsibility"256. Given all these circumstances,, the planners could be little 
more than analysts. 
A planning department would have been a huge concern and it appears that the 
Treasury was the only department that had the reach and influence to achieve such a 
position. It is unsurprising that Bridges opposed the revival of a Ministry of 
Production. It had been abolished very quickly at the end of the war, whilst other 
wartime creations such as the Ministry of Supply remained. Only a true Ministry of 
Production, encompassing much of the Board of Trade and Nfinistry of Supply plus all 
the planning elements and possessing both a strong minister and permanent secretary 
could have even approached the machinery necessary to plan the economy effectively. 
Such a body, however, would have created intolerable ffiction within Whitehall. Yet, 
despite all the rhetoric of planning, the Government failed to do more than make small 
changes to bodies which themselves were aimed more at immediate problems than the 
long-term. This apparently confirms David Marquand's view of the lack of a 
"developmental state" in Britain able to adapt to changed circumstances. 
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ChaDter III 
Debates on the Philosolft of Planning 
Introduction 
Chapter I demonstrated that the lack of agreement on what it actually meant to 
plan the economy was a key problem. This chapter will focus on the views of the 
ministers and officials working in the planning machine. Despite the range of opinions, 
no-one at ministerial or senior official level arbitrated or determined which particular 
type of planning would be pursued. Much of the debate revolved around what powers 
it was possible to use to implement a plan, a theme covered in Chapter IV. 
The Philosopk, f- Plannin ya 
Correlli Barnett states that there was a "continuing theoretical debate about the 
'economy' and how best to 'manage' it"1. It does appear that those involved in 
planning spent much time philosophising about it and the structure of the planning 
machine2. Barnett condemns these exercises as "academic" and "bulky" with only 
"broad objectives"3 and there certainly were numerous sweeping statements of grand 
strategy rather than practical ideas. 
Speculation on economic planning among officials began in the latter months 
of 1945, stimulated by election promises. The completion of the first economic survey 
in January 1946 encouraged discussion about what was possible now that such 
statistics were available. In Spring 1947 following the fuel crisis debate surrounded 
what the new institutions, the C. E. P. S. and the E. P. B., should be doing to 
"strengthen" planning. Discussion became most heated between Autumn 1947 and 
December 1949. Arguments on planning flared up between the most intense periods 
of work for the planning officials. Debate faded when the C. E. P. 
S. was tackling 
investment cuts in Winter 19474 and the Long-Term Programme 
in late 19485. 
Discussion of planning was a "luxury" which could only be pursued when time was 
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available. No clear decisions were reached. Instead there was a long series of hard- 
hitting but ultimately hollow words. Many of the difficulties of economic planning 
were recognised at an early stage but remained unresolved. Examples come from the 
concerns of James Meade in Autumn 1945 about the inability to direct labour and the 
obstacles to planning in detail6; from Christopher Mayhew, then Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to the Lord President's Office, who worried about the lack of effective 
controls over private investment; and from Christopher Saunders of the Ministry of 
Labour who focused on the question of wage control at the start of 19467. 
Herbert Morrison was the axis around which many of the early discussions, 
guided by Bridges, revolved. With the appointment of Plowden debate became 
centred on him. In 1945-6, Meade was pressing for a coherent policy of economic 
plannine. Throughout one can also see the continuing involvement of Cripps, and at 
times,, Austin Robinson,. though neither man found any solutions to the difficulties of 
planning. As Tiratsoo and Tomlinson show,, Cripps, even as President of the Board of 
Trade,, was interested in economic planning and improving the efficiency of British 
industry through state intervention9. Cripps contributed to the planning discussions at 
L. P. (I. ) Conm-littee meetings from October 1945 onwards. He also commented on 
memoranda which theorized about planning". Robinson, then under Cripps at the 
Board of Trade was similarly involved in the discussions of these early months and 
contributed to the E. S. W. P. 's deliberationsil. 
Economic planning had featured as a key policy in Labour's For Socialism and 
PeN of 1934 and Labour's, Immediate Pla published in 193712. 
However, the 
Labour Party's wartime policy document produced in October 1943, Full EmplQyment 
i I]cial Policy despite advocating the retention of wartime controls also aimed 
to 
use investment and a steady level of purchasing power to maintain 
full employment, a 
more Keynesian approach to the 
issue. Members of the Labour Party felt the 
document was too close to Coalition policies and 
from Septembr 1944 Dalton set 
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about re-working it to become a potential election manifesto. Stephen Brooke claims 
that the actual manifesto, Let Us Em the Future broke from the coalition consensus 
and included a specific commitment to strict economic controls,, a nationalized sector 
and economic planning. The war had separated the issues of economic control and 
ownership allowing the post-war manifesto to have a different perspective on 
econornic planning, one which engaged with privately-owned industry, which 
distinguished it from its inter-war predecessors13. 
Planning had not been discussed in Whitehall during the war as a policy option 
for the post-war economy14. Consequently Let Us Face the Future was a focus for 
debate15. The manifesto contained more references to planning than to the welfare 
state,. housing or social policies which were covered only in the last third of the 
document. It implied that a planned "industrial programme" would underpin these 
other ob ectives. The manifesto anticipated a repeat of the quick boom and slump 
which had followed the Great War. The blame for these economic problems was 
placed on "private monopolies", the "Czars of Big Business" and the "profiteers and 
racketeers" who were keen for decontrol. Controls provided "fair shares" and order 
16 
ngainst the "do-as-they-please anarchy" of the free market ZD 
The manifesto stressed the need for "modernization and re-equipment" across 
the economy, to be achieved by "drastic policies of replanning and by keeping a firm 
constructive hand on our whole productive machinery". Labour would give "an 
appropriate place to constructive enterprise and private endeavour in the national 
plan" but would take steps against "the sectional interests of private business"17. 
Perceptively, the manifesto predicted that full employment depended on how far 
private and public investment and development promoted a healthy economy. 
However, looking back to the inter-war Depression rather than the state-industry co- 
operation of wartime, the manifesto envisaged a conflict with 
big business, This 
demonstrated Labour's lack of ideas of how it was going to work with industry18. 
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The maintenance of full employment, the manifesto suggested, needed- the 
fullest usage of all national resources; a high, constant level of purchasing power; a 
nationalized Bank of England and planned investment, including a National investment 
Board". These points were reinforced by seven further objectives of the so-called 
"industrial programme" including nationalizations, anti-monopoly and anti-cartel 
legislation, an efficient Civil Service, but also a "firm and clear-cut programme for the 
export trade" and the use of "suitable economic and price controls, 120. The references 
to controls were mixed in with Keynesian- sounding policies implying they could co- 
exist. Though the manifesto made economic planning a central policy element it gave 
only sketchy outlines of how this would be managed. The discussions covered in this 
chapter represented the attempts to elaborate upon this picture. 
In the early days after the war organizational questions came before the 
"philosophical" ones. As seen above, by October 1945, new planning committees had 
been established and thought was soon being given to what their tasks would entail. 
The debate was overseen by Bridges with suggestions coming from James Meade, 
AN Coleridge, a Board of Trade official, and John Maud and Martin Flett, both in 
the Lord President's Office. From the start the planning focus was to be on national 
"resources" encompassing raw materials, labour and capital. Maud referred to 
Cripps's call for: 
"... the working out of a national plan, in the sense that it is necessary 
to decide how much of our resources should be devoted to 
consumption goods, the export trade, capital goods and so forth. "21 
This established an enduring preoccupation with surveying what resources were 
available. Coleridge22 and Meade wrote of the need for an economic survey 
before 
planning could begin23 . 
The belief that a comprehensive survey had to come first 
delayed proper consideration of how planning would be implemented once the 
necessary information had been assembled. 
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Meade's views were important in shaping opinions about the form British 
planning should take. As early as November 1944 he was keen to promote his so- 
called "middle way" or Tiberal- Socialist" approach to the economy24. Meade was a 
disciple of Maynard KeyneS25 and Meade's Liberal- Socialism was a Keynesian 
"thermostatic" approach to the economy26. Meade felt state intervention should be 
restricted to fiscal and financial tools to promote a strong economy, in particular to 
maintain demand. The state should encourage industrial efficiency, run natural 
monopolies and redistribute income through social services and the tax system. 
Everything else should be left for the market27. Meade strongly disliked "Gosplanites" 
who believed "in quantitative planning of the economy commodity by commodity. " 
and "planning the real resources"28. He wrongly included Cripps and Robinson 
among them". Meade perceived quickly that there were going to be "different main 
meanings" given to "Socialist economic planning". He felt "a Gosplan" would mean 
"losing freedom of choice of consumers and workers as to what they will consume and 
what they will work at"30. Meade was also wary, however, of senior Treasury 
officials like Sir Wilfrid Eady, who appeared unenthusiastic about an increased state 
role in the economy3l. 
In October 1945 Meade produced a key memorandum, "Economic 
Planning"32,. which was circulated among officials and informed Bridges's own 
memorandum to Morrison on planning33. Meade saw planning as a tool to ensure full 
employment by predicting and combating inflation or deflation. He believed it would 
prove easier to manage specific industries' problems if the overall level of supply and 
demand was balanced. 34 His memorandum emphasised macro-level planning, 
but it 
also outlined the main elements of economic planning which were to be 
discussed for 
the next six years. 
For Meade, the first stage in planning was an economic survey, the second the 
adoption of an economic policy in the light of that survey. His concern was with 
the 
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gap between the natioWs resources and the demands put upon them. This emphasis 
came from the wartime experience and the belief that the transition period would be 
one of shortages. Meade believed controls would be necessary to prevent the 
expected inflationary pressure but recognised the limits to such controls, both in terms 
of flexibility, public freedom and consumer choice. In peacetime there had to be a 
regard for prices. Even at this stage Meade perceived that government expenditure, 
private investment and the balance of payments were going to be the key determinants 
of the economy of the post-war period. Meade believed it was possible to forecast 
over a five-year period though he acknowledged that the level of accuracy would fall 
the further one looked ahead35. Meade's paper stimulated work on the economic 
survey36. The type of information Meade had called for in his memorandum was soon 
becoming available37. In January 1946 Meade oversaw the preparation of four papers 
provided for Nicholson and Morrison: 38 by Christopher Saunders of the Ministry of 
Labour, Jack Stafford of the C. S. O., Robinson of the Board of Trade and Ronald 
Tress of the Economic Section". 
Saunders recognised that planning would impact on his own department in 
terms of labour mobility, training and Development Areas and raised the issue of 
unemployment. For Saunders planning was about managing demand. He believed 
that surveys would make it possible to see which industries would need increased or 
decreased demand and he suggested shorter-term, industry-specific surveys to 
supplement the overall ones. Saunders felt that if unemployment was too low it would 
mean tougher controls, as wages and prices could not respond fast enough to changed 
demand40. 
Stafford, a C. S. O. statistician since 1941, put forward a model with a high 
degree of state intervention. He wrote that to plan for five years ahead one 
had to be 
certain of what were the desired goals for society and the economy. He made seven 
suggestions for objectives including an adequate housing programme, a good standard 
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of nutrition, full employment, the re-equipment of heavy industry, price stability, a 
balance of payments surplus and a falling level of taxation. Once such objectives had 
been established then the national income and in turn the necessary level of 
productivity, wage rates, work hours, and unemployment to achieve such goals could 
be calculated. Forecasts of investment and demand could also be added to this 
"econon-fic nexus". As the year in question approached planning would increasingly 
focus on individual industries, - their 
location and demand for their products" 
Despite Meade's view of him, Robinson believed planning should be less 
"hands on" than Stafford. Robinson felt that "the main purpose of planning" was "to 
foresee the problems - more particularly of surplus and deficit" and "provide such 
remedies as are possible by administrative and budgetary action and by control of 
investment more quickly than would happen through the ordinary operations of the 
price mechanism"42. Robinson made no mention of full employment. For him, the 
aim was to remove controls,, thus restoring consumer choice and yet "to pedect rather 
than o12Dose the operations of an ideally functioning market". Any redistribution of 
wealth had to be through the welfare state and not by tampering with the market. 
f-D",. U-binson brought a practical slant to suggestions by colleagues, for example 
concerning a review of national income, control of investment and the balance of 
payments. He indicated potential difficulties like statistical error and felt that the 
concentration on the surveys detracted from longer-term planning. For Robinson, 
because of the delayed impact of fiscal changes, planning had to be for three or more 
years ahead, As Caimcross notes, Robinson focused on the major, predictable 
changes ahead, and upon the need for the government to "short circuit" the market 
in 
reaching the solution43. 
Tress's concern was with acquiring information rather than action. He believed 
planning would be hampered by a lack of certain data. He saw the 
balance of national 
income and expenditure as central to planning but acknowledged the need 
for some 
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detailed investigations into various sectors of the economy, despite being vulnerable to 
inaccuracy, especially in a time of transition. Once demand had been properly gauged 
within particular sectors, it could be translated into estimates of labour and raw 
material requirements and allow the Government to predict shortfalIS44. 
With the start of work on the second survey in 1946, discussions on planning 
withered45. However, five months after Anderson's lecture of May 194646 Morrison 
himself addressed the Institute of Public Administration on the Government's 
philosophy of planning. A verbatim copy of his speech was circulated to the E. D. 
Committee47- Acknowledging that it was written for public consumption, it was 
surprisingly tentative and suggested that despite the debate in official circles since the 
war governmental thinking on planning had barely advanced. 
To Morrison Britain was "the first great nation" to plan, combining "economic 
and social planning" with "a full measure" of individual freedom. He emphasized that 
British planning was still at an "experimental" stage but outlined five stages it should 
take. The first step was "making up one's mind to plan and grasping what planning 
means". Then forecasts had to be compiled after which planners would devise 
alternative plans and consider what each offered. Decision had to be made between 
the plans and on what to plan and "what to leave unplanned". Finally there was 
implementation. Like Cripps, Morrison defined planning as "deliberately using the 
main available national resources,, in the endeavour to secure the good of the nation as 
a whole". The onus was on ministers to plan and plan correctly or face censure. This 
revealed the prevailing phobia of planners that they would suffer if the public was 
disappointed by the process48. 
Morrison believed that the Government now had the right economic 
information. The current figures allowed "statistical floodlighting" of the economy 
illuminating the correct decisions that had to be made, for example between exporting 
or retaining shirts or turbo generators. Prophetically Morrison suggested that a 
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shortage of miners could lead to factories closing, predicting, possibly unwittingly, the 
crisis which Britain faced a couple of months later49. 
Morrison's suggested tools for planning had a strong Keynesian element. They 
included the Budget, control of investment and public sector spending. Regulation of 
industrial location was the only direct control he envisaged. Through "trial balance 
sheets" showing the gaps between supply and demand in different sectors of the 
economy, a clear plan would make the economic future more certain. As a result 
productivity would increase allowing improved living standards. Previously 
unforeseen snags and fluctuations could be seen and avoided. Morrison stated falsely 
that a "reserve of orders",. "all blueprinted and prepared" was ready to combat any 
50 slump 
Morrison emphasised the relation of the plan to the public. It needed to "be 
inspired from the consumer", open to public criticism and would be subject to 
"widespread publicity". Such rhetoric contrasts with the growing secrecy surrounding 
planning. Morrison's speech offered little that was concrete. He harked back to the 
manifesto outlining how the Government would avoid cyclical problems and mass 
unemploymentýl. Leruez claims that this speech showed Morrison confused about 
economic planning and that his original assumptions about using controls had been 
muddied since the end of the war. Morrison was reduced to describing planning "as 
not much more than applied common sense"52. As Middlemas shows disagreement 
raged between ministers,, at this time, on the powers needed to run the economY53 and 
given such tension Morrison would have been inhibited ftom highlighting certain 
potential economic planning tools. 
Weeks after Morrison's speech Britain faced a severe coal shortage 
exacerbated by increased demand and acute problems of distribution brought on by the 
harsh winter. This led to closed factories and temporary unemployment54. Morrison 
fell ill with thrombosis. Though the responsibility for coal lay with the Ministry of 
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Fuel and Power, the crisis reflected badly on the planners who had aimed to foresee 
and avoid the "snags", especially in the use of national resources. The crisis, as seen in 
Chapter H, prompted reform of the economic planning machine. 
In February and March 1947 Sir Oliver Franks delivered three influential public 
lectures on economic planning at the invitation of the University of London Senate. 
Franks,, at the time Provost of Queen's College, Oxford, drew on his wartime Civil 
Service experience. He viewed the wartime planning bodies as "dialectical", 
responsible for implementing decisions from elsewhere in government, but also 
working with private industry". He believed the demands of military security, full 
employment and maintaining trade made planning inevitable56, Franks recognised the 
dangers of a bloated bureaucracy unable to communicate policy effectively. As 
"general manager of the national economy", the Government had to make the broad 
decisions and decide between competing demands but leave as much of the 
implementation as possible to private busineSS57. Civil servants also had to take 
initiatives and become people with whom business wanted to work58. 
Like the French Plan which had recently been published, Franks stated that the 
British version had to belong to the nation and not just the Government. The country 
had to be brought out of its outdated economic attitudes through educative 
campaigns". Lords Ro1160 and Croham see Franks! s lectures as being "very 
importantio6l in shaping thinking about planning. Tomfirison claims Franks's view 
informed Cripps's thinking much more than any other approaCh62. 
In November 1946 the Government promised a parliamentary discussion on 
the economy as a whole., but this was delayed until the censure debate over the fuel 
crisis in March 194763. Together with the release of the White Paper version of the 
economic survey in February, this brought planning back under the Spotlight64. Due 
to Morrison's illness, Cripps spoke on the White Paper and covered very similar points 
to Morrison's speech the previous October. Cripps spoke of the need to ensure that 
-72- 
"the national resources are used in the best interests of the state as a whole". British 
economic planning differed from that of totalitarian states, because it respected public 
freedoms and consumer choice. However,, it also aimed to bring "order into the 
industrial production of the country"65 
Though emergency measures would be preserved for "some urgent economic 
crisis", Cripps did not envisage the use of "direction or compulsion of manpower 
outside the necessities of defence". Planning had to be flexible and adapt to the 
"means of control and enforcement" available,, such as taxation, allocation of raw 
materials and controls over capital, investment and machinery. Cripps, like Franks, 
highlighted the need to secure "the individual co-operation of both sides of 
industry"66. Bridges had been particularly keen that this element, the essence of 
France's Plan,. be made clear to Parliament67 
For Cripps planning was founded on guiding labour distribution and the 
allocation of the gross national income. The desired patterns would be achieved 
through "budgets" which resembled Morrison's "test balance sheets" and aimed to 
focus on physical rather than fiscal resources68. Unlike Franks,, Cripps suggested that 
a central staff was needed to formulate these "budgets"69. Cripps acknowledged that 
the survey he was presenting did "not purport, of course, to be a long-term plan". 
This would come later once the planners had more experience70. These vague 
comments represented the cornerstone of the Government's public statements on 
planning. They were the definition against which subsequent developments would 
be 
set by the Government Is critics. 
Later in March, Attlee,. announcing the creation of the C. E. P. S., repeated 
much that had been said about planning, though he did explicitly refer to 
development 
of a "long-term plan". However, Attlee also acknowledged the 
limits to economic 
planning: 
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"... it would of course be a mistake to assume that the present 
difficulties of under-production can be solved by planning alone. ... Planning is in itself no substitute for the increased effort and 
efficiency which are essential to our national prosperity. l17l 
Planning appeared to be losing its status as the prime solution to economic problems 
though the exhortation to work harder remained. 
Debate among officials about planning revived as the C. E. P. S. was being 
established. Nicholson felt that whereas manpower had been the major problem in 
1946,, materials and their allocation had become the key focus. He questioned how 
one could distinguish current allocations policies from "forward planning" and the 
"economic grand strategy". Nicholson believed that allocations were separate from, 
but important for, the realisation of plans. He still sought a definition of planning and 
came down to: 
"Planning is organised thinking ahead, leading to decisions capable 
of effectively shaping the future. " 72 
This was as vague as previous definitions. 
The new preoccupation with materials rather than manpower is apparent in 
Morrison's memorandum "Planning for Expansion", drafted by Nicholson in May 
1947. Circulated amongst officials, it outlined how raw material supplies could be 
boosted73. The fuel crisis had demonstrated how the "vicious circle"74 of short-term 
problems had been the main preoccupation of Morrison and the E. D. Committee and 
had made long-term planning difficult. The economy was also effectively being 
"strangled" by raw material and fuel shortages75. 
The crisis prompted suggestions on planning from the likes of Campbell 
Secord, an assistant secretary at the Lord President's Office, and Marquand76. 
Marquand claimed that: 
"The coal crisis is one illustration of the fact that our governmental 
system in Britain never thinks ahead ... 
[it is] always thinking hard 
about today, sometimes about tomorrow, never about next year.,, 
77 
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Marquand's suggestions mixed common sense, such as postponing convertibility and 
increasing imports of consumer goods from non-dollar areas, with foolishness like a 
5-10% appreciation in the rate of sterling78. He favoured a central economic advisory 
body which would identify priorities and prevent the "tug of war" between 
departments' demands. Coal had shown him a key difficulty in planning: 
"Everybody hoped his programme would get by. Nobody pointed 
out that all the programmes could not possibly get by. "79 
Marquand was aware that his suggestions could undermine departmental sovereignty, 
but pressed for the Budget to be combined with economic planning80. He caused 
controversy in June 1947 when he claimed accurately in public that Britain faced an 
"economic jam". This forced the recovered Morrison to evade a parliamentary 
question on the issue8l. Marquand was soon eclipsed by Plowden and his suggestions 
appeared to have been ignored. 
Secord's memorandum was the last such document to be circulated before the 
C. E. P. S. took off Like Marquand, Secord included sensible points and called for "an 
obvious success" in planning. He recognised that the useful organization of the former 
Nfinistry of Production was withering away82. He felt future surveys had to represent 
more of a plan than a forecast and greater consideration had to be given to 
implementing plans. Secord accurately warned that the balance of payments would be 
a problem and that investment needed control in the existing conditions of cheap 
money. Secord's objective was to create an over-capacity in fuel, power, and 
inffastructure as a boost to prodUCtiVity83 
The announcements of the new planning bodies generated new debate on what 
constituted planning. In July Morrison again referred to the "best use of economic 
resources" but this time this "both for the realisation of a long-term plan and 
for 
remedial measures against our immediate difficulties" 
84. This recognised that the 
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short-term perspective could not help but impinge on the long-term one. in fact, it 
came to subsume it. 
Meade left the Economic Section in September 1946 after an i1lneSS85. FES 
Successor, Robert Hall, like Plowden,, was more concerned with day-to-day economic 
problems than theory. Hall still wished to plan the economy but his vision was 
apparently limited to forecasting and demand management. He felt that following the 
convertibility crisis of July/August 1947 officials had time to "get going soon, on the 
real business of planning". In his memorandum to Plowden, "Have We Got a Plan? ", 
86 Hall stated that the first objective should be to work on balance of payments figures . 
The peak of discussion about "real" economic planning ran from late Summer 
1947 to Autumn 1948. It was centred around the "angry young men" as Patricia 
Brown and Professor Marris have subsequently characterised them87. These men 
were Robinson, Berrill and MarriS88 who has described himself as a "Gosplanner"89. 
Robinson was more concerned with consumer choice than a gosplanner would have 
been,, but by late 194790, his views on the level of detail necessary for a "true" 
economic plan, I would argue, show a shift towards a greater level of state 
intervention than his comments in January 1946 had revealed. 
Alford el al state that the vaunted "good working relationship" between the 
C. E. P. S. and the Economic Section did not develop until the three "professional 
economists", - that 
is Robinson,, Marris and Berrill, had left in 194891. Plowden and 
Hall, however, always worked well together92 though some of their staff could not co- 
operate so amicably. Notwithstanding the practical problems of the style of planning 
envisaged by Robinson, Marris and Berrill, I would argue their approach was 
discarded as it did not accord with the views of more established officials such as 
Plowden, Hall and David Bensusan Butt, a leading long-serving member of the 
Econon-fic Section. 
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The zenith of belief in detailed economic planning can be found in the 
"November Plan" and "Level of Industry Planning" memoranda produced by 
Robinson's coterie93. These were controversial within the C. E. P. S. itSelf94 and led to 
friction with the Economic Section". "Level of Industry Planning", produced in 
Summer 1947,. argued that planning had become "clouded by dogmatism". It 
questioned whether the consumer was really to be supreme. It suggested that using 
economist Wassilly Leontiefs model of gross transactions between industries, the 
planners could predict "what will happen to the production of babies' shoes as a result 
of a shortage of pitprops. " The paper stated that the planners were not seeking 
"Grand Solution" but the scope of planning implied in this and follow-up documents 
was clearly a new departure, envisaging a more detailed form of planning, probably 
with stricter controls96. 
The "Experimental Plan for the Cotton Industry" showed the form this type of 
detailed planmng could have taken, It represented the only model for calculating the 
links between demand, productivity and output that the planners produced. It revealed 
the complexity of the calculations and the potential for error involved. Using actual 
figures it demonstrated the likely output of cotton textiles from a set amount of raw 
materials and produced a formula to indicate the necessary amount of coal, labour and 
spindles97. 
Many such long papers simply mulled over what needed to be done, rather 
than analysing solid figures or forming part of an actual plan. However, they showed 
a desire for greater state intervention and the use of more controls than was supported 
by the majority of officials at the time". In "Strategic Decisions"99, Berrill aimed to 
outline all the types of information which planning needed. He took account of 
foreign systems brought to the attention of British officials through visits to Whitehall 
in 1947 by leading French and Czechoslovak planning officials"O. Berrill emphasised 
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macro-economics but also pointed out the need for regional bodies and works councils 
of the kind used by the Ministry of ProductionlOl. 
In September 1947 Marris stated that planning was "very different, much more 
positive" than Keynesian demand management which he felt would be insufficient to 
tackle a crisis. Planners had "to design the best predictor" they could to avoid 
repeated economic crises, but Marris gave no details102. Despite Marris's and Berrill's 
efforts to consider longer-term issues they found themselves dragged back into day-to- 
day crises. This was shown clearly in "November Plan" of 1947, a programme to deal 
with the currency crisis and aimed to run for a year from n-ýid-1948. The plan outlined 
eleven steps including studying investment, allocations and other potential economic 
tools which could be used to implement a plan whether they were politically 
"palatable", or "unpalatable" but necessary. It also outlined which departments and 
103 individuals could supply the relevant information 
Marris's "Notes on the Post-War 'Normal Year"1104 of September 1947 
provoked a reaction which can be seen as the start of resistance to such interventiomst 
papers. Unlike other official memoranda, Marris's showed awareness of current 
economic debate. In "Notes",. he sought to determine what would constitute a 
"normal" year on which to base assumptions. Marris suggested that rather than 
breaking down "global" national income figures it was more helpful to consider 
changing productivity in sectors of industry and then to build up national income 
105 figures from an aggregate of this 
Butt,, the main critic of such an approach, sneered at the document, declaring: 
"I wouldn't mind constructing 'dream- 19 5 I's' if we were wide awake 
about 1948. But in fact we are in a trance about them both. 11106 
He felt that: 
"Planning to me is all a matter of directing present efforts at present 
problems"107. 
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From June 1946 onwards Butt had characterised the almost fortune-telling nature of 
many long-term forecasts as "numerology". He bemoaned the "enthusiasm for 
Monnet's methods" and the "passion now sweeping Whitehall" for "excessive figuring" 
which was "wasteflul,, misleading, and dangerous"108. He felt that to be worthwhile 
the long-term surveys had to be made less elaborate and more qualified. Butt believed 
that "sham precision" demanded in Whitehall led to "rigid and irreversible plans" 
carried on "long after their statistical foundations" had "crumbled" 109. 
Much of this argument between staff was at a relatively junior level but some 
details reached their seniors. In October 1947 Hall noted the dispute between Butt 
and Robinson over whether the C. E. P. S. or the Econon-ýc Section should produce the 
economic survey110. Robinson claimed that the problem with the previous surveys 
had been the reluctance on the part of the Economic Section and other officials to 
plan11I. Though Hall dubbed the Economic Survey for 1948, produced by Robinson, 
112 
as the "Black Paper", he prevented Butt from resigning over it 
The C. E. P. S. -Economic Section dispute is the clearest example of the 
differences between the "Gosplanners", a small ginger group within the C. E. P. S., and 
the majority of the C. E. P. S. and Economic Section who could be termed 
"Thermostatters". Disagreement arose over the Economic Survey for 1948-52, never 
seen by ministers, compiled throughout 1948 by Marris and Berrill. under Austin 
Robinson's supervisionI13. Robinson had been disappointed by the abandom-nent of 
the "grandiose plans" of "Level of Industry planning"114. For him the hope of the 
"real" planners lay in the 1948-52 survey, which was later the basis of the British 
Long-Term ProgrammelI5. Both are considered in Chapter VI. 
Marris and Berrill were young and unlike nearly all their colleagues were 
trained economists'16. They enjoyed some sympathy from Robinson, their immediate 
boss. Berrill and Marris soon recognised that the 1948-52 survey would face criticism 
from ministers as too austere and from the Economic Section that 
it was too detailed. 
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The two men suggested, in a conciliatory tone, that it was only necessary to plan in 
detail where specific governmental action was required but did not define criteria for 
117 such action 
Once it was completed Marris and Berrill complained that the Economic 
Section were "sniping" at the survey and opposed to the necessary "radical changes". 
They wrote simply: 
"Fundamentally the difference between the Economic Section and 
ourselves is that, as an act of faith, we believe in planning and they 
do not. it 118 
Dispute focused on the difficulties of accurate forecasting and implementation and 
differing views of the international trade and financial system. The Economic Section 
felt Britain had the possibility to influence international patterns through price and 
production policies. Berrill and Marris felt that the country had to adapt to the system 
of world trade which had developed gradually over the previous decades. Though the 
dispute did not spread far in Whitehall, Berrill and Marris were concerned that the 
Economic Section's hostility would strengthen ministerial criticism of the survey's 
austerity and consequently more imports would be authorised than Britain could 
afford. Though the argument stemmed from a disagreement on the detail of planning, 
it soon focused on practical "tactical" issues119 and Butt continued to press for 
120 changes to the survey 
Some rapprochement developed between Marris and Butt in August 1948 as 
Butt started work on the Long Term Programme. Both men remained interested in a 
longer term survey. Marris produced a "technical document" which envisaged a "fairly 
detailed econometric model", with minor revisions every quarter and major revisions 
sent to the E. D. Committee every six months. He sought a 
flexible "Economic Bible 
or Economic 'War Book... which could be referred to 
by departments. The C. E. P. S. 
would supply the "metal" which could then 
"be forged by the Economic Survey 
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[Working] Party. 11121. Marris was apparently trying to salvage a planning role for the 
C. E. P. S. 
. tailoring 
his language to be more acceptable to Butt. 
Throughout the latter months of 1948, and into 1949, much time was 
concentrated on preparing material for the O. E. E. C. 122, Once this activity had settled 
down,, however, there was a resumption of conflict. In April 1949, Butt tried to clarify 
the differences in "What Does the Economic Section Believe? "123,, which he sent to 
Marris. Butt believed that "all agreed that planning is meritorious" but recognised that 
"planning is a term that has to many of us much more formidable connotations". The 
points of dispute were: the precision of objectives; the extent of interventions to 
implement plans; and the distinction between counter-cyclical short-term planning of 
one to two years ahead and longer-term planning. Butt acknowledged that short-term 
techniques contributed to the long-term picture but he agreed with Hall that many 
long-term policies,, such as opposing monopolies, nationalization, encouraging 
research and developing social policies fell outside the scope of econon-ýc planning. 
Butt accepted stronger policies for foreign trade but felt that generally, "fierce" 
intervention could only be justified if the state could detennine the "right" decisions to 
make,, better than the market itself, a perspective which was "palpably untrue". Butt 
felt the only justification for planning was to reduce the impact of future economic 
124 crises 
Butt was concerned that Hall would be converted to the "numerological 
church" supported by Attlee and the E. P. B. in favouring detailed long-term 
surveys125. Butt felt "numerological" sentiments were just "an emotional reaction" to 
the accurate fear that too little was being done to analyse the long-term material 
available. It had become apparent that the Government could do little to implement its 
designs for labour or investment, and trade predictions had proven inaccurate even for 
just six months ahead. Small changes in the economy could easily falsify forecasts. 
Thus the only use for such plans was in exhortation. Butt wrote: 
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"Plans in the semi-socialist State seem too much what Cathedrals are 
to the Church: they have an inspiring and soothing effect for the 
faithful in a wicked world. " 
Butt accepted that if ministers wanted such products, officials would have to comply, 
but he felt this wasted civil servants' time126 
Marris claimed the Economic Section was now arguing that long-term 
planning was impossible. He felt that the C. E. P. S. was being ignored. He believed 
that the E. S. W. P. had adopted a passive role and urged it to begin investigating the 
long-term consequences of the dollar shortage. Marris felt the C. E. P. S. had to: 
"... help the administrative machine to avoid its usual error in times of 
crisis of losing sight of the long term wood for the short term 
trees.,, 127 
Douglas Allen was sin-filarly concerned at the dernise of planning and felt the 
Economic Section's revision of the Economic Survey for 1948-52 had removed "every 
reference to a comprehensive study" just leaving "a general essay on economic 
development" 128. Marris encouraged Allen to press for the C. E. P. S. to take over the 
work on the continuing longer term survey129 
The devaluation of September 1949 subsumed the arguments over the 
philosophy of planning. Devaluation removed the danger to reserves and the need for 
harsh "Schachtian" measures130. The meeting of December 1949 to discuss the 
C. E. P. S. memorandum,, "Note on Central Planning"131, marked a crucial moment. At 
the meeting officials agreed that there had to be a clear distinction between planning 
and general economic policy, and between planning, and research and advice. The war 
had emphasised manpower planning. Now, however, the balance of payments and 
investment planning, which were Treasury tasks, were paramount. Consequently, 
Hall 
suggested that many of the planning tools and the machine to operate them 
had come 
to be perceived as "luxuries"132 
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The subsequent memorandum "Economic Planning"133 marked the end of any 
gosplanning sentiment in the C. E. P. S.. It stated that the increasing number of 
interdepartmental groups were "not suitable for longer term work". Planning had 
become dependent on what could be implemented. Now that the C. E. P. S. was "made 
up of adn-ýnistrators and not of experts": 
"The purpose of the Central Staff, is, in fact to assist in the more 
effective evolution and carrying out of economic policy. 11 134 
Hall's deputy of the time, Russell Brethertonl35,, claimed: 
"... if you keep the Budget Committee, the I. P. C. and the 
Programmes Committee you have a pretty effective planning 
it 136 machine... 
He made no mention of the C. E. P. S.. The committees he highlighted were concerned 
with financial measures alone. By the time of "Economic Planning" Robinson and 
Berrill had gone, and Marris was about to be transferred137. Civil Service debate 
n1k dbout planning had ceased and the C. E. P. S. had simply become another Treasury 
division. 
Mnisterial Attitudes 
Though Cripps was to deny in his 1950 Budget speech that econornic planning 
had been abandonedl38,, this chapter has demonstrated that attempts to formulate 
comprehensive plans had come to a clear end in December 1949. Cripps's last detailed 
statement of what economic planning entailed, "The Framework of Economic 
Planning"139,, had been produced in November 1947 for circulation to the Production 
Committee140. There is no evidence that Cripps's views filtered back to his staff. This 
statement can be seen as yet another just tossed into the vacuum of 
indecision on 
planning. 
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Cripps re-used the familiar phrase of ensuring that "available resources are fully 
employed" and consumer choice was satisfied. However,, he felt in a time of shortage 
ff it might prove necessary to restrict the "consumption of less essentials . Such 
restriction in "ordinary circumstances" would represent "a failure in planning". 
Difficulties in maintaining a balance of payments and sufficient saving and avoiding 
inflation distorted normal conditionsl4l. Determining the desirable levels of trade and 
consumption required "direct and/or indirect means" to implement such decisions. 
However, the means Cripps suggested really formed a Keynesian package: import 
controls,, investment planning and consumption planning through fiscal means. With 
Britain so heavily dependent on foreign trade he recognised "hard and fast long term 
planningif was "impracticable" 142. 
Cripps, like Morrison before him, presented worthy but vague ideas. flis 
objectives were: to ensure a sufficient supply of labour and raw materials; that goods 
were not absorbed by the domestic market and that export sales were to the right 
markets. He aimed to bring investment into line with available resources, that would 
have been at around 17% of the national income. This was less than the current 
French and Soviet plans, the U. S. A. 1925-9 and the British 1938 level of 18%. It is 
not clear where these figures originated but Cripps was aware of the lack of available 
143 
savings for higher investment 
Cripps's paper contained the same contradictions as many of the memoranda 
discussed in this chapter. For example, he aimed to restrain consumption whilst 
maintaining incentives. Cripps felt detailed plans were necessary for commodities 
like 
clothing and food but would be "impossible" for all products. The "ultimate guide" 
had to be "the demands of the public transmitted through ordinary trading channels". 
Cripps did state that though the consumer was supreme, there could not 
be "complete 
freedom" in the next four years due to the need to reorganize and reorientate 
industry. 
Even the possibility of restoring tabour direction would remain144 
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In December 1949, Gaitskell, assisted by Jay, produced a memorandum on 
planning145 in response to Production Committee discussion on whether direct 
controls, which Gaitskell saw as "the distinguishing feature of British socialist 
planning",. had to yield to indirect anti-inflationary measures. Gaitskell felt that this 
change was being provoked by O. E. E. C. demands. He claimed that hitherto policy 
had had four objectives: maximum production; full employment; a balance of 
payments, and fair shares for consumers. Despite the effective use of budgetary, price 
and incomes policies demand still exceeded supply. Gaitskell saw direct controls as 
necessary not only to solve the dollar gap and thus to assist European economic 
viability, but also to maintain full employment and equitable distribution of 
146 resources Gaitskell's focus was less on actual plans than broad social and 
economic policies. This illustrates how far the perception of planning had come to 
encompass a macro-economic perspective. Decontrol continued. It was only partly 
reversed by the Korean War, when some direct controls were used to combat inflation. 
Conclusions 
A number of confusions and contradictions about economic planning have been 
highlighted by this chapter: the tension between consumer freedom and the need to 
control; the need for short-term solutions and desire for longer-term remedies, and the 
wish to plan in detail, whilst recognising that it was impossible to do so. No-one in 
government had a clear-cut answer and arguments revolved around the degree of 
control and level of detail that planning should employ. The debate had effectively 
ended by December 1949. Comparative outsiders like Robinson and Marris 
had 
moved into other fields. Those who remained were career civil servants, unlikely to 
challenge what was handed down on ideological grounds. Sir Kenneth 
Berrill notes 
147 
though, that this did not mean there was agreement on how things should be done 
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The debate on planning within Whitehall can be set against the background of 
a wealth of lectures and publications on the subject at the time from a wide spectrum 
of writers including Ely Devons, Evan Durbin, W. A. Lewis, Lionel Robbins, John 
Jewkes,. Barbara Wootton and Michael Young148. One can trace the efforts of the 
planners themselves in trying to determine a formula for planning. Neither side of the 
argument on detail and economic tools "won". The C. E. P. S. was diverted from any 
real long-term forecasting, particularly once the Long-Term Programme had been 
produced, let alone long-term planning, by the series of crises. The C. E. P. S. focused 
on short-term concerns such as raw material allocations,, but in an overarching way, 
rather than in detail like the economic ministries. As the C. E. P. S. dissolved into the 
Treasury, ideological debate became irrelevant as planning withered away. 
Thermosttating survived as it was also capable of guiding general short-term economic 
policy responses. Planners had sought a mission but the lack of guidance from 
ministers and senior officials,, left staff squabbling over detailed planning and controls. 
By the start of 1950, British planning had come to fit Ernest Bevin's description: "we 
don't have plans, we work things out practically"149. 
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Ch ttr iv 
Econon-fic Tools 
Introduction 
A major difficulty for the planners which inspired much media criticism was the 
lack of economic tools they possessed to implement plans. At various times officials 
and ministers perceived the key tools as: investment programming; labour control 
either through direction or a wages policy; controls over imports and the allocation of 
raw materials; and fiscal measures, particularly aimed at consumption and inflation. 
These were interrelated. For example, the greatest focus of investment was 
construction which was heavily dependent on the allocation of steel and timber. This 
chapter will only focus on these tools when they were specifically discussed in 
association with the policy of economic planning. It will analyse the Government's 
inability to use them to execute a plan. 
Discussions about Economic Toots 
Tomlinson details the "iron quadrilateral" of assumptions on the economy that 
hampered post-war planning and the application of certain instruments. These 
assumptions had been built up in the 1930s by the Labour Party and were reinforced 
by Britain's victory in the war. They were commitments to: parliamentary sovereignty, 
consensual tripartitism, ftee collective bargaining, and the Morrisonian style public 
corporation for nationalized industriesI. Middlemas sees such paradigms as breeding a 
complacent attitude towards institutional reform, an approach that was oblivious to 
foreign models2. 
The Government adopted the "traditional" approach to administering economic 
planning through inter-departmental official and ministerial committees. Tomlinson 
states that this was due to Labour's enduring faith in parliamentary sovereignty, 
developed in the face of inter-war threats to democracy, which precluded developing 
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bodies outside the mainstream of government3- As a result tripartite bodies did little 
more than disseminate governmental information and seek consensus from both sides 
of industry for ministerial decisions4. This was linked to the maintenance of free 
collective bargaining, seen as an important element in defining the proper roles of 
government and trade unions. Morgan notes that the "government and the T. U. C. 
made no effort to alter the adversarial character of relations between labour and 
management"5. The right to free collective bargaining had been curtailed during the 
war and Order 1305 effectively banned strikes without first referring the National 
Arbitration Tribunal. Large unions such as the Transport & General Workers' Union 
(T&G. W. U. ), the Amalgamated Engineering Union (A. E. U. ) and the shopworkers' 
union (U. S. D. A. W. ) were generally happy to work in such a system6, as even referring 
to arbitration effectively represented collective bargaining. In 1951 it was replaced by 
Order 1376 which provided for legally binding arbitration but lifted the restrictions on 
strikes7. Even within such constraints collective bargaining was reasserted and 
effectively removed the Government's ability to shape labour distribution8. NEddlemas 
warns however, against seeing unions as forcing the Labour Governments to abandon 
physical planning9. It does appear their pressure was asserted more agamst wage 
regulation. 
Officials and ministers held a range of views as to which economic tools should 
be used for planning purposes. In 1945 Meade favoured financial instruments, seeing 
them as more sophisticated than physical ones. He believed this was the right 
direction for planning to develop once shortages were over". He recognised that it 
would be harder to operate controls over some elements of the economy, such as 
public consumption than others like demobilization1l. Alan Budd states that officials 
saw physical controls as associated with the war and the subsequent transition period 
rather than being useful in the long-term12. In 1946 Nicholson suggested that physical 
controls should be removed "as fast as the growing efficacy of 
indirect fiscal control" 
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allowed13. However,, there was no certainty how long the transition to a full 
peacetime economy would take14. Meade stated in August 1946 that controls over 
production, raw materials, prices and investment would only be necessary for about 
another two years15. 
Tomlinson suggests that the Government felt it had to respond to, or certainly 
be aware of, criticisms that controls restricted essential liberties. Attacks of this kind 
were fuelled by books by Jewkes and Hayek16. Both Keynes and Meade were 
sympathetic to such concerns. In 1948, having left the Economic Section, Meade 
wrote Planning and the Price Mechanism. Though Tomlinson claims he distinguished 
himself from Hayek17, Meade attacked quantitative planning which directed labour 
and restricted consumer sovereignty. However, he favoured manipulating the 
economy through fiscal tools to secure full employment and what he called equity and 
freedom". Hall also advocated a move from direct to fiscal controls. Tomlinson 
writes that before the war Hall favoured a Liberal- Socialist approach like Meade's19. 
Even Cripps felt planning should be the way to an economy guided by consumer 
choice20. 
There was parliamentary opposition to the extension of economic powers in 
194721. Churchill called them "a blank cheque for totalitarian government"22. Even 
the King expressed concern that Attlee had underestimated the popular reaction to 
such powers. He asked for assurance that they would not be used to circumvent 
Parliament's rights23. Stuart Walkland has written that such criticism led ministers to 
feel "constrained to publicize its [the Government's] record and intentions by inflated 
claims"24 to justify keeping economic powers. The critical reactions which ministers 
and officials faced at the time led them to be hesitant and uncertain over what powers 
should be retained and to question how they might be justified to the public. 
One of the strongest Civil Service advocates for the replacement of direct 
physical controls by fiscal ones was Secord. In 1946, he believed the 
Government had 
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to "eschew control by piece-meal restrictions on a priority basis,, in favour of indirect 
guidance of expenditure by fiscal and other techniquest125. He saw the prevailing 
shortages as being one of the strongest reasons for reassertion of the market price 
system and derided physical controls as "politically objectionable". Secord felt the 
"elimination of direct controls" should be carried out as quickly as the "growing 
efficacy of indirect controls" permitted. Likewise, Mayhew stated that attempts to 
influence consumption were counter to "democratic principles" and the "powerful 
weapon" of fiscal policy should be used instead26. Such assertions of Keynesianism 
were possibly expressed most openly on the Working Party on the Means of 
Implementing Planning Decisions which met in late 1946 under Sir Bernard Gilbert, a 
Treasury Second Secretary. This involved Meade and Butt from the Economic 
Section and focused almost exclusively on financial and fiscal measures to rebalance 
the general supply and demand position27. 
Indirect controls did not prove to be as effective as officials had anticipated in 
1945-6 and many wartime physical controls persisted. As Bridges had soon 
recognised, it would be difficult to make departments, in particular the Treasury, the 
regulator of finance, adjust their own policies to fit in with a plan. No-one bar the 
Chancellor could guarantee that the Budget would necessarily aid implementation, As 
seen below, Dalton was uneasy about any such budgetary link with planning. In 
addition, large projects such as the housing programme needed ministerial decisions to 
make them conform with other programmes28. Officials could advise but it was clear 
that to implement a plan needed ministerial co-operation and a shared faith in the goals 
of a plan. 
Ministers remained as undecided about controls as their officials. In 
September 1945, Morrison laid down the principle that controls should not be 
removed simply because a particular shortage came to an end. He saw them as 
necessary to support measures to promote industrial efficiency and to regulate 
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industries which were to be nationalized. Given inflationary pressure, senior economic 
ministers agreed that price control should be retained29- The continued need for 
"negative" controls to restrain economic activity was re-emphasised by in July 1947 by 
Otto Clarke! s memoranda on "Alternative Action", 
.. 
forwarded to the Chancellor". 
These demonstrated that in the face of the exhaustion of the U. S. Loan, the difficulties 
of sterling convertibility and the possibility of a delay in Marshall Aid or Britain 
receiving none, a harsh programme would have to be adopted. This programme, 
which Hennessy terms the "Doomsday Plan"31, would have used the full power of 
controls to cut construction and investment sharply, to impose a "'famine' food 
programme" and to direct labour into essential industries and exports to dollar 
markets32. Fortunately the abandonment of convertibility and granting of generous 
Marshall Aid prevented the need for such "a complete and total national 
mobilisation"33 and allowed controls to continue to gradually fade. 
Moves towards decontrol effectively began with the Board of Trade's review 
of July-September 1947. This focused particularly on the need to remove price 
controls to soak up excess demand34. In February 1948, Harold Wilson, President of 
the Board of Trade, and George Strauss, Minister of Supply, appointed officials as 
Examiners of Controls. That June, the official Controls and Efficiency Conunittee was 
established. Chaired by Gilbert, a strong advocate of decontrol, it pressed for the 
continuing removal of controls35. Similarly the official Comn-fittee on Economic 
Controls set up in July 1949, argued that the price mechanism and Budget would 
increasingly replace controls36. 
The removal of direct controls was slower than ministers had envisaged in 
194537. There was minimal relaxation of price controls before 1949. Until November 
1948's abolition of many controls, rationing affected a third of consumer spending. 
Bread rationing was introduced in 1946 for the first time. The 
final abolition of 
rationing on food was in 1954 and for coal in 195838. Rollings argues that controls 
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were not really linked to economic planning and were just wartime leftovers prolonged 
by the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act of 1945 and the Supplies and 
Services (Extended Purposes) Act of 194739. Caimcross shows that whilst having 
little involvement with shaping the economy controls enabled the Government to 
counter inflation and ensure a more equitable distribution4O. This was because 
government control of goods in short supply stopped free competiton driving up 
prices and rationing gave everyone access to at least a basic minimum. Some controls 
were re-imposed after June 1950 particularly on cotton, special steels, non-ferrous 
metals and sulphuric acid, because of the Korean War". They were not revived for 
consumer goods, the main target of those who advocated decontrol, until July 195142. 
Morgan claims that in the face of public and media pressure Morrison believed 
that decontrol would win middle class votes43. Neil Rollings, however, counters the 
view that Morrison and Wilson advocated rapid decontrol. Wilson portrayed controls 
as "'an essential basis for the organisation of economic planning"'. Morrison supported 
efforts in 1950-1,, to make controls permanent through a Full Employment Bill. 
Rollings shows that between 1948-50, Cripps, Jay and Gaitskell were also all 
concerned that decontrol could move too fast44. Gaitskell opposed pressure from the 
O. E. E. C. to weaken such governmental powers45. 
As is outlined below, controls over manpower provoked some of the greatest 
debate in government. As early as September 1945 George Isaacs, the Minister of 
Labour,, was keen to see them abolished as soon as possible46. In fact, labour controls 
remained until 1950. The E. S. W. P. feared that without labour direction "measures 
directed to control supply" might be "impossible effectively to operate against a 
background of ftee labour movement"47. This opened the debate on how manpower 
was to be moved into the essential industries. Dalton48 and Secord49 raised the 
issue 
of using a wages policy to effect such shifts but as seen below, no real attempts at such 
a policy materialised. 
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R-ogow believes that without the Korean War, by the start of the 1950s 
planning would have become restricted to the Budget and balance of payments 
controls5O. Tomlinson suggests that from the November 1947 Budget onwards 
concentration shifted to planning the national income and demand through the 
Budget5l. I certainly agree that the Budget increasingly became the central method 
for shaping the economy, though this was only at a macro-economic level through 
demand management. The controls which remained were confined to preventing 
inflation and ensuring fair shares for consumers rather than for moving the economy in 
a particular direction. 
Despite the Economic Section being favourable to a return to a freer 
economy52, Butt who, in May 1947, produced the summary of the controls the 
Government possessed, felt that they remained necessary "to implement administrative 
plans" and without them planning would be "a wholly fatile activity"53. However, 
controls were negative and could only promote an activity by restricting something 
else. The first consideration of how to make controls more positive came in August 
1947. The Cabinet sought ways to boost production in the face of the convertibility 
crisis. To continue or extend many of the wartime economic powers considered vital 
for planning needed new legislation54. There was a correct concern that such 
legislation would provoke controversy in Parliament55,. so it was to be couched in 
terms which showed the desire for a positive use of controls. The Cabinet recognised 
that supplies were still short and that some might become scarcer, reflecting the 
deterioration of the economy. The scope of the powers was to be extended to cover: 
the promotion of increased productivity and exports; the restriction of imports; and 
powers to ensure the best use of the community's resources56. 
The dichotomy between the pressure for decontrol and the objective of 
retaining them to implement plans came out clearly in Cabinet 
discussions of 1950-51 
over the so-called Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill. 
The bill was 
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"designed to continue on a permanent basis the essential economic controls" which at 
the time "depended mainly on emergency powers", primarily the Supplies and Services 
(Transitional Powers) Acts, 1945 and 1947 which extended wartime controls. As an 
official committee established in Summer 1949 under Gilbert reported, the 1945 Act 
was due to expire on 10th December 195057. Departments were already running into 
difficulties, for example, in fixing grain prices to apply after the expiry date58. In early 
1950, the ad hoc Official Committee on the Economic Planning and Full Employment 
Bill was established to consider the issue and reported to the L. P. C. in March. By the 
summer the draft of a bill to make certain powers permanent had been drawn up59. 
Input from departments led to numerous revisions60. The L. P. C. was particularly 
keen to include positive measures to direct industry and commerce to maintain full 
employment or combat monopolies" 
Morrison told the Cabinet the bill was aimed at preventing inflation rather than 
promoting fall employment. He anticipated that defence expenditure and the ending of 
the wage fteeze would revive strong inflationary pressure62. Morrison believed that as 
it was difficult to delineate what powers would be necessary in the future the scope of 
the powers needed to be wide to be effective63. The bill made many existing powers 
permanent and in less defined terms empowered the Government to carry out planning 
and to regulate production, distribution, prices and consumption in order to promote 
productivity, full employment and to shape the economy to the best interests of the 
community. The Act would come into force through an Order in Council and then its 
powers could be used by a range of ministries and their appointees, particularly the 
Board of Trade64. However, Morrison was sensitive to the political opposition that 
the bill would face,. including allegations that the Government was seeking to rule by 
decree. The Cabinet was aware of such dangers and had delayed work on a bill of 
purely negative measures until after the 1950 election65. The draft 
bill emphasised 
that it did not seek powers to impose industrial conscription, the acquisition or 
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requisitioning of property or to suppress any newspaper or publication. However 
there was provision f 66 or inspection and in cases of contravention, for prosecution . 
Morrison was keen to have positive measures, for example the power to 
produce any sort of goods in government factories for sale on the open market67. The 
68 NEnister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, chaired a ministerial sub-committee on the issue . 
It highlighted the potential powers of government departments to produce, buy and 
sell items. Other positive measures including making or guaranteeing financial 
advances to the boards of nationalized industries or public authorities to allow 
schemes not justified by commercial considerationS69. However,, by October, only a 
few half-hearted proposals had been made. On one hand Gilbert opposed such powers 
as being ill-defined and of dubious use in a depression. On the other, Jay, now 
70 Financial Secretary, opposed reviving a bill simply covering economic controls . 
The bill's emphasis was shifted again by Gaitskell becoming Chancellor in 
October 1950 and the feeling that the long-awaited slump was coming. A new 
ministerial Committee on the Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill was set up 
the following month7l,. and the ad hoc Civil Service committee became its official 
equivalent. Though the ministerial committee was chaired by Morrison, Gaitskell led 
the way. He envisaged a successor to the 1944 White Paper on employment. 
Gaitskell saw the focus as being on full employment and "omitting measures of 
economic planning"72. Gilbert still disliked the inclusion of anti-slump measures. His 
fellow Second Secretary, Sir Wilfrid Eady, felt budgetary steps should be included 
solely in a finance bill and that reference to depression distracted the public from the 
prime concern of inflation73. Butt similarly and correctly saw inflation as the 
key 
"74 
economic danger and felt that full employment had already become 
"a dead issue 
Morrison came to share Gaitskell's view and aimed "to knit together the 
positive and negative powers into a coherent whole" for "the maintenance of 
full 
employment rather than on economic planning"75. Many of the new positive powers 
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suggested came from the 1950 election manifesto, Labour B* in Rritain76. An 
official sub-committee investigated powers to manufacture, purchase and sell goods, 
drawing on earlier Production Committee Work77. 
By the start of 1951, it was clear that the slump and the threat to full 
employment anticipated in October 1950 had, as Morrison said,, "been relegated to a 
relatively distant future"78. The official committee reported in January 195 1. It had 
become clear that the Korean War meant that a full employment bill would not lead to 
a rationalisation of emergency legislation. The heightening of the Cold War gave 
emergency powers continued legitimacy in the public's eyes. The Supplies and 
Services (Defence Purposes) Act of 195 1, which effectively substituted for the Fun 
Employment Bill did emphasise that such powers could be used in a positive way. The 
need for these powers, however, was due more to new rearmament and inflationary 
pressures79. The relevance to economic planning had been discarded months before. 
Having considered the powers the Government sought to retain, I will now 
turn to the different types of tools which at one time or another were associated with 
economic planning. 
Raw Materials Controls 
Caimcross shows that as late as 1950 47% of raw materials were allocated by 
the Government80. Such controls,, however,. were crude. In order for them to have 
been used effectively as planning tools the Government would have had to be able to 
analyse developments within individual companies. Ton-Ainson suggests that given the 
government's support for consensual tripartitism, it was unwilling to use "leverage" 
such as withholding raw materials to compel companies to follow a particular pattern. 
It is certain that any government would have faced harsh criticism from the public and 
business interests for curtailing certain industrial activity and possibly creating 
unemployment to fulfill a plan. The Board of Trade was particularly opposed 
to using 
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this leverage. However, the Ministry of Supply, did operate discriminatory raw 
material allocation policies towards car manufacturers8l and the silk industry1Q, to 
promote exports. 
Rogow outlines the obstacles to a more vigorous use of allocations. The 
relations between different government divisions and agencies handling allocations 
were "labyrinthine"83. The ministerial Materials Allocation Committee was 
responsible for the global allocation of scarce materialS84. However, dealings with 
industry were through the eight "sponsoring" departments each assigned sectors of the 
economy. The most crucial were the Board of Trade and the ministries of Supply and 
Food. The Ministry of Materials, created at the time of the Korean War, took over 
raw material concerns from the sponsoring ministries". 
The system had been inherited from the Coalition Government. Partly due to 
the lack of appropriately experienced civil servants, allocation policy was usually 
implemented by the peak organizations or a leading company in each sector. Rogow 
states this gave "authority to typical business practices and behaviour" and not 
necessarily the most effiCient86. Unilever had ninety representatives working for the 
Ministry of Food, Bryant & May supplied the controller of the match industry and 
., 
the footwear controller. In industries as diverse as cocoa, timber, leather, Dolcis, 
newsprint and non-ferrous metals, businessmen wielded great power, sometimes even 
administering controls from their company's offices. Even The Economist believed 
that controls had been yielded to "private monopolies"87. Rogow demonstrates, 
however, that even those businessmen involved in administering allocations publicly 
pressed for the removal of controls88. 
Before 1949 the Goverm-nent imported four-fifths of all food and raw materials 
itself However, import control was restricted as a planning tool. Four-fifths of the 
government's imports were on long-term contracts which could not 
be changed 
quickly. By 1949 trade liberalization, driven particularly by the O. E. E. 
C., was well 
-104- 
underway and restrictions had been lifted on half of all British imports. Discrimination 
against dollar imports continued until 195989. However,, I would suggest such import 
controls were used more to influence the balance of payments than to shape the 
domestic economy as the focus was on the source rather than the type of import and 
so affected the domestic pattern of industry less than allocation of such imports. Even 
without the pressures for decontrol raw material allocations and import controls could 
not have succeeded as tools of economic planning, without a radical alteration of the 
system. 
Investment 
Investment control and programming and their relationship to economic 
planning have been handled comprehensively in Martin Chi&s thesis and subsequent 
book9O and will only be touched on briefly here. Chick shows how investment control 
was really only used to deal with short-term difficulties, particularly the balance of 
payments. Cutting investment reduced demand for resources and allowed priority to 
be given to industries which could rapidly increase exports". Chick and Tomlinson 
suggest that the cheap money policy of low interest rates ran against such a general 
counter-inflationary policy92. In addition, businesses had large savings accrued during 
the war that lay beyond governmental control from which investment could be 
fanded93. In 1945, for example, Courtaulds had E40 million and Vickers 112.5 million 
in liquid assetS94. In 1948 company reserves and undistributed profits provided 050 
million of L2 billion of total gross investment95. 
Building licences had been perceived as a way of controlling investment at 
point of use. However, Cairncross shows that the amount of licenced construction 
exceeded the actual work carried out in the first three years of the Labour 
Government96. The Government also failed to promote the production of sufficient 
building materials or to move building workers into the types of construction to which 
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it wanted to give priority". As Dow demonstrates, the purchase of plant, - machinery 
and vehicles,. which made up a third of industrial investment, remained unrestricted". 
There was also institutional ineffectiveness in controlling investment. The 
Investment Working Party (I. W. P. ) was set up in February 1946 in response to the 
Economic Sizvey for 1946. Chick states that it "concentrated on the 'physical' aspects 
of investment, such as the availability of labour, materials and capacity"99. The 
I. W. P. 's successor, the Investment Programmes Committee (I. P. C. ), chaired by 
Plowden, was established initially as a sub-committee of the E. D. Committee in 
August 1947 with the immediate aim of reducing investment. It was reconstituted in 
December under Weeks, himself succeeded by Strath in April 1948100. As Alford et 
al outline, the lack of co-ordination between the I. P. C. and Materials Committee,. 
often led to a mismatch between approved investment and the resources availablel0l, 
despite both bodies having a C. E. P. S. secretariatl02. 
Planners overestimated the importance of investment by nationalized 
industries,. which represented only 18.1% of the totaI103. Tomlinson claims these 
industries acted autonomously in taking decisions about investment104 and Chick 
highlights the difficulties that I. P. C. had in getting compliance from the Railway 
Executive and National Coal Board105. Dow states that after 1948, limits on public 
investment did help prevent inflation but also discriminated against rail modernization 
106 
and road building 
Tomlinson shows that instead of a National Investment Board, promised in 
Labour's manifesto,, investment control was shared between three ineffectual bodies: 
the Capital Issues Committee (C. I. C. ) set up in November 1945, the Finance 
Corporation for Industry (F. C. I. ), aimed at medium-sized businesses, and the 
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (I. C. F. C. ) for larger companies. The 
latter two, Tomlinson suggests were founded by the Bank of England to pre-empt 
more radical reforms107. The National Investment Council 
(N. I. C. ) was set up by 
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Dalton in January 1946 supposedly to prepare a "shelf of works" against a future 
slump. It was chaired by the Chancellor and included the Governor of the Bank of 
England, the chairmen of the Stock Exchange, the F. C. I.,, and the C. I. C., plus 
representatives of the F. B. I., Co-operative Movement and banks. However, as no 
slump emerged its work was confined to discussing "marginal issues" and Cripps 
scrapped it in December 1948108. 
The C. I. C. had to approve any capital issues over L50,000 in one year. Its task 
was undermined by the large business savings. It remained a "cosmetic artifice" 
confined to advising the Government rather than influencing investment109. The 
I. C. F. C. and F. C. I. were ineffective and unable to interest banks in long-term 
investment110. Tomlinson claims that the only real possibility for investment control 
would have been through government appointees to company boards, as suggested by 
Wilson in 1950111. 
By 1951 gross Exed investment was 14.6% of Gross National Product 
(G. N. P. ), compared to 10.4% in 1946. Manufacturing investment, primarily in the 
private sector was able to reach its peak share of total investment in 1951. Sectors 
such as the housing programme, coaL education, petroleum and defence to which the 
Government gave a priority did see investment increases. This did not guarantee 
success in increasing output, as coal, in particular, demonstrated112. The Government 
overestimated its strength in programming investment. It also lacked a coherent idea 
of what it wanted to achieve in the long-term and, as Chick suggests, cuts in 
investment tended to be simply an immediate response to economic crises as they 
arosel 13. 
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Finan iI ntrols, 
Financial controls encompassed the varying of subsidies, tax and national 
insurance rates and allowances or rebates on these. Using financial controls as an 
instrument of economic planning proved more difficult than commentators like 
Meade114 had envisaged. Tax rates were set in the Budget once, or at most twice a 
year. Bridges also recognised that no official "could give a flat assurance that the 
Chancellor will carry out fiscal measures which were necessary to give effect to a 
long-term plan"115. As Chancellor,, Dalton was uncomfortable with economic 
planning being associated with the BudgetI16. Samuel Beer argues that Dalton's first 
three Budgets showed "little evidence" of even being influenced by the new techniques 
of national income analysisI17. These remained unused until Gaitskell's Budget of 
1951118. 
Administrative inability to amend tax rates quickly was another obstacle. 
Complex tax tables were necessary. To have a sufficient effect on consumption 
financial controls had to work on the mass of consumers who fell into the two reduced 
rate tax bands or below the taxable level of income. About 14 million people paid tax 
after the war,, but only 17% of these paid the standard rate or abovel". Beer claims 
that the "working classes" share of consumption was a fifth higher whilst that of the 
middle and upper classes had fallen120. Tomlinson shows that the Inland Revenue was 
reluctant to consider manipulating tax to affect demand because they felt it would 
threaten the tax basel2l. As a result,, in contrast to France122, tax variations in Britain 
could only be used at a crude macro-economic level. 
The 1944 VvNte Paper on Employment Policy had referred to the possible use 
of national insurance as a tool for promoting demand and full employment. The 
viability of using income tax and national insurance to shape demand was investigated 
in 1946123. National insurance was seen as more effective because it would affect the 
most numerous low-income earners whose patterns of consumption changed more 
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quickly than higher-paid groups. This meant the desired result could be reached by a 
124 smaller variation than if using income tax 
To achieve the L 100 million variation deemed necessary to have an impact, tax 
would have had to be varied by 60%, i. e. ± 4s 6d (221/2p) on the standard rate of 7s 6d 
(371/2p) in the pound. Alternatively allowances would have to be altered by L35 per 
"tax family" per year. The favoured option, however, was a flat-rate poll tax of L6 per 
tax family, levied on every household. A poll tax would affect 25-30 minion people 
compared to 17 million with national insurance variations125. To achieve the DOO 
million variation national insurance contributions would have to be altered by between 
Is Id (52/5p) and Is 5d (7p) on the standard rate of 4s 7d (23p) for an employed man. 
This allowed a 4% variation either way on the 8.5% level of unemployment assumed 
by the national insurance scheme. Throughout 1945-51 unemployment was almost 
always well below this. In addition, the full effect on consumption would be delayed 
as changes to the employers' contribution took effect. Setting tax or national 
insurance rates needed an accurate prediction of likely unemployment, which as 
Chapter V shows, was something the econon-fic surveys failed to achieve. The need 
for pre-printed stamps and for tax or national insurance payments to be made more 
regularly126 would have rendered them almost impossible to administer as detailed 
planning tools. 
The Budget 
It is difficult to see what impact the planners had on the Budget. It is clear that 
despite the rhetoric, there was never a clear link between what was revealed by the 
planners, for example, in the economic surveys, and Budget details. Caimcross has 
certainly detected no such connection and emphasises how far, in the period 1945-7, 
economic and fiscal policy were divorced from each other127. Ministerial and official 
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references to the economic surveys tended to be in terms of closing "physical" gaps, 
such as the manpower shortage, rather than the fiscal ones. 
The reasons for Daltods unease with economic planning are far from clear. 
Before the war Dalton had advocated a strong Cabinet comn-fittee or even an authority 
to handle planning, keeping it separate from the Treasury. Ben Pimlott claims that 
Dalton favoured physical controls over fiscal ones'.. because he felt they were more 
effective in redistributing wealth. Dalton disregarded Meade and the Economic 
Section's enthusiasm for demand management to shape the economy. Consequently 
for Dalton the "planning machinery was essentially a system of rationing scarce 
resources"128 and thus he wished it kept apart from the Treasury and the Budget. 
Added to these factors,, Cai-mcross states that "it is hard to detect any attempt 
to bring credit control or any other monetary device into play between 1948 and 
1951429. Monetary policy was aimed at maintaining the cheap money approach 
which had prevailed since 1932, in order to keep down the Government's debt burden, 
and in the post-war years to promote reconstruction investment130. Consequently, 
given these priorities it did not enter into consideration as an economic tool with 
which to carry out planning. Monetary policy was not even covered in the annual 
economic surveys until 1952131. 
Some Budget policies ran counter to what the planners would have suggested, 
most notably the cutting of purchase tax on cooking appliances and space heaters in 
the October 1945 Budget at a time when coal output had not recovered its pre-war 
132 levels. High demand for power contributed to the subsequent fuel shortage 
Plowden and Hall both sat on the Budget Committee and given their Keynesian 
attitudes, it would be unlikely that they advocated the micro-economic approaches that 
were necessary to implement economic planning. Throughout 1945-5 1, and 
particularly after 1947, the focus was increasingly on using the Budget against 
inflation and thus building up a surplus. The doubling of purchase and profits tax in 
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the November 1947 Budget was aimed at this rather than encouraging particular 
developments in industry and consumption133. Thus, once Cripps, who might have 
been expected to have adopt a more planning orientated approach, produced his first 
Budget in April 1948, it could be argued that its use as a macro rather than micro- 
economic tool had been well established. An isolated example of an element of the 
Budget influenced by planning concerns came in the 1951 when Gaitskell scrapped the 
initial depreciation allowances to discourage domestic investment and allow the 
engineering industry to move into production for rearmament. However, this was a 
crude tool unless backed up by other incentives or penalties134. Consequently, it is 
difficult to argue that the Budget was ever part of a toolkit for carrying out economic 
planning, 
Wages Polia 
The first Cabinet discussions about a wages policy were stimulated by the 
Economic Survcy for 1946's emphasis that more labour was needed in essential 
industries. The stances of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Minister of 
Labour, George Isaacs on this issue were important. Bevin had been General 
Secretary of the T&G. W. U. and wartime Minister of Labour. The two men were the 
trade unions' voice in Cabinet135. They inhibited new departures in wages and tabour 
policies and in the relationship between the unions, employers and government. 
Consequently, Morgan suggests, the Cabinet left the "pattern of wage negotiations to 
the traditional procedures" untouched in "return for union discipline and loyalty" 
136 
. 
In March 1946 Bevin told the Cabinet that he was "strongly opposed" to any 
regulation of wages believing they would prejudice the "development of 
industrial 
efficiency". Other ministers felt "it would be difficult to apply the Government's policy 
of planning for full employment while leaving industrial wages to 
be determined 
-III- 
without any guidance from the Government". Though having publicly ruled out a 
differential wages poliCy137, Morrison sought a position between the two extremes138 
An Economic Section paper portrayed wage increases as being achieved by 
"sheer skill" on the part of the negotiators. No change in the system was expected but 
it was felt much could be "done by general education and persuasion of the Trade 
Union movement" and public opinion through periodic statements139. The official 
Working Party on Wages Policy established in October 1945 reported to Morrison in 
March 1946140 along similar lines. It detailed what was to remain the Labour 
Governments' position on wages, that is the persistence of free collective bargaining 
periodically guided by governmental statementS141 
The report advised creating a National Industrial Conference to educate both 
sides of industry, workers and employers, about their responsibilities under full 
employment, in terms of wage demands. However, the working party rejected any 
state involvement or a "hybrid system" in which collective bargaining worked within 
govemment parameters. It was feared that such a system would face the Govemment 
with "dangerous sectional passions" that were part of wage negotiations142. By April 
1946 Morrison, however, felt that the Government should seek to influence wage 
negotiations indirectly through a tripartite conference but even this proved 
controversial. Bevin re-emphasised the dangers in reducing representative bodies' 
sense of responsibility if the Government intervened too much. He felt there was too 
much machinery in the wages field which just hampered the resolution of disputes. He 
wanted wage settlements to be left to individual unions and employers. Others in 
143 
Cabinet favoured a conference on general issues affecting industry, not just wages 
The most heated Cabinet debate was provoked by a memorandum in July 1947 
by Emmanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Fuel and Power, who, since April 1946, had 
advocated a more active wages poliCy144. He felt that as 
long as the Government paid 
food subsidies there had to be such a policy. He believed the 
Govemment must 
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discuss wages with both sides of industry rather than set wagesUý 1. Shinwell 
suggested a central body which would advise trade unions on claims and employers on 
what they should concede. Isaacs saw the proposals as "disastrous" 146 and made a 
detailed refutation147. Like Bevin,, he stressed the danger of undermining the 
148 authority of unions and employers' associations 
Cripps, James Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary and John Strachey, the 
Minister of Food, tended towards Shinwell's line,, whereas Alfred Bames, the Minister 
of Transport, scoffed at any governmental attempts to restrain wage increases. 
Morrison, Dalton and Tom Williams, the Minister of Agriculture, tried to strike a 
compromise position. Backing Morrison's compromise proposals, Attlee felt it was 
"clearly the duty" of the Government to have a positive wages policy, but believed it 
it 149 unwise" for it to set wage rates 
Intermittently ministers suggested modifications to the arbitration machinery to 
influence wages more effectively. In October 1946 Shinwell called for a tripartite 
National Wages Authority to check that wage claims did not undermine price stability; 
and that they maximised incentives and ensured a decent minimum wage150. This 
suggestion was modified in June 1947 to a Central Advisory Council, composed of 
experienced wage negotiators who would indicate the likely social and economic 
consequences of any pay award151. Isaacs's feeble counter-proposal was to ensure 
that "statesmanlike" chairmen sat on as many wages boards and councils as possible to 
152 bring their knowledge to a wide range of bodies 
In November 1947, the new Chancellor, Cripps, advocated a Central Appeals 
Tribunal to which appeals to wage awards could be forwarded by wages councils and 
arbitration bodies, when it was felt that the wage increases had not recognised the 
wider economic impact'53. Bitterly attacking the proposal, Isaacs stated that 
"it 
would be far better if they [T. U. C. ] could make suggestions to the 
Government". He 
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felt ministers had to "avoid the possibility of making proposals which the Trades 
Union Congress would feel bound to oppose" 154. 
As Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell made the final suggestion for a central wages 
body in November 1950. There had been "a sharp diverge-nee" between Gaitskell and 
Isaacs over wages policy from that April onwards155. Having reviewed the old 
suggestions, Gaitskell advocated an independent body which informed negotiators of 
the likely social and economic consequences of an award156. Isaacs believed no single 
body was capable of handling the complexities of Britain's long established wages 
system and that the "democratic traditions of the British working class movement 
would be seriously threatened" 157. The T. U. C. deemed a conference motion on a 
national wages board as "not worthy of discussion" 158. Despite such opposition the 
ministerial E. P. C. backed an advisory service, but the proposal disappeared into 
further negotiations with unions and within the Labour Party159. 
The closest that the Government came to establishing a tripartite body on 
wages was to reconstitute the N. J. A. C. and its Joint Consultative Committee (J. C. C. ), 
both created during the war. Both included T. U. C. and B. E. C. representatives. In 
Juty T946, Isaacs had the N. J. A. C. augmented in place of a National Industrial 
Council. The new N. J. A. C. was to meet quarterly, its J. C. C., each month160, but they 
161 remained little more than communications channels 
Ministers became frustrated as the same ideas on wages were repeatedly 
considered. In June 1949, "[mlinisters expressed anxiety at the extent to which the 
Government was powerless to prevent wage increases, even when these involved 
increased charges on public funds", thus not only in nationalized industries, but also in 
those receiving subsidies. Cynicism had grown about the worth of tripartite 
approaches. The Production Committee felt that "[v]aluable results were not normally 
attained from joint conferences with both sides of industry; indeed such meetings were 
likely to do more harm than good" 162. 
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In July 1950 Isaacs referred to the possibility of introducing "some method to 
regulate wage increases on the model of those adopted in Holland and the 
Scandinavian countries"163 and was invited by the Cabinet164 to investigate 
165 options The acceptance that other countries could offer positive examples 
represented a leap in ministerial thinking, particularly by Isaacs. However, he saw 
other countries' systems as "inferior" and "alien to the temprament [sic]" of the British. 
Isaacs advocated "utmost self-government in industry" in order to settle its own 
problems166. He compiled a comprehensive survey of the wage systems in the 
northern Europe and the AntipodeS167,, where governments pursued a degree of 
economic planning. However, the seeds of their systems tended to have been sown 
long before the war, or during and immediately after it. In contrast British ministers 
were considering these methods over five years after the war had ended. 
A number of the schemes, such as the Dutch and Australian systems, set basic 
minimum wages, sufficient for an unskilled worker to keep a family, above which 
wages for the semi-skilled and skilled were set by a formula168. Such schemes did not 
address the desire to attract workers to essential industries. Isaacs felt a minimum 
169 
wage would provoke inflation and prevent subsequent wage reductions 
Many of the agreements had a set duration, often two years, but Isaacs 
170 perceived this as cumbersome Wage regulation also implied restriction of 
industrial action, yet since the war New Zealand and Australia, with such systems, had 
lost many more days to strikes than Britainl7l. The U. K. lacked the institutions and 
legislation necessary for a wages policy similar to such models. The exercise just gave 
Isaacs further opportunity to heap praise on the British system. 
The sole tool remaining for the Government to affect wages was intermittant 
guidance. This was used more as a response to crises than as a consistent policy. 
The 
statements basically called on trade unions to think of the national 
interest when 
making wage demands. In January 1947 there was the "rather timid" 
172 Statement on 
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(Cmd. 7018). The Prime Nfinister made a further statement to Parliament on 6th 
August 1947, and, on 4th February 1948, the Stal n,, me I on Personal ncomes, Costs 
and Price (Cmd 7321)173, which importantly formed the basis of wage restraint for 
the next two years. Similar statements followed, such as the advice of 23rd November 
1949 after devaluation which led to the pay standstill. Another on 30th June 1950 was 
provoked by the slim majority of approval for the standstill at the T. U. C. 's Conference 
of Trade Union Executives174. 
Though these were bland, straightforward statements, the unions were easily 
upset by them. In August 1947 letters sent to the T. U. C. and employers' organizations 
drawing attention to the Prime Minister's statement led to an immediate hostile 
response from the T. U. C. - It asked whether this heralded the Government's intention 
to "interfere with the normal machinery for the settlement of wage disputes"175 and 
demanded that the Prime Minister receive a delegation. Fifteen trade union leaders,, 
including Vincent Tewson, General Secretary of the T. U. C., met Attlee and Isaacs on 
176 Ist October 1947 
The trade unionists attacked the Government's "indiscriminate" interference 
arguing the letters had broken the practice of consulting the T. U. C. first. The trade 
unionists believed such an approach would cause "seething discontent" among their 
members,, and they felt the unions' "forebearance" on wages had been ignored. They 
also expected the Government to consult the T. U. C. first on any proposals it might 
consider on wages and prices before publicising them177. The Government was 
forced to apologise for despatching the letters and had to curtail the policy of 
communicating directly with the two sides of a pay dispute. Subsequently 
Tewson 
was enraged by the creation of a Ministry of Labour section specifically to gather 
information on changes in wages and conditions178. Tewson by-passed the ministry 
on this issue and approached Attlee directly179. Tewson's arrogant attitude 
implied 
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the Government should not be free to organize its own departments without T. U. C. 
approval. 
By November 1947,, Cripps and Morrison felt talks with the T. U. C. were 
fruitless. Cripps thought the Government must "accept the implications for wages of 
adopting a policy of economic planning" and put forward "definite proposals". 
Discussions produced nothing new and Attlee concluded that all that could be done 
was to listen to the T. U. C. 's suggestions180. A further meeting with the T. U. C. 
demonstrated that even Bevin and Isaacs had become exasperated by the unions' 
intransigence. Bevin lamented how union pressure to retain traditional differentials 
between industries undermined the Government's policies. The trade union leaders 
were unwilling to grasp the so-called "theory of relativity" at the heart of the 
Government's efforts to change labour patterns. This was the idea that wages should 
be increased in undermanned essential industries to attract labour to them whilst 
restraining wages in less essential sectors. The trade unionists were preoccupied with 
181 profits taxes and maintaining subsidies 
The Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices,, was a milestone in 
Goverment policy. It pleaded with, rather than exhorted, the general public to co- 
operate in keeping down inflation. Business was also encouraged to restrain profits 
and prices. The Wite Paper stated that the Government was trying hard to keep 
down the cost of living and it did not want to have to intervene in wage settlements. 
However, negotiators had to be aware that intervention was possible if settlements 
were too large. Pressing for wage rises would undermine the position of those on 
pensions and social benefits and stimulate the black market. Producers who allowed 
wage costs to rise could not expect price controls to be altered to reflect this. Wage 
and profit rises could only be justified when productivity rose or in order to 
influence 
the movement of labour in the national interest. The wage differentials of the past 
could not remain182 
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Despite long-running talks with the Goverment on wages, the T. U. C. 
complained immediately that it had not been consulted183. The T. U. C. was further 
offended by a letter outlining the implications of the statement to wages boardS184 
which it characterised as government "directives". Having met the T. U. C. on 23rd 
March Attlee withdrew the letter allowing the conference of trade union executives to 
endorse the statement the following day, by 5.421 million votes to 2.032 millionI85. 
This began the period of wage restraint which was to last eighteen months. It was 
reinforced by the capital levy imposed in the 1948 Budget. In addition, in 1949 Cripps 
successfully persuaded 90% of companies to limit their dividend payments. He 
negotiated with industry using businessmen M. P. s, like the Conservative Sir Peter 
Bennett, as go-betweens186. Following devaluation in September 1949 T. U. C. 
support for a standstill which suspended all the exemptions of the White Paper that 
had allowed some pay rises, stood at 4.263 million votes to 3.606 million. In 
September 1950, when rearmament began to affect the economy, the policy was 
defeated at the T. U. C., but even then by only 220,000 votes187. Despite the petulant 
attitude of the T. U. C. and the growing disillusion with tripartitism, restraint proved 
successful. Weekly wage rates had risen by 8% in 1946,5% in 1947 and 4% in 1948, 
but only 11/2-2% in 1949,. and 0% in the first nine months of 1950188. 
Restraint,, however,, "was not the differential wages policy for which planners 
had hoped" 189 and the attempts to alter wage differentials between industries proved 
intractable. This arose partly from the failure to apply the principles, described above, 
of the Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices and from the lack of effective 
machinery for determining wages. There was antipathy both within and outside the 
Government to its involvement in individual claims. In fact, it was already involved in 
setting the wages of selected industries such as agriculture which 
had always been low 
paid and, since the war, undermanned'90. Attempts to 
increase agricultural wage 
rates relative to occupations drawing 
from the same labour pool failed. Nfinisters felt,, 
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however, that it was improper even to inform the unions representing rural jobs which 
rivalled agriculture about the need to change differentialsl9l. Even whilst pursuing a 
policy of restraint, the T. U. C. reserved the right to maintain traditional differentials192. 
The difficulties in applying the 1948 statement revealed further Government 
weaknesses. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, was frustrated by Isaacs's 
evasion of Cabinet decisions on wages193. Isaacs was hostile to Cabinet requests to 
gather information on public sector wage claims194 but was forced by the Cabinet to 
concede195. Isaacs also tried to weaken the Government's ability to prevent wage 
increases by refusing to allow controlled prices to rise in line with any pay increase. In 
1945 the Government controlled the prices of items equivalent to half of consumer 
spending196. This "price-sanction" was an element of the 1948 statement197 and it 
198 was used to discourage wage rises in the hosiery dyeing and coal mining industries 
Isaacs argued that the Goverm-nent could not say whether it would permit a price rise 
before negotiations had been concluded, otherwise it would be tantamount to setting 
wages199. He also asserted the autonomy of the Agricultural Wages Board to make 
awards without government approval but was defeated in Cabinet200. 
In Autumn 1949,, nine new wages councils created in the retail sector put 
forward claims which would have increased 1.5 million workers' wages by f, 15-20 
million, pushing them above many other industries covered by wages councils. Such 
increases went against the 1948 statement, particularly as the retail distribution sector 
had been drawing labour from the ill-defined essential industries201. On 12th August 
the Cabinet flatly refused to allow such increases202. However,, Tewson203,, Bevin and 
Wilson204, pressured the Cabinet so that they "[r]eversed their earlier decision" and 
205 
allowed all the increases 
Despite these failures, officials saw the 1948 statement as a "moderating 
influence" on the second post-war cycle of wage claims206. 
Its principles were 
reiterated in Parliament in May 
1949207. It was feared, however, that further publicity 
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nt-11 about the statement would imply that it had been ignored and that the policy had 
failed208. There was the false hope of a fall in priceS209 and for a stringent policy of 
restraint210. The tougher wage regime following devaluation was portrayed the 
suspension of the "normal" policy of the 1948 statement211. By Summer 1950,, it was 
clear that given the improvements to the economy, the strict restraint could not 
continue. However, it was the effects of the Korean War which finally triggered its 
end212, 
The Government remained vacillating and divided on wages policy. There is 
evidence here of elements of Ton-flinson's iron quadrilateral, particularly in Isaacs's and 
Bevin's attitudes which undermined the policy. Wages policy was shaped by what the 
T. U. C. would concede213. It tolerated a policy of restraint, but this allowed it to bring 
pressure against the differential wages policy which the Government needed to 
influence manpower distribution214. Restraint was primarily an anti-inflation measure. 
As Evan Durbin had earlier claimed,, a differential wages policy was a key planning 
215 tool. It was one which the Government was prevented from using 
Labour Controls 
Labour controls were the only alternative to a wages policy for changing 
manpower distribution in the way the Government desired. Labour direction was 
condemned as unacceptable in peacetime. The Ministry of Labour felt it infringed the 
Declaration of Human RightS216. Beer feels that the unions were more amenable to 
labour direction than to government interference in collective bargaining217 because 
such controls were liable only to work effectively when there was a labour shortage, a 
condition not expected to last long. 
In October 1945 Morrison felt that "[c]ontrols over raw materials and 
production" were "no effective substitute 
for labour controls" in planning the 
economy. Actual direction of 
labour had almost ceased by Spring 1945, but Essential 
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Work Orders covered 9 million workers, tying thern to a job until retirement. The 
Control of Engagement Order was introduced to replace direction. It meant that 
workers had to use a labour exchange to find work where they could be encouraged to 
take more essential work. This requirement was being evaded by workers and 
employers, and it was recognised as being insufficient to affect labour distribution218 
The Cabinet effectively pursued a policy of no change219, partly because 
demobilization appeared to offer an answer. Each month 500,, 000 workers were 
entering the labour market and by mid-1946 it was expected that civil employment 
would have returned to 1939 levels. It was felt that occupations with recruitment 
difficulties could increase their attractiveness to workers by introducing better wages 
and conditions. Directing people into such jobs would absolve employers from 
making such improvements220. Apart from industries such as coal mining, agriculture 
and house construction labour controls effectively became moribund221. There was a 
dawning recognition of future problems, particularly the flow of manpower into 
distribution. Within two years, such problems led to a reassessment of labour 
222 controls 
The rethink was provoked the convertibility crisis and given impetus by 
Attlee's economic statement on 6th August 1947223. Subsequently Morrison felt that 
"some measure of negative or positive direction of labour was necessary,, 
224. Here 
"positive" meant forcing people into essential jobs. The reintroduction of the Control 
of Engagement Order was accepted by Cabinet225,, ensuring that employers only 
engaged staff via labour exchanges. People seeking work would 
be offered four 
suitable jobs in "essential" industries and would be directed 
into a job if they refused 
these. Workers in agriculture and coal mining were ftee to move within the 
industries 
226 but not leave them 
Conditions of the order meant women with family responsibilities would not be 
forced to work "unreasonable distances" from home. Builders would not 
be allowed 
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to escape by setting up their own businesses. The measure exempted managers and 
professionals. It was felt necessary though to announce that the measure would apply 
as strongly to employers as workers. CrippS227, Jay and Durbin228, as well as left- 
wing Labour backbenchers were uneasy at this apparent interference with individual 
liberty229. However, importantly the T. U. C. accepted direction as a last resort230. 
Morrison found them amenable to the re-introduction of the Order231. Isaacs was 
1.11,232 able to reassure them on a number of issues , which, as Stephen Brooke argues, 
won them over233. Given the rare success in achieving some consensus, ministerial 
discomfort that the T. U. C. had taken the lead in determining the nature of the Order 
was disregarded234. 
The 1949 economic survey stated that in 1948 only 300 of the 567,. 000 
workers placed in essential industries had had to be directed235. In 1949 490,000 
placings in these industries were made, representing 12% of the working population. 
Of these only 162 people had been directed. The Order and other labour controls 
were abolished in 1950236. The distribution of manpower continued running counter 
to the Goverm-nent's designs. Undermanned industries failed to meet their labour 
targets. Much effort had been expended on measures which proved ineffective. 
The issue of labour controls also covered the mobilization of those in 
"unproductive" employment, in particular street traders classified as "spivs", and the 
unoccupied, "drones". William Crofts highlights the near "witch hunt" mentality which 
developed among Conservative and left-wing Labour M. P. s who resented those seen 
as not contributing productively. They pressed for harsh action such as selective 
labour direction or withholding ration books. Dalton said "'idleness is a crime"'237. 
The T. U. C. raised the issue of getting such people into essential work in talks with 
ministers238. Attlee mentioned prospective measures 
in his speech of 6th August 
1947239 and an official working party was established to investigate240. 
The aim was 
to demonstrate that no-one could evade efforts to increase manpower 
in essential 
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industries. It also smacked of puritanism as those targeted often worked in nightclubs 
or the football pools. Civil servants of the officially-titled 'Spivs' And 'Drones' 
Working Party deemed such work, stimulated by inflationary pressure, as "undesirable 
activities to 24 1. However,. the policy encountered the same problems that labour 
direction faced,, of keeping track of people and curtailing the individual's right to 
choose an occupation. 
Some ministers felt that the football pools should be banned during the 
economic crisis to free female tabour. More generally it was felt that managers of 
businesses such as social clubs should register their employees, allowing them to be 
directed into suitable essential employment242. Effective registration would have 
taken two years and an additional 600-1,000 civil servants243. Ministers felt uneasy 
over enforcing the necessary stop-and-search powers244 and over the "fairness" to 
legitimate street traders245. The policy became a propaganda exercise, rather than 
effective tabour mobilization246. Though evasion was likely, the Cabinet felt it could 
247 not risk the charge that it had neglected any source of tabour 
The Registration for Employment Order, mainly affecting street traderS248 
came into force in December 1947249. By raid-April over 30,000 people had been 
registered250 and by Autumn 1949 around 7,200 people from these categories, 
predominantly women, had been placed in more essential work. This compared to a 
total of 3.25 million placings by tabour exchanges over the same period251. It 
is 
unsurprising, given all the difficulties faced, that this policy effectively came to 
nothing. 
ýLEC nuC-Prol2agan-Aa An inform Jon ? Qlicy 
The final economic tool which the Attlee govermnents endeavoured to use to 
shape the economy, was propaganda. 
The objectives differed to some extent, though 
not entirely, from. the wartime. 
However, the immediate post-war Labour 
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governments still aimed to press people to do things they would not otherwise have 
considered. Most obviously this encompassed the campaigns to encourage people to 
take employment in particular industries and to increase their productivity so as to 
i raise production across the economy. Given that the Government hoped to alter 
people's attitudes through the presentation of straightforward economic information,, 
this can also be considered as propaganda activity. 
The economic surveys, discussed in Chapter V, faced many difficulties in 
encouraging the public to change their behaviour in the way ministers wished. Crofts 
reinforces this picture by showing that across the board, the Goverment's econon-ýc 
propaganda encountered many hurdles. Ministers such as Attlee, Morrison and 
particularly Cripps, were convinced that the public could be persuaded to work harder 
and move into essential industries by being presented with information on the state of 
the economy. As Chancellor, Cripps emphasised the distinction between informing 
and exhorting the public, but, despite such protestations, it is difficult to see such a 
252 divide in the Government's activities 
At the end of the war, the Central Office of Information (C. O. I. ), headed by 
D_ 
Robert Fraser,. former Daily Herald journalist, was created. It employed 1,601 staff, 
about a third as much as its predecessor, the wartime Nfinistry of Information 
(M. O. I. ), for which Fraser had worked. The objective was to have a low-key 
department which would provide an information service usable by all departments. 
The focus shifted from the M. 01's wartime role aimed at victory to the C. 01's wider 
explanatory function combining both information and propaganda on social and 
economic issues253. The C. 0.1. was supplemented by the small Economic Information 
Unit (E. I. U. ) created in June 1947, headed by Dr. Clem Leslie,. former Director of the 
Council of Industrial Design254. 
Expenditure on publicity remained high. In 1946 L5 million was spent on 
domestic information, ten times the pre-war peak. In real terms it remained at this 
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level until the French Committee report of May 1949 led to cutbackS255. By 1947, the 
Government occupied a fifth of the country's poster sites and that year sponsored 
1,521 talks. Films, publications and newspaper advertisements were also 
important256. The Government tackled a range of issues, such as health and road 
safety, but various economic campaigns took the dominant part of expenditure. 
'Examples include the Prosperity Campaign from Spring 1946 to March 1947, which 
sought to increase output and accelerate improvement of standards of living. 
Following the crises of 1947, a more sustained approach was adopted, outlining the 
economy's plight, such as the "Report to the Nation" campaign started in October 
1947. Parallel to these was publicity to recruit staff to undermanned industries, 
257 especially agriculture, coalmining and textiles 
There was resistance to what was recognised as governmental propaganda 
from the Opposition, pressure groups like the National Housewives' League and 
unsympathetic newspapers hit by newsprint shortages258. Leslie was constantly 
frustrated by ministers who were over-optimistic about the success of campaigns and 
yet seemed to have no clear overall propaganda goalS259. The Government were slow 
to hone such skills. It was not until the popular version of the 1948 economic survey 
and the glossy Something Done pamphlet that the presentation of economic 
information in an interesting and appealing way was addressed260. 
The greatest obstacle, however, was the unreceptiveness of the public. The 
sales of government publications were generally a twentieth of the wartime levels and 
only 7% of the population listened to "serious" B. B. C. radio discussions261. After 
three months of the "Report to the Nation" campaign only 63% of the public were 
aware of it,, and. only 37% could remember even one of its twenty-six newspaper 
reports262. Mass Observation showed that the public could misinterpret the message 
the Government was aiming to impart. Before the award of Marshall Aid, 49% of the 
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public thought things were going well economically for Britain compared to 28% who 
thought things were going badly263. Rogow notes: 
of 
... it was abundantlY clear that the whole emphasis of the 1947 and 
1948 Economic Surveys had not been grasped. "264 
Thus the efforts at exhortation in the vaunted annual surveys appeared to be wasted. 
The public were often even confused by long-running campaigns, for example 
on the need to increase exports. The public's attitudes were shaped more as 
consumers than producers. Few believed their efforts could alleviate the crises. 
Boredom also developed in the face of incessant exhortation265. There was a lack of 
follow-up action to campaigns, so even the willing waited in vain to be told how to 
h 266 elp 
Economic propaganda was also aimed at industrialists and managers. There 
were regular C. O. I. publications, such as Target which covered productivity issues. 
Bulletin for Indusir-y was sent to 12,000 leading industrialists and trade unionists, and 
the one-off Tell the Worker, went to 25,000 Managing DirectorS267. Tiratsoo and 
Tomlinson portrayed such government attempts to improve industrial efficiency as 
"weak". This was despite using the Development Councils and the Anglo-American 
Council on Productivity (A-A. C. P. ) which aimed to disseminate information on 
successful U. S. industrial practice268. Business,. experiencing high profits, saw little to 
gain from such schemes and was able to moderate the extent of government 
initiatives269. Industrialists felt that they knew best and were only willing to swallow 
270 such advice to avoid stronger government measures 
Given the failure of economic publicity to achieve change it is unsurprising that 
by 1949 the Government was yielding to pressure to curtail such activity, which, by 
1948,. was annually costing 6s (30p) per head of population. In 1949 Morrison 
acknowledged the demands by business, the press and politicians for an enquiry 
into 
271 the propaganda machine The Cabinet established the French Committee to 
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conduct the enquiry. It was chaired by Sir Henry French, Director-General of the 
British Film Producers' Association, and consisted of three civil servants and a 
joumalist. Its report of July 1949 vindicated the existence of the C. O. I. and 
recognised some improvement in the public's knowledge of economic circumstances,, 
particularly through focused campaigns. However, it pressed for a sharp cut in 
general economic propaganda. Most of the report's proposals had been fulfilled by the 
time it was produced. In the financial year 1949/50, the Government, recognising that 
this particular instrument, the last one remaining for it to shape the economy, had 
failed,, cut L832,000 from the L6 million overall information budget272. By the 1951/2 
financial year the budget was down to L2.42 million, a fall of two-thirds in real terms 
since 1947273. 
Conclusions 
Shonfield claims that the "controls were the very stuff of economic planning" 
producing "in effect a war economy with civilian purposes, 274. However, the 
Government faced a multiplicity of demands and he argues that directing the economy 
was beyond the ability of the government machine275. Particularly from 1949 
onwards the contradiction between the desires to shape the economy and yet remove 
276. - satisfaction" and controls became more acute I agree that there was "self- 
complacency about the Government's economic policies and a failure to introduce 
positive "carrot" measures to supplement the "sticks" of control277. Brooke argues 
that it was the failure to effect a policy to shape the distribution of labour which 
changed the nature of Labour's socialism and set perimeters to the scope of its policy- 
278 
making, partly through the unions blocking potential "avenues" of policy 
Tomlinson counters this by pointing to the spectrum of trade union and Cabinet 
opinion. Instead he highlights the binding effects of the iron quadrilateral 
assumptions279. I see a path between these two, most clearly with wages policy. 
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Isaacs was able to use the ingrained assumptions of most of his colleagues to oppose 
initiatives which ran counter to the T. U. C. 's line. 
Behind these debates lies the issue of how far Keynesian ideas were being 
adopted. The post-war Economic Section has been portrayed as particularly 
Keynesian280. Meade's enthusiasm for demand management was apparent in late 
1946, though linked to the implementation rather than the replacement of planning. 
He emphasised balancing long-term supply and demand and the use of fiscal tools to 
281 execute plans 
Tomlinson controversially suggests that true Keynesianism was not attempted 
282 until the 1970s, because full employment removed the need for deficit financing 
G. C. Peden claims that Daltods first three Budgets ran counter to a Keynesian 
approach. He and Booth feel that the change came in November 1947 with Keynesian 
methods being used to counter inflation. Booth believes that 1947's crises removed 
the obstacles which planning represented thus allowing the true adoption of demand 
manageMent283. In Peden's view, the practical concerns encouraging decontrol 
fostered the greater use of fiscal meanS284 as Dalton and senior civil servants in fact 
remained unconvinced about the worth of KeynesianiSM285. Rollings sees the 
adoption of Keynesianism as passing through a number of steps: at the 194 1, 
November 1947 and 1948 Budgets. However, he believes that the process was not 
complete until the mid-1950S286. Clearly Keynesian analysis was adopted years before 
quasi-Keynesian policies were introduced. By the 1950 Budget it was clear that 
Cripps and the Labour Party, had been converted to Keynesian-style disinflationary 
analysis and a degree of demand management. Brooke argues this laid the ground for 
the subsequent consensus between Labour and the Conservatives on demand 
management, known as "Butskellism"287. 
Booth believes that despite Whitehall becoming amenable to Keynesianism 
there was no "revolution" as continuities in economic policy outweighed 
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discontinuities. As he shows,, wartime compromises led to a simplification of 
Keynesianism away from the subtleties of Keynes's inter-war writingS288. The 
Keynesian approach was "contorted, reshaped" and simplified. Its effects were more 
political than economic, focusing attention on the maintenance of full employment for 
289 the next thirty years 
This chapter demonstrates that none of the tools considered for implementing 
plans worked. However, the adoption of Keynesian techniques was gradual. Demand 
management did not fully become an effective alternative to direct controls before the 
end of the Korean War shortages in the mid-1950s. Between 1945-51 the economy 
was guided by short-term solutions to immediate problems against the background of 
controls countering the effects of shortages and inflationary pressure. A clear example 
is the Cabinet's attempt in January 1947 to solve manpower shortages revealed by the 
economic survey through immediate measures including tabour conscription for 
women, postponing raising the school leaving age290 and cutting the size of the armed 
forces and Civil Service. However, no department was willing to countenance such 
measures291. This showed the difficulty of solving such problems even by ad hoc 
attempts. As discussions around the Full Employment Bill revealed, ministers were 
aware that time was running out to introduce more permanent long-term instruments, 
yet due to disagreements and fear of electoral liabilities they failed to do this. Such 
failure is at the root of the justified charge that the Labour Governments did not run a 
planned economy 1945-51. 
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Chai)ter Va 
The Economic Surveys - An Overview Introduction 
Chapter III established that those in government who gave thought to 
economic planning agreed on the need for a comprehensive survey of the British 
economy. This impetus led to a series of economic surveys combining information, 
statistics and forecasts from a range of ministries. The material was presented 
annually in a form digestible by senior civil servants, ministers and, from 1947 
onwards, by the public. 
The surveys were the most tangible and public expression of British attempts at 
economic planning and this is why Chapter V forms the backbone to this thesis. 
Throughout Labours time in office, work producing them occupied many of the 
planners for several months each year and tied in with other forecasting by the 
planning staff and other departments. Both the files dealing with their production and 
the surveys themselves allow historians to gauge the evolving oýinions of those in 
government on the policy of planning and their ways of working. 
There are a number of common strands which run through the analysis of the 
economic surveys. The surveys demonstrate the views held on the statistics that were 
becoming increasingly available to government and, more importantly, the differences 
over the way information on the economy should be used and presented, particularly in 
approaches to the public. This chapter also analyses the changing priorities given to 
different sectors of the economy, a picture admirably illustrated by the surveys. There 
was a clear move away from the wartime emphasis on manpower and production 
figures to a greater concern for the balance of payments and reserves. Finally the 
surveys were the most public face of British economic planning and so allow a study 
of the response of the press, reflecting public opinion on the policy, an aspect 
overlooked in other economic studies of these issues. 
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The desire for a clear picture of the economy was natural given the legacy of 
the wartime economy and the importance of fall employment policies. For many 
officials and ministers the surveys seemed able to provide the statistics necessary to 
make economic planning possible. However, as Rogow notes, Cripps commented in 
January 1950 that "the Economic Surveys were not meant as a basis for economic 
planning". Cripps argued that the annual review of investment was more important to 
planningl. In fact neither was used effectively for planning. Despite this and Rogow's 
observation that "the Surveys preferred to place the emphasis on patriotic endeavour 
for the common good"2 rather than on planning tools, one cannot ignore the planning 
rhetoric contained in the surveys. 
In November 1944 Meade had highlighted the collection of statistics for full 
employment as a key post-war job for the Economic Section. By December work had 
begun on national income forecasts for a survey3. However, the development of such 
analysis can also be seen as laying the foundations for demand management which 
ultimately superseded planning as the main post-war technique for shaping the 
economy. 
The survey the Economic Section was preparing in Winter 1944/5 was falsified 
by rapidly changing developments in the war. Consequently Meade emphasised the 
need for flexibility and a range of "possible alternative assumptions" when plan-ning4. 
By March 1945 the production of forecasts for a survey had been assigned to the 
Economic Section and the C. S. 0.5. In June Bridges began investigating how the 
statistics necessary for a full employment policy could be assembled6. Meade believed 
that a peacetime survey would have to be concerned not solely with manpower but 
also national income and expenditure which would reflect demand and hence 
employment. Such a survey would be the "bridge" between physical and financial 
controls. Comi-deration would also have to be given to transition to a full peacetime 
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economy and to external factors, particularly commercial and commodity policies7. 
That summer the Economic Section and C. S. O. were invited by the Treasury to 
produce a target for national expenditure which would sustain full employment over 
the following five years. Meade believed that it was around September 1945 that the 
idea of long-term economic planning became established in the Civil Service8 and 
Britain entered an era of "Joy through Statistics"9. 
By October 1945, with the creation of the E. D. Committee, the machinery was 
in place to work on the economic surveys". Meade believed that the survey should 
be based on what departments anticipated for the coming year including probable 
changes in output and employment. It should show macro-economic aggregates of 
resources and requirements. The main purpose was to wam of impending inflation or 
deflation, allowing the government to implement counter-measures and to maintain full 
employmentll. Economic Section, C. S. O. and, later, C. E. P. S. officials combined on 
such work through the E. S W. P. 
The first post-war survey, the Economic Survey for 1946, was circulated to 
the Cabinet in February 1946. It was not referred to in parliament12. Bridges was 
concerned about its "mathematical accuracy"13. E. D. Committee officials worried 
about revealing a gap between expected demand and resources and did not wish the 
survey to become "regarded as an annual event"14. Caimcross writes that the 
Government was concerned that publishing the survey would arouse public demands 
for details of an economic plan which it did not have15. Such worries persisted even 
when the Economic Survey for 1947 was readied for publication the next February. 
The bulk of this third survey was written by the Economic Sectiods Ronald Tress and 
the C. S. O. 's Jack Stafford. 16. Otto Clarke drafted most of the public version. Cripps 
wrote the introduction in the Prime Minister's name17. 
In Summer 1946,, between the 1946 and 1947 surveys, came the Economic 
18. Despite continuing concerns about accuracy", this interim 
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survey was designed to show how assessing the economy could be an ongoing 
process. It advanced the figures from the 1946 survey by one quarter into 1947. 
Though officials anticipated that the survey would "enable ministers to reach 
conclusions on the basis of which a plan may be drawn up"20, for some unknown 
reason it was never presented to the Cabinet. 
By late 1946, given the interest in the surveys it appeared that they would be 
an'"lannual event", possibly with quarterly updates. The production of the 1946 survey 
had been determined by when the war ended, that is August 1945. A working party, 
established in September 1946, considered the timetable for subsequent surveys, either 
21 by calendar or financial year . It was argued that the surveys had to provide input 
into budgetary decisions. However, a white paper of the survey had to avoid revealing 
Budget secrets. A survey adjusted to accord with the Budget could not be published 
until May of the year it surveyed. Officials believed that the public would understand a 
calendar year approach more easily22 matching the practice for the national income 
and expenditure white paper, elements of which would be important for the survey. 
November or December were deemed the best months for the parliamentary debate 
but such a timetable would allow ministers insufficient opportunity to digest a survey 
before discussing it. A survey ready in August or September would be inaccurate by 
the time of the parliamentary debate. 
It was decided to begin work on each year's survey in August and present it to 
the E. D. Committee by late November. The survey and its draft white paper, 
including "unadjusted figures" plus E. D. Committee comments, would go to ministers 
in December. Unisters would be encouraged to make decisions on the basis of the 
survey before the end of the year. The "adjusted" survey would be returned to 
ministers by mid-January. There would be a final revision, publication and a 
parliamentary debate on it in February23. This was the model adopted for the surveys, 
though publication was increasingly delayed24. 
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In November 1946 the Government promised that a large-scale economic 
debate would follow the survey's publication in February 1947. The debate came a 
fortnight later, fitting the timetable perfectly25. The Government's tone in the debate 
was apologetic, blaming the economic uncertainties following the war for the lack of 
planning previously and for preventing projections more than a year ahead26. 
Despite changes to the planning machine in Summer 1947, the E. S, W. P. 
remained the central body for handling the surveyý'27. Initially, the C. E. P. S. and 
Economic Section had joint responsibility for the surveys. However, in October 1947, 
a dispute arose between Robinson of the C. E. P. S. and Butt of the Economic Section. 
Both were determined that their organization should be primarily responsible. 
Plowden was able to resolve this demarcation dispute, aided by his good relationship 
with HaII28,, and the surveys became the C. E. P. S. 's concern with assistance from the 
Economic Section" 
Originally the Lord President oversaw the surveys. From 1948 they came 
under the auspices of the Chancellor in his role as Minister for Economic Affairs. The 
survey's figures were collated by the E. S. W. P. which was chaired by the Director of 
the Economic Section and included the Director of the C. S. O. and a "senior member" 
of the C. E. P. S.. After the creation of the E. P. B. it also commented on the different 
versions of the survey. By the end of 1950, the E. P. C. was supposed to carry out the 
important task of determining how the survey should be presented to the public30. 
However,. the Production Committee,, formed in October 1947 and chaired by the 
Chancellor, had become the main ministerial body for scrutinizing the survey before it 
was sent to the Cabinet and remained so for the rest of Labour's time in office. 
Having established the background to the economic surveys, this thesis will 
now study each in turn. 
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Chai)ter Vb 
The U ublished Surveys 
The Economic, Survey for 1946 
The 1946 survey, though never published, was the first comprehensive 
examination of the whole economy. Meade had integrated the idea of an economic 
survey into his model of economic planning and established the link between the twol. 
He saw planning as adapting economic policy in "the light of' the survey. In fine with 
his "Liberal- Socialist "2 approach, Meade believed that the survey should focus on 
aggregate figures of requirements and resources, especially manpower3, but avoid 
consideration of individual industries. Despite the emphasis on manpower, which 
reflected wartime practices, as a Keynesian, Meade believed that monetary indicators 
best illustrated likely inflationary pressure. By November 1945, the 1946 survey gave 
national income and expenditure priority over manpower4. 
The survey's key task was to show the "gap" between requirements and 
resources5. It had three main tables,, covering manpower, balance of payments and 
national income and expenditure. All three showed "gaps", but that for the balance of 
payments was the only one officials termed "real" as it would result in a trade deficit. 
The "'notional' gaps" of manpower, and income and expenditure would manifest as 
investment programmes which could not be carried out due to shortages of labour or 
capital6. The level of demand which was indicated was an aggregate of the projects 
which government departments regarded as of the highest priority. It did not reflect 
the total anticipated level of potential demand in the economy. The 1946 survey also 
outlined priorities that proved to be enduring: most importantly the need to increase 
exports, particularly to dollar markets, and the need for saving to reduce inflationary 
pressure. 
The survey revealed the level of inflationary pressure generated by the L6.1 
billion of savings available for consumption in a period of shortages. The gap between 
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total supply and demand was estimated at 6%. Consumption was expected to be 93% 
of the 1938 level. Expenditure on tobacco, beer, entertainment and travel had 
rocketed whilst the consumption of furniture stood at 45% of the pre-war level and of 
clothes at 65%. Continued high saving levels were needed to counter inflation7. No 
method was suggested for raising them to the 20% of the national income,, some 
11.54 billion, deemed necessary. In 1938 savings had been only 8% of the national 
income. Fiscal measures would have to "restrain demand" and investment had to be 
restricted. 
At the time private investment stood at 0 10 million and public at 
L325 million, mainly for housing. A 5-10% rise was expected in 19468. Restricting 
investment soon proved to be a difficult task9. The survey ambitiously aimed for a 
balance of payments by mid-1947. It predicted imports would rise by 35% in 1946 to 
il billion, a level 10% less than in 1938. As exports were expected to reach only 
L700 million, 75% of the 1938 level, a trade deficit would persist. Rapidly rising 
import prices was another enduring difficulty. All sorts of supplies had to be increased 
to reduce prices. Demands had to be "pruned". The survey suggested that the 
Government would find it easiest to carry out cuts from its own expenditure, then 
running at f, 2.275 billion per yearIO 
Despite some misgivings in Whitehall about the focus on manpowerll,, it was 
an important theme in the survey. The metal, chemical and engineering industries had 
swollen by about 50% during the war. Most industries were expected to return to 
their pre-war patterns. This would disadvantage export industries, a sector in which 
the Board of Trade wanted to double the workforce from its current leve112. The rise 
could be promoted by reducing domestic demand to encourage more production to go 
into exports. However,. if the supplies available to the home market were not matched 
by a reduction in consumer demand this would just exacerbate the inflationary 
pressures. 
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The coal and textile industries and agriculture were also going to be 
undermanned. Though unemployment was expected to reach 500,000 by the end of 
1946, the search for additional labour continued. The survey estimated that the rate of 
demobilization planned for 1946 would mean a shortfall of 800,, 000 industrial 
workers13. In the House of Commons debate on manpower in February Attlee made 
it clear that there would be no "endeavour to control labour"14. However, - 
it was 
feared that cuts in manpower or resources to bring about transfers of labour would not 
necessarily fall on the least essential industries. 
The first complete, draft of the 1946 survey was ready by 12th December 
194515. It was considered by the E. D. Committee16 and the LR(L) Sub-committee17 
before reaching the Cabinet on 7th February18. The compilers remained concerned 
about its mathematical accuracy. Its key revelation was that labour demands exceeded 
supply by 1.3 million and that despite cuts in government programmes, national 
expenditure would exceed national income by L500 million19. 
The major consequence was to persuade senior officials of the need to 
accelerate the cuts in armed forces' manpower and recognise that Britain could not 
sustain its expenditure on "the whole defence machine" and "simultaneously reconvert" 
British industry "to peace productionif2O. To relieve inflationary pressure it was 
agreed investment had to be reduced2l with capital being concentrated on in-defined 
"essential" sectors22. The Cabinet's confirmation of the suggested cuts in military 
manpower in February, it can be argued, was the sole achievement of the survey23. 
Aside from the Civil Service, the armed forces were the only sector of employment 
over which the Government had total control. Service personnel were used as a pool 
to fill the manpower "gap" but the Government could only give guidance as to which 
industries demobilised people joined, it could not control their choices. 
Towards the end of 1945, disagreement arose over the level of publicity for 
planning. Though it was recognised that the public believed that a plan was 
being 
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prepared, officials felt it would be difficult to make any statement about planning when 
no plan was ready. It was thought best just to mention that the Government was 
surveying the country's resources to ensure their most eff 24 ective use . Senior 
officials25 favoured a general parliamentary discussion26. This was realised in the 
Commons manpower debate of February 1946. 
Some officials, including Bridges, referred to the survey as a plan27 or "an 
instalment" of one28. Robinson saw the survey as only a predictor of upcoming 
emergencies, unrelated to planning29. Meade similarly believed that it did not 
constitute a plan and feared that any publicity about planning would arouse 
embarrassing public "clamour" for details30. There were such calls at the British 
Employers' Confederation conference in March 194631. That January, however, the 
M. E. P. had effectively blocked publication of the survey. Morrison thought it was 
important to use it to secure the co-operation of industry and the public, but Cripps 
felt that publication could establish a dangerous precedent and could embarrass the 
Crovemment when the slurnp came32 
Ministers agreed that some reference should be made to planning in 
Parliament. Morrison aimed to make a statement that left out complex facts and 
figures which were uncertain at this experimental stage33. Leslie Rowan, the Prime 
Minister's Principal Private Secretary, preferred a more technical statement. Morrison 
was torn between making the M. P. s "face the hard and sometimes inconvenient facts" 
,, 34 
about the economy and taking them "too far into our secrets . His eventual 
statement was simple and it came during the manpower debate as Rowan had 
wished35. 
The manpower debate of 27th-28th February was the closest in 1946 that 
Parliament came to discussing economic planning. It involved Oliver Lyttelton, the 
Conservative spokesman on trade and industry and former Minister of Production, and 
Ellis Smith, who had recently returned to Labour's backbenches. They were to be 
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regular contributors to subsequent planning debates. Attlee stated that despite lacking 
1136 all the data,. the Government had "set itself to formulating a working plan for 1946 
Morrison made vague references to the planning machine and the Government being 
"actively engaged in surveying the resources available" and "economic investigations 
it37 o938 and surveys , as the first steps towards "sound planning and fuller democracy 
The response to the references to planning were mixed. Demonstrating a 
degree of consensus between the Government and the Opposition, the Liberal M. P. 
Frank Byers39,, and the Conservative Norman Bower welcomed "the age of 
planning40. Another Conservative,. Alexander Spearman, criticised the Government 
"for having no plans or inadequate plans", insisting that an industrialised country like 
Britain would "have to have planning"41. Other Conservatives such as William 
Shepherd42 and Nigel Birch called for "proper targets and priorities" for industry. 
Birch claimed correctly that there was "no master plan at the top", leaving a partial 
"statistical blackout". He wanted more comprehensible economic information to be 
presented to the public but believed exhortation could not boost production. Birch felt 
that it was "the job of the State to plan the shape of the national income" and to leave 
planning at the operational level to business43. Ellis Smith called for a Cabinet 
planning committee and an annual debate to review the progress of planning44. In 
contrast,. Lyttelton viewed the attempts at planning as "a sham" and feared the 
beginning of "a period of goverment by exhortation" - He argued that planning could 
not work without unacceptable labour direction45- 
The discussion over publicity for the survey continued within government. In 
I 
March 1946 Sir John Woods, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, argued that 
"the fullest possible publicity should be given to planning figures". Oliver Franks, 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, saw planning as "dependent on co- 
operation from industry and the public" which made it "essential" to present the 
Government's plans "in the most concrete terms". Hitchman of the Ministry of Labour 
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disliked revealing the assumptions about unemployment. However, Douglas Jay, the 
Prime Minister's Economic Adviser,. and Sir Wilffid Eady, a Second Secretary of the 
Treasury argued that the public now saw "an unemployment figure of 300,000 - 
500,. 000" as llnormaI46. 
Meade,, by emphasising the lack of experience of the officials producing the 
survey, discouraged its publication. He suggested that no figures should be made 
public, certainly not before ministers had decided how to fill the "gaps" and probably 
not for another year. The advice senior officials gave ministers was even more 
cautious. They emphasised that the survey's forecasts were "merely intended to 
indicate the probable trend of events as a guide to policy and administration" and help 
them take decisions which ensured that the forecasts were "falsified". They felt any 
publications should be confined to "past results" as it was believed that once the 
expected slump arrived the survey would simply sap public confidence47. This 
highlights the dichotomy between the desire to involve the public and a fear of 
alarming them. However, the survey did demonstrate the kind of statistics it was 
possible to assemble and how quickly. Meade argued that though unpublished, the 
survey still had an important role, most notably in accelerating demobilization48, 
Indeed,. this was the last occasion that evidence provided by an economic survey led 
directly to ministerial action. 
The Economic Survey for 1946-47 
In January 1946 the E. D. Committee recommended breaking the survey down 
into quarterly as well as annual figures, to chart progress towards the end of year 
targets49. The Economic Survey for 1946-47 simply advanced the 1946 survey's 
figures to the end of the financial year 1946/750. Officials felt that the public could be 
persuaded to accept the unemployment estimate of 550,000 
for March 194751 but 
believed that the Government could not show a gap between requirements and 
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resources52. Secord criticised the continued obsession with a SIUMP53. The approach, 
however, was unchanged. This second survey was still an "experiment", but officials 
felt it should be "a quantified expression of the pattern which the Government seeks to 
bring about", linked to the 1947 Budget but not as an "arbitrarily imposed" plan54. 
The survey was produced between early April and the end of May 194655. It 
was passed by the E. D. Committee to some ministers in July - precisely which ones is 
unclear56. Though many of the 1946 survey's figures were used, the new survey 
indicated "some serious problems"57 and highlighted recent decisions, such as 
accelerated demobilization, taken by ministers since the spring58. The working 
population was still falling due to retirements and women leaving employment. This 
was expected to create a gap of 360,000 workers by March 1947. The distortion 
towards engineering, metals and chemicals persisted, but these were important export 
sectors". The greatest change was in the armed forces. Whereas the 1946 survey 
had envisaged 1.75 million in the forces and 850,000 in their support industries by the 
end of 194660,, the figures had now fallen respectively to 1.16 million and 500,000 by 
March 194761. Concerns continued about undermanning in the coal, textile and 
agricultural sectors whilst the distribution sector, though still smaller than pre-war, 
was expanding rapidly and drawing in much labour. 
The balance of payments deficit was growing faster, but wages and profits 
more slowly than had been predicted in the 1946 survey. The interim survey also 
showed investment, demand and consumption rising, and government expenditure 
falling. It indicated a gap of around 3% between national income and expenditure. 
Consumption was now some 95% of the 193 8 level, but inflationary pressure remained 
high62. 
The "coal problem" was the "all pervasive" element of the new survey, because 
industries essential for Britain's recovery, in particular steel and bricks, were heavy 
users. The target had been 740,000 miners by the end of the year 
but there was 
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already a shortfall of 40,, 000. Demand for coal from industry in general had risen by 
21/2% and by 4% in the gas and electricity sectors. Coal stocks had already fallen to 
only 6.7 million tons. A gap of 10 million tons was expected by winter, a level likely 
to cause unemployment. As early as May 1946, the survey had recognised the need 
for "quick and drastic remedies" to the approaching crisis. It suggested gloomily that 
there was no real solution,, except possibly importing labour63. 
Maynard Keynes was sceptical of the surveys' validity. He did not openly 
attack them,, but by supporting use of the calendar year basis and opposing publication, 
he apparently hoped they would collapse of their own accord. Meade complained in 
January 1946, that Keynes was making "a nuisance of himself' about the survey 
particularly on the gap between national income and expenditure64. Keynes did not 
reveal the full extent of his feelings until April, just before he died, when he argued 
against continuing the surveys on the grounds that they could neither be accurate nor 
could the plans drawn from them be implemented65. Though disappointed by 
Keynes's stance, Meade remained convinced that the surveys were valid and necessary 
to implement Keynesianism. 
The issue of publicity arose again. The E. D. Committee believed that now 
ministers had taken decisions to close the gaps, the "risks of publication" were "worth 
taking"66. Nichol-son felt that publicity was necessary to secure public co-operation in 
executing a plan. Additionally when the facts were revealed people would be shocked 
because they had previously been kept uninformed67. Bridges recogni-sed that the 
annual publication of economic surveys would be important in showing not just "mere 
forecasts" but also the Government's objective& However, given that the economy 
had not yet returned to peacetime patterns, he felt publication would be premature68. 
in June 1946 Bridges warned minister. -, that published targets which proved wrong 
would "prejudice the whole principle of economic planning in the public mind". 
Isaacs 
agreed, but like Bridges, felt that once conditions stabilised the public 
had to be kept 
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informedO. -One can see the enduring conflict between the desire of ministers and 
officials to satisfy demands for economic information and the fear that mistaken 
targets would open planning to sharp criticism. This chimes in closely with Hennessy's 
view of "Whitehall's failure-avoidance culture" whereby officials' behaviour was 
shaped by the fear that whatever they did was liable to come under critical scrutiny70. 
Though the unpublished surveys' figures may not have been accurate, they did indicate 
the direction the economy was moving in terms of industrial patterns, the continued 
inflationary pressures and the forthcoming coal and employment problems. However, 
as demonstrated in Chapter IV, ministers did little about the problems that were 
revealed. 
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ChaZer Vc 
The Economic Survey for 1947 
Despite lingering qualms about what could be publicly revealed, the 1947 
survey was the first to be published. The survey's immediate purpose, however, was 
to provide information to enable ministers to produce what officials termed a "rough 
programme" for the economyl. It portrayed 1947 as the "terminal year" in the 
transition to a peacetime econoMY2. Demobilization was ending and the armed forces 
and their support industries could no longer be regarded as a labour pool for industry. 
Work on the 1947 survey allowed the success of the two previous surveys' 
forecasts to be gauged. Rather than rising by 125,000, as predicted in the 1946 
survey, the working population had fallen by 220,0003. The anned forces' strength 
had been trimmed back from 2.758 million in March 19464 to 1.385 million at the start 
of 19475. This compared to 1.75 million predicted in the 1946 survey6. The interim 
survey for 1946-7 had proven slightly more accurate. Unemployment was 90,000 less 
than it had forecast. Its predictions of the working population had been wrong by only 
72,000 on a total of around 20 n-fillion. The 1947 survey anticipated a shortfall of 
325,000 workers, mainly affecting the coal mining, textiles, clothes, brick and clay 
industries7. 
Though manpower remained a central concern, national income and 
expenditure dorninated the 1947 survey It adopted two models of consumption: 
Assumptions A and B. Both were very optimistic about the amount of saving that the 
public would undertake voluntarily. Assumption A was based on the level of saving of 
1938ý, 7.3% of national income, and B used the minimum level of saving that would 
permit every government department to fulfil its investment programme, that was 
12%. Assumption Ns pattern would result in a gap between national income and 
expenditure of L648 million, for B, L226 million8. Early drafts of the survey suggested 
this could be reduced by employing more women and foreigners; increasing 
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productivity and reducing government expenditure. Investment would have to be 
limited as it would be difficult to fund from the savings anticipated9. 
Inflationary pressure was viewed as a growing potential problem because the 
abolition of controls was "a major objective of policy"10, emphasised by Morrison in 
his October 1946 speechll. By November 1946 the objective was to "target" a 
national income which would avoid inflation. However, the Chancellor,, Dalton, never 
enthusiastic about the surveys, intimated that forecasting capital expenditure would be 
impossible until the distribution of physical resources had been determined12 
Nicholson pointed out this meant planning decisions would be left too late to be 
effectivel3. 
Unemployment, at 350,000, was lower than had been expected and wages 
were 7 1/2% higher than in 1946. This meant an increased potential for consumption 
and hence inflationary pressure14, especially as supplies to the consumer had been 
hampered by export needs and deteriorating terms of trade. Though exports were 
50% greater than in 1938 they now only paid for the equivalent of 83% of 1938's 
imports15. The balance of payments deficit was expected to be E218 million16,. thus 
more manpower was needed to boost export industries. The industries designated as 
being in Group 111, mainly metals, chemicals and engineering, had grown greatly 
during the war and were important for exports but drew labour from the traditional 
basic industries such as coal, textiles and agriculture. These sectors plus building 
materials still needed more workers and their shortages hit export and raw material 
production17 
The economic survey showed that coal output and the attendance record of 
miners had improved but this was countered by the release of men drafted 
during the 
war into minmg, the nse in the school leaving age and the five-day week. 
To get the 
190 million tons of coal needed, productivity had to rise by 30 tons per man per year. 
A shortage of 3-5 million tons was expected by 194718. The harsh weather 
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exacerbated this and stocks fell below 4 million tons which was deemed to be 
minimum needed to satisfy the natioWs demands". Domestic shortages ruled out any 
coal exports which prevented the import of timber in exchange and affected the 
housing programme. The electricity shortage was linked both to coal and to the need 
for more generating equipment20. 
In later drafts of the survey officials stated that "the distribution schemes for 
scarce materials" could be "a potent influence in determining the general shape of the 
economy", contrasting to comments in earlier versions about controls becoming 
"increasingly unreal"21. The emphasis on controls reflected a ministerial rhetoric 
which had not been thought through. The survey continued to show an increasing 
awareness of how interlinked the economic problems were. With its emphasis on 
national income and expenditure it also reflected a more Keynesian approach. Despite 
this shift targets for individual industrial sectors remained, reflecting the persistence of 
support for more quantitative approaches. 
The E. D. Committee finalised the first draft in December 1946 before 
forwarding it to ministerS22. It was accompanied by a detailed minute on how the 
survey's objectives could be achieved23. Nicholson wrote to Morrison that he felt that 
the "worst bottleneck" was the slow progress in providing the public with economic 
information24. Morrison, however, remained keen for the surveys to look more than 
one year ahead though some ministers remained reluctant. Cripps feared that with so 
much information unavailable, planning could be discredited. Dalton remained 
concerned about revealing Budget secrets25. However, to avoid this risk, as early as 
November 1946 Meade had already suggested producing a separate public version26. 
officials revised the survey to make it accessible. Bridges encouraged a colloquial 
tone27. 
At the M. E. P. meeting to consider the draft in January 1947, Morrison, soon 
to fafl ill, suggested the survey would be the basis of a white paper, a popular version 
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and an associated parliamentary debate. It would guide immediate administrative 
action for long-term planning28 and negotiations with the N. J. A. C. and N. P. A. C. 1.29. 
M. E. P. supported the E. D. Committee's controversial recommendations to postpone 
raising the school leaving age and to conscript women to work in factories to fill the 
manpower gap30. 
The Cabinet scrutinized the 1947 survey more than any other. They discussed 
it five times in the month to mid-February, mostly focusing on altering manpower 
distribution. Due to Morrison's illness, Cripps took his place in presenting the survey. 
Tff - He called for a "concerted plan" to close the supply and demand gap revealed by the 
survey. It was emphasised that quick Cabinet decisions were needed so that they 
could be debated in Parliament by the end of Februa 1 
Ministers recognised that though the survey's statistics were open to error, 
there was "no escape from the broad conclusion that the nation's economy was 
overburdened". They felt that "special efforts would have to be made to present to the 
public the broad facts" to encourage "increased efficiency and effort"32. The Cabinet 
rejected all the manpower recommendations so Cripps doubted whether "it would be 
wise" to publish a survey which failed to propose any remedies. Some ministers felt it 
was enough for the survey just to form the basis for appeals for increased productivity 
and wage restraint. Due to the "divergent" views of ministers the final decision on 
publication was postponed33. 
William Gorell Barnes, the Prime Minister's personal assistant, was "very 
disturbed" by the lack of a firm decision on publication. He argued that harsh 
decisions could be portrayed positively34, but that failure to publish would draw 
criticism fi7om the Government's sympathisers as well as its opponents35. 
Sir Norman 
Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, told Attlee to simply announce to the Cabinet that 
publication would proceed36, which he did37 and work 
began on preparing it for 
public consumption. 
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Bridges portrayed the survey as adopting "the same general approach as the 
Monnet Plan" in that it needed the "combined effort of the whole nation and 
demanded co-operation between Government, industry and the people"38. This 
suggests that leading officials saw the survey as potentially providing part of a 
comprehensive economic plan. The draft version for publication was first scrutinized 
by an ad hoc committee of ministers and senior officials,, chaired by the Prime 
Minister". The officials were keen on publication and a date was confirmed. The 
meeting effectively established a number offaites accompli for the Cabinet40 which 
eased this draft's passage4l. For example, it was determined that the facts should be 
revealed,. however "unpalatable" they were42. 
Officials had decided that the published version had to be "degapped", i. e. the 
income and expenditure deficits had to be concealed43. Bridges wrote that the survey 
still demonstrated Britain's "grave" position and the possibility that the country might 
"never restore the foundations of our national life"44. A version in late January 1947, 
stated, revealingly, that "priority has been given to the short-term job" though a plan 
was still "being developed"45. Such candid material from the early versions was later 
expunged. Instead, the final version adopted a tone of enthusiastic sacrifice. 
The manpower gap of 350,000 was deceitfully shown as 250,000 which could 
be overcome by a 11/4% increase in productivity. The targets for exports of 150% of 
the 193 8 level and for 1.5 million workers in textiles, were retained though 
departments knew these could not be met. The survey emphasised the balance of 
payments and rebuilding the basic industrieS46. Meade felt that it was important to 
include details of how a plan would be executed47. The sections which were included 
in earlier drafts referred vaguely to drawing up supply and demand "budgets" and the 
various economic "instruments" the Government had48. These were omitted 
from the 
final version49, due to uncertainty among officials about the availability and 
effectiveness of relevant economic tools5O. 
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Unlike the version printed on green paper5l to inform officials and ministers, 
the White Paper aimed to elicit public support. The White Paper was only 36 pages 
compared to the "green"'s 53, as much was summarised or omitted. The White Paper 
was like a manifesto,, with an introduction in the Prime Minister's name. It requested 
everyone to devote "themselves unflinchingly to the task"52 of reviving the economy. 
In return the Government would "take the people frankly into its confidence"53. 
There was a constant emphasis on a "democratic" approach to avoid criticisms that the 
Government was behaving dictatorially. 
The two popular versions of the survey were The Battle for OutMA, 1947, 
comp . ed yt Central Office of Information (C. O. I. ) and the eleven-page Labour's 
Plan for 1947, written for party members by Douglas Jay who had ceased being 
Attlee's economic assistant to become a Labour M. P. in July 1946. The BattlC for 
OuW! 
p 
1947 was 48 pages long and priced at 6d (21/2p); it sold 200,000 copies. 
Despite a few diagrams it was little different from the White Paper54. Rogow 
demonstrates that the language of both the White Paper and The Battle for Output, 
1947, was shown to be confusing and often misinterpreted by the public55. Mass 
Observation viewed the popular version as "'incapable of directly influencing most of 
the population to any great degree"', including "'Millions of sensible and intelligent 
citizens in responsible production jobs. "56. 
Labour's Plan foL-1947, costing 2d(4/5p), portrayed the survey as "a detailed 
Plan". It was an eulogy to the Government's economic record. It reiterated that 
recovery needed the public's co-operation and suggested smoking less American 
tobacco, being economical with fuel, and pressed women to work in essential 
industries. It smacked of Stakhanovitism. and spoke of forming groups of "'shock 
workers"'57. 
The White Paper presented the survey as the "blueprint" for reconciling 
requirements and resources and ensuring that the essentials 
had priority58. Though 
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personal choices were important, some would be restricted by shortages. The five 
main priorities were, in order: defence, paying for imports, capital equipment and 
maintenance, personal consumption and public services. The balancing of conflicting 
demands would be achieved by "budgets" which would indicate the availability of 
various resources and the demands upon them". It stated that the economic tools 
available could not bring rapid or fine ad ustments60. 
The survey stated that the changeover to peacetime production, including 
demobilization, had been accomplished without much dislocation. Unemployment had 
not risen above 400,000. The survey tried to be positive about consumption. Supplies 
of consumer goods were rising though, exports at 115% of the 1938 level, would only 
pay for 75% of 1938's volume of imports6l. To avoid shortages in 1947 production 
had to rise 25% in 1947 and exports climb to 150% of the 1938 level. The trade 
deficit would drain reserves and the loans provided by the U. S. A. and Canada in 1946. 
The Americans had lent Britain $3.75 billion and the Canadians $1.25 billion, 
equivalent to U. S. $1.159 billion62. The dollar shortage was acute. Britain took half 
its imports from the dollar area but sold only an eighth of its exports there. This 
should have been a warning of problems ahead, given the approach of sterling 
convertibility which had been a condition of the U. S. loan. The fuel and power picture 
remained bleak with an electricity supply shortfall expected by Winter 1948. Supplies 
to domestic consumers would have to be restricted63. In other sectors - steel, railways, 
shipbuilding and agriculture and housing the survey was proud of the achievements but 
encouraged further effort64. 
The last seventh of the White Paper was taken up with objectives for the year 
ahead including for exports and housing, and for investment which was to rise 
15%. 
To combat labour shortages the survey appealed to women and those over retirement 
age to work. The coal output target was 200 million tons. To achieve 
it 770,000 
miners were needed65. This was 50,000 higher than the target figure circulated among 
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officials66. More effort and more efficient industrial production67 would generate a 
larger national income allowing more for consumption. To achieve this restrictive 
practices68 and pressure for wage rises and a shorter working week had to be 
avoided69. The survey invited constructive criticism of "these plans" from the whole 
population and emphasised that they were not rigid or final. 
The survey's launch on 21 st February 1947, which included a press conference, 
made a big impact on newspapers. Despite the newsprint restrictions of the time they 
reproduced large tracts of the survey, often taking up a quarter of an edition. The 
survey was also covered in thirty-five films produced by the C. O. I. both for cinema 
and non-cinema distribution, that is in workplaces and institutions. Attlee made a 
radio broadcast on it in March7O and it was discussed on a number of B. B. C. 
programmes7l. 
At the press conference Cripps, standing in for Morrison, emphasised that the 
survey was only "'a short-term plan"' and a longer-term one would follow72. He 
played down the impact of the fuel crisis and misleadingly said it had been taken into 
consideration when producing the survey when, in fact, many of the figures had been 
calculated months earlier. Cripps did warn that "'economies"' would have to be found 
from domestic fuel consumption73. He asserted that the "'right of the individual to 
choose his own occupation"74 would be preserved and that there was no intention to 
interfere in collective bargaining75. The Government could only "'induce employers 
and employees to conform to a pattern of industrial production"' and work 
"'for the 
benefit of the nation and produce as much as possible"'76. 
Across the political spectrum newspapers tended to see the "gloOM"77 of the 
survey. Maný78 called for an "operational plan" to supplement 
this "strategic 
picture1179. The centrist News Chronicle believed 
it would only have real value as part 
of "a master plan for a much longer period - five years at 
least". It felt, however, that 
the survey was "valuable" in preventing Britain's "descent into the economic abyss"80. 
-168- 
Right-wing commentators in The Economist,. the Financial lin=81 and the Spectator 
felt it contained little more than "recitals of the difficulties "82, with its "sights" set "too 
IOW, '83 and complained that it had come too late84 
The popular press such as the Evening Standard. Daily-Graphic & Sketc and 
Daily Mail saw it simply as "a defence of the Government and Socialist policy"85 and a 
"repetition of the obvious"86 that foresaw a year of "[h]ard toil, more exports, drastic 
power cuts, '87. The News Chronicle said the public could expect "only an endless era 
of austerity"88. In contrast, the pro-government, Daily Herald, called the survey "the 
most human document ever issued ftom Whitehall"89 which demanded "the active co- 
operation of every citizen"90 
The Wall Street Journal had a clear Hayekian perspective and suggested that 
the fuel crisis had shown that "Planning with freedom" was failing in Britain. To 
succeed it was likely that the Government would have to tighten controls and curtail 
personal freedoms. British planning could only work as a system for rationing scarcity 
so Britain's standard of living was lagging behind the laissez-faire economies of 
Belgium and Switzerland" 
In contrast,, there was a mixture in much of the British right-wing between 
condemning planning and calling for more. The Daily Mail attacked the "horrid" 
survey as a model for dictatorship yet also called for greater controls over electrical 
appliances and tobacC092. It complained "the thing lacking in the White Paper is the 
Plan"93. Though the Financial Times felt labour direction was "a gross interference 
with individual liberty", the newspaper conceded it was not "quite the same thing to 
04 
restrict the areas of free choice to 25 per cent when national survival 
is involved 
The Times attacked the Government for having done "too little planning" with too 
much resting on "pious hopes and good intentions" to prevent 
further crises". The 
Ddjjy_jClcgmph similarly concluded that the "Government of would-be planners" had 
"no plan at all. 1196 
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There was widespread criticism of the lack of tools to implement planning. 
The DaijX_j&rM07 and News Chronicle criticised the Goverment for having no 
wages poliC? 8. Likewise the Daily Graphic & Sketch99,, Evf,, mLng StandardlOO. D "id 
Telegraphlo' and The Times attacked the Government's lack of "root-and-branch 
remedies" which should have followed "inexorably from their analysis" 102. Instead the 
survey offered just "a running commentary on the failure of the Government"103. The 
Daily Grohic & Sketch savaged it as "a kindergarten exercise" indulging in "wishful 
thinking" and "speculations" and written "as much for the education of Ministers as of 
the man in the street" 104. 
The Times was particularly alarmed, with good reason, that the "astute 
Chancellor" seemed to have "contracted out of' planning. It believed accurately that 
monetary and fiscal concerns were perceived as "a parochial Treasury affair" 
unconnected with planning105. The New Statesman & Nation believed there needed 
to be a ministry with Cabinet representation and a range of planning tools, not only 
financial ones, at its disposall06. In contrast, the Daily Mail attacked attempts "to 
arrange taxation or purchase tax" to "discourage people from going into an industry 
where we do not want them"107. However, as the Manchester Guardi concluded, 
all this left was "the negative inducement of disaster to the country if the people do not 
act as they are asked" 108, a tactic used repeatedly in the surveys. 
Some newspapers109 blamed the unions,, through their pressure for shorter 
working weeks110 and better pay, for harming the "country's prospects"111. 
ýS, 113 Publications as diverse as the Communist Dail-Y Wo ke 
112 The EcQnomi and the 
DaibLfgAphjc-&-S-keI-c, h- charged the Goverm-nent with failing to provide "decisive" 
114 
and "inspiring" leadership The Daily MailI15 and 
Financial Times felt the 
Government had left the working out and execution of the plans to the public without 
giving any guidance'16. The News Chronicle called on the 
Government to "offer 
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some glimpse of the dawn"I a "definable hope" in return for the sacrifice it 
expectedl 17, 
Overall, though welcoming the survey's frankness many newspapers took the 
opportunity to attack the unions and the Government's failure to plan effectively. 
Officials, such as Gorell Barnes, told Attlee that the press reception was positive. 
Civil servants believed that the public and the Opposition would recognise the dire 
position of the country and not only accepted but were demanding "drastic measures" 
and would judge the Government by its ability to take hard decisionsl 18. 
The three-day House of Commons debate on the survey began on 10th March, 
two-and-a-half weeks after the launch which meant M. P. s had had time to familiarise 
themselves with it. With the Budget less than a month away there was some 
constraint on what could be discussed119. Cripps introduced the survey for Morrison, 
who remained seriously ill. As seen in Chapter IR, Cripps outlined his philosophy of 
120 planning before moving on to the survey's substance 
Using the survey, Cripps highlighted the previous year's economic 
achievements and uncertainties such as bread rationing and the coal shortagel2l. The 
1947 survey outlined "the challenge" to the British people rather than their "failure or 
their impotence"122. Cripps saw an export target of 140% of the 1938 level, below 
the survey's 150% target, as attainable. However, success depended on industry's 
efforts rather than governmental controIS123. Cripps countered claims that the survey 
contained no indication of how Britaids difficulties were to be overcome, but said 
these were expressed in democratic rather than totalitarian terms. He added that the 
survey did outline a wages policy which was that "despite the difficulties created by 
full employment,, employers and employees should remain free to settle the conditions 
of work or wages". Wage negotiators, however, were urged to be more aware of 
broad economic trends. Undermanned industries had to develop their own incentives 
to attract labour yet avoid provoking the "prices wages spiral". Again, the "best way" 
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was to leave such development "to the leaders of both sides of industry". Assistance 
from the Government was limited to the new British Institute of Management (B. I. M. ) 
which it subsidised,, the Board of Trade's advisory body, the Production Efficiency 
Service (P. E. S. ), and Ministry of Labour courses. This revealed how meagre the 
124 Government's policies were 
The debate which followed revealed both criticism and a degree of consensus. 
Cripps said: 
it we all recognise that there must be some method of planning in the 
post-war world" 125. 
Even Oliver Lyttelton believed it was "absurd" to suggest that the Opposition thought 
"that the Goverment should not have a central and overall plan" with "key 
controls"126. Fellow Conservative, David Eccles,, believed his party had to "convince 
itself and the nation that it knows how to prevent a return to an over-priced and 
under-employed society "127. Some on the Opposition benches like the industrialist Sir 
Andrew Duncan the former Minister of SUppl y 128, and Robert Boothby complained 
that there was too little planning and called for "a comprehensive production plan for 
several years ahead"129, a view shared by the Liberal Leader, Clement DavieS130. 
Despite the air of consensus, Churchill turned the debate into a confidence 
issue,, deriding the "false and foolish" "Socialist dream" which had "seduced" the 
electorate. He accused the Government of introducing a system that was "destructive 
of fi7ee life" yet felt that of "course the State must have its plan", but one which 
liberated the energy of the peoplel3l, Attlee emphasised consensus in his concluding 
speech. He said there had been "general acceptance of the principle of economic 
planning" and agreed with Churchill that controls should not exist simply 
for "control's 
sake" 132. 
Harold Macmillan, who Attlee described as the "very eminent exponent of 
planning"133, was reluctant to contribute. He was only drawn into the 
debate by 
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accident to replace the Conservative frontbencher, Oliver Stanley,, who had fallen 
111134. Macmillan was pleased that planning had become "acceptable", but he argued 
that the survey contained "no plans, no specific proposals" and he offered no 
135 constructive comments 
Lyttelton complained perceptively that the survey was "completely out of date 
when it was published". He contrasted the "diagnosis" produced by "competent 
officials" with the lack of "action" by ministers136. He saw the fuel crisis and policies 
such as removing purchase tax from electrical appliances as demonstrating such failure 
in the Government's planning137. Lyttelton felt that the Government was "wedded" to 
if economic planning of the sort" which required labour direction, the "antithesis" of co- 
operation with industry Cripps professed to be pursuing138. Lyttelton believed instead 
that financial tools such as "taxes designed to drive labour and resources away from 
the unessential and towards the essential industry" should be used139. He derided the 
intention "to create artificial unemployment in certain industries by cutting down their 
allocations of fuel and raw materials" 140 
There were Opposition calls for the Government to "[flell the people what the 
facts are"141 though the Government was seen as ignorant of these itself142. Yet the 
survey also drew criticism, from the Financial Times's chairman and Conservative 
M. P.,, Brendan Bracken for being a patronising, morale-boosting exercise143. Both 
the Independent M. P., Sir John Anderson, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer144 7 
and Lyttelton accurately recognised the difficulty in mobilising the public to tackle a 
445 
problem which was "invisible and intangible 
Some solutions offered by the Opposition demonstrated their distance from the 
Government. Quintin Hogg146, Eccles147 and Anderson saw nationalization and 
achieving the necessary national unity as "incompatible" 
148. Most extreme was Peter 
Roberts who sought not only the end of nationalization, but the postponement of 
11some of the most expensive items of health, education and insurance" and the re- 
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establishment of a coalition under Churchill149, though Churchill himself rejected this 
call150. 
Labour backbenchers focused on particular sectors like coal and said little on 
planning. Thomas Hubbard argued there was no alternative to Labour's approach as 
the Conservatives only suggested a return to the reduced wages and longer hours of 
the inter-war yearsI51. The performance of Labour ministers in the debate was also 
generally unconstructive and poor in content, especially AN. Alexander, Minister of 
Defence and Arthur Greenwood, the Lord Privy SeaI152. Though the Government 
had feared embarrassing attacks on its economic planning policy the debate 
demonstrated the proximity of the two sides of the House on many issues. However, 
Morrison, Cripps and Attlee arrogantly did not even respond to positive suggestions 
that were made. They seemed convinced that Britain was the only country in the 
world really pursuing a policy of planning. Attlee portrayed France as having suffered 
from discontinuities which had "militated against planning". Wrongly, he suggested 
that the French Government had "not got the same kind of consultation between the 
two sides of industry" that Britain had been developing "over so many years". Overall 
153 he implied that little could be learnt from elsewhere 
Though the annual economic survey had been dealt with by March 1947, work 
producing supplements for it continued in Whitehall. The Progress Records, 
circulated in governmental circles, were four follow-up reports to the survey. Issued 
by the C. S. O. in April, July, August and September 1947 they consisted of one sheet 
with quarterly figures of imports and exports, details of industrial output and raw 
material stocks, and of manpower distribution154. Progress Record No. _2 was 
the first 
to include C. E. P. S. comments. It showed that the coal production target was being 
achieved but that the housing target had had to be reduced. It also highlighted the 
155 
failure to attain targets in exports, electricity generation and agricultural manpower 
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Pro- ss Record No. 3 showed that the summer months had been good for 
exports, especially to the important hard currency markets. Coal and housing were on 
target. Unemployment was 104,000 less than mid-1946, though agriculture continued 
156 to lose labour o. 4 looked back two months so it did not cover 
the effects of the collapse of covertibility in August. It did reveal that vehicles were 
providing 30% of British exports, over L3 million worth. Though total exports were 
the highest since 1920, the level of imports, mainly of raw materials, was rising. The 
trade deficit was around 164 million per month by July. Unemployment of 260,000 in 
June, the lowest for two years, was seen as abnormal. It was expected to rise to 
400151000, by the end of 1947. The economy proved capricious. The target for 
workers producing exports was suddenly greatly exceeded, whilst Civil Service 
numbers began to fall. Textile labour increased slowly, but agricultural manpower had 
157 only just returned to its December 1946 level, far short of any target 
The Progress Records then ended, probably as work was gearing up for the 
1948 survey and the division of Marshall Aid. Though they fulfilled earlier designs of 
having a rolling survey the Progress. Records revealed both the Government's inability 
to move the economy in the desired direction and how erratic the economy could be. 
Progress Record No. 3 showed scant awareness of the approaching holiday period and 
that the booming production of the early summer would fall away158, as was revealed 
in the following report'59. 
The 1947 survey demonstrated that though the C. S. O., Economic Section and 
C. E. P. S. were able to collate a comprehensive set of figures, it is questionable how 
beneficial these were either to a Keynesian approach through the national income and 
expenditure figures, or for a more Gosplanning method using production and 
manpower targets. The survey could only show what had happened and 
identify 
broadly what problems would occur. Even at the dawn of economic planning in the 
public eye, serious flaws were becoming apparent that were not to be overcome. 
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Chapitr-Y-d 
The Eco u r. 
The 1948 survey grew out of the abortive Economic Survey for 1948-511, 
which is discussed in Chapter VI. It was the first to include substantial input from the 
C. E. P. S.. Data for the survey was still collated by the E. S. W. P., chaired by Hall, and 
the Economic Section remained closely involved. The survey was prepared with 
publication in mind. Emphasis was laid on the popular version2 and the press 
conferences3. As early as September 1947, a "dummy" format for the published 
version using old data was circulated to officialS4. It was clear that trade and the 
export industries would be of primary concern, A secret annex forecast a trade deficit 
with the Western Hemisphere5 of L250 million within eight months and reserves as 
low as L135 million by the end of 19486. Old problems such as coal and manpower 
were included,, though with a lower priority than before7. Producing the survey was 
treated as routine. Robinson believed only a couple of E. S. W. P. meetings were 
necessary. Hall agreed, feeling that "huddles" of officials could handle it8. 
The level of Marshall Aid Britain received would detern-fine imports from the 
Western Hemisphere which were crucial for food and steel supplies. The aid was 
expected to start arriving in February or March 19489. The compilers aimed to 
portray the economy in a fashion that elicited as much aid as possible". Comments 
which could upset the Americans or Canadians were avoided". Unrequited exports 
were seen as having "serious public relations implications" 
12. These were exports to 
countries which could pay in neither dollars nor gold. Otto Clarke argued that it was 
morale-sapping to ask the British public to go short to allow such exports. It was felt 
the Americans would be loath to give dollars to the British if they were not attempting 
to earn their own13. 
Clarke also pointed out that it was inadvisable to show that Britain expected 
only 1543 million of imports from the Western Hemisphere when the 
U. S. Congress's 
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estimate was 030 million. He feared a low target would lead to a reduction in 
Britain's Marshall Aid allocation14. The survey had become almost more important 
for publicity than as a statistical tool. Cripps saw it as being "deliberately" addressed 
to readers "on both sides of the Atlantic" 15. 
Robinson played an important role in the debate on including targets in the 
survey. Meade had earlier condemned him and Cripps as Gosplanners16. This was an 
attitude which appeared to be verified by Robinson's memorandum to the E. P. C. 
which praised the Ministry of Agriculture's targets. Robinson also argued that the 
targets previously set for coal output had boosted production. He believed others 
should be determined for steel,, cotton yam and other industries17. 
Robinson's approach soon generated discussion among officials and 
ministers18. One C. E. P. S. paper emphasised the need to limit targets to "essential" 
items like specific types of steel, textile and chemical production. To be worthwhile 
the targets had to push for some increase, but also had to avoid "limiting the flexibility 
of action". It had already been recognised that labour targets were impossible to 
implement". Robinson complained, however, that the Ministry of Labour were 
20 
overly cautious. He also felt it pointless to set a target without a completion date . 
Clarke,, who had considerable doubt "about the desirability and opportuneness of 
1921 publication" of the survey, believed that targets would be "a hostage to fortune 
For the first time the surveys were scrutinized by the E. P. B. which made 
suggestions on style and presentation22. Having considered the first full draft of the 
survey in mid-December the E. D. Committee highlighted controversial points for 
ministers23. It was recognised that modifications would be necessary as the likelihood 
of Marshall Aid increased24. Cripps emphasised to the 
E. P. C. in January the dire 
implications for Britain if aid was not forthcoming. E. P. C. agreed that whatever the 
expectations, production targets should 
be set and it was hoped to extend these to 
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individual companies. Despite the gloomy prospects it was felt important to produce a 
version for publication25. 
The E. P. B. was the first body to scrutinize the public version in February 1948. 
Most of its suggestions aimed to improve the survey's clarity. However, it also felt 
that the coal output target was too low. The Board supported production targets but 
was less enthusiastic about manpower ones. it felt, though, that manpower targets 
should be retained for their psychological impact in encouraging labour into 
undermanned industries. Ince, however, thought they could give industries "an alibi" if 
they failed to achieve their production targets26. Ince and Plowden took the E. P. B. 's 
views to the E. D. Committee meeting on the survey, which also focused on style. This 
led to redrafts27. The E. D. Committee and E. P. B. alike emphasised the importance of 
the survey in giving the public a proper picture of the economy. 
By late February it was clear that more time was needed to discuss the survey, 
especially given the problem of reconciling the production and manpower targets for 
the textile industry28. There were two brief Cabinet meetings in February which 
included discussion on the survey. Cripps warned his colleagues of the worsening 
terms of trade, the poor balance of payments and ongoing loss of reserves highlighted 
by the survey, nineteen months before Britain was forced to devalue29. The second 
meeting was concerned mainly with the coal and textiles output targets. Gaitskell, the 
Minister of Fuel and Power, convinced the Cabinet that raising the target for coal 
production from 211 million tons to 220 million tons would encourage wage demands 
and the additional output would have to be exported to countries receiving Marshall 
Aid30. In contrast, Nicholson later argued that only by setting an "apparently 
unattainable" target in the previous survey Britain had avoided another 
fuel crisis3l. 
The textile manpower target was maintained due to optimism that new factories could 
be opened. It was felt that the surveys were an important part of educating the public 
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about economic conditionS32. Due to all the minor amendments,, re-writing continued 
to 26th February33 and the final release was delayed until 9th March34. 
The inclusion of more targets meant the differences between the version 
printed on green paper circulated to officials in December 1947 and the final White 
Paper were far greater than between the different versions of the previous survey. The 
White Paper had twenty-eight statistical tables, almost three times more than the 
"green"- version, and they were more detailed35. A new section headed "Targets for 
194811 was added "to give concrete expression to the nation's industrial needs in 1948" 
and to set targets for certain industries. "[P]roduction units" were encouraged to set 
their own targets "in accordance with the overall figures"36. The targets included coal 
output, manpower and machinery; output of different sorts of steel and textiles, and 
production of items like oil tankers and railway wagons37. However, they represented 
yet more exhortation rather than a form of gosplanning. Targets were included to 
show that the Government was striving to improve things. 
In both versions the agriculture sections included the most comprehensive 
targets and adopted "socialist realist" language. Each called for volunteers, including 
the unemployed and school children38, "people from all walks of life" to gather in the 
harvest. The "green" version explained the problems of the poor harvest; the need for 
a larger animal feed ration; increased agricultural manpower and investment, mainly 
in 
agricultural machinery". The White Paper outlined the "four year plan", the 
Agricultural Expansion Programme started in 1947, in detail. It included year-by-year 
target yields of a range of produce up to 1951-240. 
The coal section was extensively re-written and proved far more positive in the 
White Paper. U. K. output targets had been set by the inter-governmental Committee 
for European Economic Co-operation (C. E. E. C. ), at 211 miflion tons in 1948 and 
reaching 245 million tons by 195 1. Both versions of the survey outlined the year-by- 
year increase. However, the "green" version was 
far more negative, fearing that the 
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C. E. E. C. would compel Britain to export coal thus restricting domestic consumption. 
Even if longer working hours and more foreign miners could be introduced to British 
pits, the C. E. E. C. target was felt to be unattainable4l. The VVWte Paper used the 
C. E. E. C. figures as targets yet recognised the same difficulties42 and urged the public 
to use less power43. 
Following the failure of convertibility, investment had been cut the previous 
autumn to restrain inflationary pressure and reduce the demand for scarce materials. 
The target for total gross domestic investment was less than V. 8 billion and the 
housing target fell from 250,000 to 140,00044. Unlike the White Paper, the "green" 
version went into far greater detail, comparing the investment figure with pre-war and 
foreign examples45. This revealed its nature as a "working" document for 
governmental use. 
It was hoped export quotas would help shape private investment, for example, 
towards specialized machinery for producing exports. Industry would be asked to 
delay any investment which did not contribute "quickly and significantly" to exports, 
import saving or the maintenance of basic industries. The investment plans for 
electricity, coal, iron and steel, petrol, the Post Office and the Agricultural Expansion 
Programme would continue unchanged but there would be limits to investment on the 
railways, in health and education46. 
The Merences between the conclusions sections of the two versions were 
some of the greatest. The White Paper described 1948 as a year of "transition", and 
"the first year of the great upward turn in European economic recoveryi'47. People 
needed to restrain income rises and work to maintain exports. Reserves would 
continue to fall. Marshall Aid would not relieve hardship but would buy time to effect 
policies to ensure a healthy economy. The country's future was "at stake". However, 
the changes were portrayed as "insignificant in relation to the underlying strength of 
48 our people 
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The same section in the "green" version, though similar, was six times longer 
and included far more on the prospects for 1949. The duration of the gold and dollar 
reserves was a matter of "guesswork". Exports had to increase and be more 
competitive. The leakage of dollars through the Sterling Area had to be hatted49. 
Tomlinson shows that capital flowed out of the Britain to other Sterling Area 
countries. In turn this promoted their increased demand for dollar imports, 
particularly in the Dominions which resented Britaids control over their expenditure. 
In 1947 1643 million in capital had left Britain, especially to Australia and South 
Africa. Consequently in the financial year 1947/8, Australia exceeded the dollar 
spending limit of $80 million (L19.9 million) it had been set by $120 million (129.8 
million)50. 
The "green" version saw Canada and Argentina, rather than the U. S. A., as 
likely to be the best markets in which to earn dollars. It was hoped to be able to divert 
more imports away ftom dollar sources and to achieve an invisible surplus of L15 
million. Three different models of how the terms of trade could go were suggested, 
reflecting higher or lower import prices. Reserves were expected to fall to between 
f, 240 million and 1440 million. Even this level would be difficult to maintain, and it 
was believed that "extensive unemployment" and "widespread malnutrition" were 
possible5l. 
The form and level of Marshall Aid remained unknown. It was feared that the 
allocation of aid could worsen Britain's position by distributing to other countries what 
Britain would have otherwise bought on the open market. British objectives continued 
to be to maintain reserves and rehabilitate industry. Raw material imports to sustain 
industrial production were the priority. Increased food imports were only acceptable if 
necessary to secure sufficient nutrition to maintain output52. 
The "green" version did speculate on implementation of these policies. Steel 
allocation needed to be linked more closely to companies' export programmes. It was 
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suggested controls could be "tightened" though this depended on the "willing 
collaboration of industry"53. It was hoped that presenting "a full and frank account of 
the national situation" to the public could promote increased effort54. It was 
recognised, however, that "exhortation" could "do little to increase output". Short- 
term methods included longer and staggered working weeks. Long-term solutions 
involved improving labour mobility, increasing the number of technical students and 
promoting greater efficiency", through the B. I. M., P. E. S. 56 and Development 
Councils57. 
To achieve the desired pattern of labour distribution a wage structure which 
attracted labour into undermanned industries was necessary and even a limit on non- 
textile industries in textile areas. The controls on the engagement of labour revived in 
1947 had not been in place long enough for their success to be measured. European 
Voluntary Workers were played down in the "green" version as a solution due to the 
dollar cost of housing and feeding theM58. The White Paper's section on manpower 
showed that the public utilities, transport, distribution and service sectors were 
popular sources of employment, but increases in their workforce were undesirable 
whilst essential industries were undermanned. Ceilings on recruitment and fiscal 
measures to reduce the pressure of demand for such work were suggested". Raw 
material shortages were expected to halt the growth of the metal, chemical, 
engineering and building industries. Unemployment was higher than had been 
expected, brought on, it was believed, by temporary shortages and distortion of 
employment patterns caused by inflationary demands. For most workers hours of 
work had fallen60. 
Inflationary pressure remained and enforced saving was likely as more 
products were diverted to export markets. In the past 21/2years Britain had proven 
itself unable to adapt successfully to post-war economic conditions. The survey 
recognised that all the forecasts could be falsified by outside events or failure in one 
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sector. However, it hoped for a repeat of 1947's improvements in production and 
exports6l. The "green" version correctly diagnosed the problems of the balance of 
payments and the shortage of reserves that were to worsen throughout the year. The 
Wite Paper was torn between revealing the bleak reality and not wanting to 
demoralize the public. Consequently, much of the bad news was expunged in favour 
of patriotic appeals. 
The VVNte Paper's introduction was as cautious as the previous surveyS62. Its 
caveats seemed to undermine the survey's validity. The reader was warned that 
European Recovery Programme (E. R. P. ) funds provided by Marshall Aid had to be 
used to sustain and develop production rather than ease living conditionS63. Morgan 
comments that this austerity and its later success in boosting exports, "were often 
linked in the popular mind with the government's new emphasis on planning. vo64 
The survey's thrust came from the balance of payments issue and the continued 
need to increase exports. The previous year exports had been i 1.125 billion, E75 
million short of the objective. Targets for 1948, were trimmed for popular 
consumption ftom 164% of the 1938 level to 150%65. Other sections on trade reveal 
qualms about disclosing Britain's dire position. Unrequited exports were portrayed 
positively as sustaining multilateral trade for the future66. The survey showed that 
imports from the Western Hemisphere had to be cut by 10% which would affect 
investment, especially house building. Further import plans had to wait for the 
allocation of E. R. P.. 
The survey gave the public a worrying view of the future. It warned that 
without aid all imports would fall by an eighth and of some raw materials by a fifth, 
leading to unemployment and industrial dislocation. The survey stated that if dollar 
expenditure persisted at its current rate Britain's reserves would most likely be 
exhausted by the end of 194967. The survey also revealed the inter-war roots of the 
trade problem which had been concealed by invisible earnings and triangular trade 
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using the Sterling Area68. This had rested on colonies selling raw materials to earn 
dollars which the U. K. could then draw from the common Sterling Area pool to buy 
goods from the U. S. A.. 
Other targets revealed shifting economic patterns. The trend of converting 
from coal to oil was being reversed as the 70% growth in U. S. oil consumption had 
caused shortageS69. Though the textiles sector, still an important export earner, was 
set unrealistic demands,. it was feared that it would be impossible both to retain the 
existing clothing ration and maintain exports70. The transport section revealed the 
extent of exhaustion of plant which hampered the movement of raw materials, 
particularly by rail7l. 
The White Paper contained short sections on investment, national income and 
manpower. The national income section came only after all the more "physical" 
elements had been covered. It represented a plea to the public to save despite the 
desire to replace worn possessions72. The figure for 1947s national income was L8.6 
billion and the estimate for 1948 was 19 billion, assuming no change in working hours 
and a small rise in wages. Increased dollar earnings and reductions in imports would 
allow greater expenditure. The survey aimed to reduce the trade deficit by E250 
million73. At the existing tax rates it was believed more purchasing power would be 
removed from the economy than returned to it by governmental expenditure. To 
cover planned investment, saving by the public had to rise sharply74 to 1575 million, a 
level it was unlikely to reach". The capacity for consumption was estimated at 
0.675 billion, a level that could not be satisfied with existing supplies. The calorific 
intake of food, already below wartime levels, would continue to fall. Without E. R. P. 
aid even these diminished levels could not be maintained76. 
The previous year's objectives had mainly not been achieved. The 1947 survey 
had aimed for 80-85% of the 1938 import total, in fact only 74% had been imported. 
However, because of rising prices these imports had cost L1.6 billion compared to the 
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11.45 billion anticipated. Exports had only risen to 120% rather than 140% of the 
1938 figure, so the trade deficit was L655 million instead of the expected L330 million. 
Coal output had fallen 3.5 million tons short of its 200 million tons target and steel 
output by 0.25 million tons of its 12.75 million tons target. Housing had suffered from 
cutbacks in investment and only 58% of the 240,000 permanent houses aimed for, had 
been built77. 
The working population had risen 333,000 more than had been expected due 
to 95,000 foreign workers and more female and retirement aged workers staying in 
industry. Coal mining, agriculture, building materials and public utilities had suffered 
labour shortfalls,, mainly as consumer services and distribution had exceeded their 
ceilings. These results, the survey suggested, proved that the Government could 
"encourage" but it could not "compel" fulfilment of its targets78. The Statement on 
Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices,, had been delivered to Parliament in February 
1948 and was attached as an appendix to the White Paper". 
The importance of the White Paper as a public document can be seen by the 
arrangements made by Clem Leslie who was responsible for media coverage of 
planning. Two versions were available to the public: the full White Paper and the 
"popular" version. The latter summarised the government's objectives, concentrating 
on "facts". It was aimed at "the reasonably intelligent factory and clerical worker"80 11 
rather than experts or "political illiteratesl18l. It was sixteen pages long, with two 
colour charts and cost 3d (I, /4p)82, whereas the White Paper was 62 pages long and 
cost Is (5p)83. The popular survey had a first section on balance of payments and 
reserves, - a 
"centre-spread" showing 1948 export targets followed by passages on 
production and manpower targets, and on personal income84. It sold 440, -000 
copieS85 and the White Paper, 60,00086. This can be compared with the sale of 
635,000 copies of the best-selling 1942 Beveridge Report87. 
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AlLs seen in Chapter IV, Mass Observation noted that88, in Rogow's words, "the 
whole emphasis" of the survey "had not been grasped"89. It can be argued that the 
survey's attempts at exhortation were wasted. However. 5 
it was the issue of targets 
and the workload of producing the surveys rather than this failure which provoked the 
planners' declining enthusiasm for the annual surveys. 
The survey was released on Tuesday 9th March, with a radio broadcast about 
it made by Cripps the next day". The lobby correspondents had received the final 
revised proofs on the previous Friday and were able to question Cripps and Plowden 
at a conference held on Monday 8th. A series of press conferences followed the 
presentation of the survey to Parliament. The first was for the City Editors, hosted by 
Cripps. This was followed immediately by one for the U. S. press. Other conferences 
were given by the Treasury and E. I. U, for British industrial and Commonwealth 
correspondents". In fact the newspapers made little use of the press conferences and 
instead simply lifted or paraphrased huge chunks from the survey. 
The statement printed for the American journalists asserted that Britain 
remained "one of the two, fully developed industrial systems left intact in the world"92 
The statement outlined Britaids grave balance of payments position especially in 
relation to dollar countries, and the need to "reshape" the whole economy and increase 
trade to sustain people and industry. Without outside help Britain could not import 
more than was sufficient for its own self-preservation and thus would be unable to 
assist European recovery. The survey indicated the optimum pattern of imports for 
the British economy to allow it to emerge as "a well-established great power" capable 
of safeguarding world stability93. The statement was written to appeal to U. S. policy- 
makers and to demonstrate that aid would not be wasted on "luxuries". 
Officials expected the White Paper's release to be used to cross-examine the 
government on its wider economic policies. Much effort was put into anticipating the 
domestic press's questions. However, this reflected more closely officials' concerns 
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rather than those ofjoumaliStS94. Many of the suggested answers were evasive. They 
also demonstrated an austere attitude and a "wait-and-see" approach to Marshall 
Aid". Officials worried that there was no guarantee that the 1948 targets could be 
fulfilled when the 1947 ones had been missed so badlY96. The suggested answers 
blamed changing world conditions and claimed that the targets were not "over 
coloured either by optimism or pessimism"97. A similar approach was adopted for 
questions on personal savings and the feasibility of cutting investment. Unrequited 
exports were seen as a dangerous issue for the Government. The line suggested was 
that a healthy level of multilateral trade of whatever kind, was to be desired". 
The launch of the 1948 survey caused more stir in the newspapers than any of 
the other surveys, due partly to the bleak facts it revealed. It drew attention to 
Britain's economic plight. The survey's honesty in exposing the difficulties faced 
disarmed its press critics on the right, but made it hard for liberal and left-wing 
newspapers to make positive responses. 
The Times-99 and especially the Evening Standard viewed the survey as "grim 
and depressing" with "many ominous warnings"100. The Nms Chronicle saw some 
"patches of sunlight" in the survey's "black shadows" and these were grounds for 
"hope and encouragement" 101. The Daily Herald, the labour movement's own 
402 newspaper, deemed the survey "a hopeful document The Manchesiff 
Guardian103,. the Financial Times104,, The EconomistIO5 believed that the survey was 
ineffectual as it outlined nothing of which the public was unaware. They had become 
"inoculated against" such warnings106. The Daily Sketch & 07 and Daily 
Mail felt it had failed to make "the mass of people" understand what they needed to do 
for the economy to recover108. The Evening Standard109 and The Times were a bit 
more positive and believed that despite the gloom the survey was "candid" and "at 
least had the outlines of a policy"110. The Dai-ty Nfirror saw the survey as a 
"climax"111 to its own recent "Face The Facts" campaign on the economy112, which 
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had attracted the attention of officials and Morrison who saw them as "useful"113. 
The D ty Mirror's attitude was generally positive, though disappointed that no four or 
five-year plan had emerged114. 
The survey did emphasise to the press how important Marshafl Aid was to the 
British economy. Until it was allocated the Daily Herald believed "uncertainties" 
would remain about the economy115. The Dait-V Telegraph noted that the survey 
revealed that without aid the future would be "distinctly unpleasant" 116. The 
Economist saw this dependence on foreign aid coming "near to defeating planning in 
any real sense" 117. In fact Marshall Aid was to prove a boon to France in carrying out 
its economic plans. In contrast, the Manchester Guardi argued Marshall Aid was 
necessary for any of the Government's objectives to be successfuII18. The right-wing 
Daily C=hic & Sketc saw the survey "warning of distress and unemployment", even 
with foreign aid forthcoming119. The Communist Daily Worker similarly saw 1948 
portrayed as a "year of ever-tightening austerity"120 but believed that Marshall Aid 
was helping to build "a military bridgehead for the U. S. " with funds being "frittered 
away in military expenditure" 121. Only the Evening Standard, owned by Lord 
Beaverbrook, suggested that Britain should "refuse" any "more charity, any more 
doles, any more loans from the kind-hearted American people" and instead develop the 
British Empire into the "richest trading area in the world"122. 
From the U. S. A, itself, the Wall Street Journal adopted a more understanding 
tone than in 1947. It welcomed the realism of Cripps, the "Economic Czar", and 
emphasised how much austerity the British public had had to face in the past decade, 
and would continue to endure, even with Marshall Aid,. as consumer goods had to be 
exported for foreign earnings. It was less sympathetic to Britaids swollen public 
expenditure and bureaucracy'23 and high taxationl24. 
As before, newspapers suggested economic policies that the Government 
should pursue. The Daily Mail favoured laissez-faire and unrealistically called for a 
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return to Britaids pre-Great War trading position which it saw as having been wrecked 
by planning. It pointed to the Belgians, whose concentration on consumer industries 
had soon restored their standard of living. In Britain even the focus on basic industries 
had failed to raise output125. The TiMeS126 and the DailLy Telegraph urged cuts in 
government expenditure127. The latter wrongly believed that the Budget was going to 
Of ', 128 play a significant part in furthering the objects of the Survey 
The Spectator rejected laissez-faire as an "absurd" alternative to planning. 
However, the journal focused on the difficulty of reconciling the trade unions to 
planning in the conditions of "over-full employment" 129. Sir Graham Cunningham, a 
member of the E. P. B., who did not see planning as a permanent feature, did argue in 
the SpQctator that during the present crisis the "tentacles" of planning had to embrace 
all economic resources and key industries, but must only "intimate" what was 
required130. The Financial Times argued that the Government had little "constructive 
policy" and had to recognise that Britain was in the grip of world forces and planning 
was "virtually powerless". The "violent revisions" of its trade calculations threw 
"doubt on the value of any official estimates"131. The problem of having to revise 
figures was subsequently harped on in Parliament. 
The survey was released two weeks before the Budget which meant that 
holding a separate debate on it would be difficult. As Leader of the House of 
Commons, Morrison moved to combine the two debates132. He argued that now the 
Chancellor was also Minister for Economic Affairs it was sensible that both financial 
and economic aspects should be covered together133. The combined debate was 
established as the model for the remainder of Labour's time in office. Churchill, 
initially hostile134, softened to the idea and highlighted "the advantage" of dealing with 
Cripps, the "overlord" of Britaids "economic life"135. However, Dalton, though no 
longer Chancellor, persisted in suggesting that the Budget and survey should be kept 
as far apart as possible136. There was more acceptance of the combined debate from 
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Opposition frontbenchers like Harry Crookshank. 137, Oliver Stanley138 and the Liberal 
Leader, Clement Davies139. The debate began on 6th April. Cripps highlighted the 
changes in the planning machinery since the previous survey. The Budget was now 
portrayed falsely as "complementary to, and, indeed, in some sense a part of the 
National Economic planto140. 
The survey was both praised and derided by the Opposition. Harold 
Macmillan141 and the backbencher, Austin Low142,, found the document gloomy, but 
effective. Nigel Birch, however, attacked its "dishonest accounting" 143. M. P. s on 
both sides questioned how much impact the survey would have on ordinary people. 
The Labour M. P., George Benson, praised the courage of the Chancellor in speaking 
"forthrightly" but argued that a way still had to be found to convince people to restrain 
their wage demands144. Barbara Castle,, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Harold 
Wilson at the Board of Trade, reminded M. P. s that the survey had to address people 
not living "in a world of White Papers, Blue Books and statistics", but with ordinary 
"human hopes and fears" otherwise it would be ignored145. Marcus Lipton, for 
Labourl" and the Conservative, Alexander Spearman. 147 echoed James Hutchinson's 
call for "the Government to make the position clear and to paint the picture in such a 
way that the man in the street can understand" 148. 
Conservatives, - 
Sir Waldron Smithers149 and Oliver Lyttelton highlighted the 
previous survey's errors of 30% - 1,900% awry of the actual outcome and expected no 
better in 1948150. The portrayal of British planning by Labour's Donald Bruce was 
very perceptive. He argued that the Opposition imagined: 
"themselves to be in a petfectly safe and strong position to say that, 
whatever the Survey or plan produced by the Government, there 
must be no deviation from it at all,, otherwise they can immediately 
criticise.,, 151 
This had been a worry of officials and ministers which had encouraged the emphasis 
on flexibility in planning. Bruce believed the survey's objectives were "impossible to 
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achieve with any great degree of accuracy" as so much of it depended on "the self- 
discipline and co-operation of a whole people", and the Opposition were aware of this. 
Bruce recognised that the Government's ability to shape the economy rested on the use 
of "raw material allocations to cause redundancies in certain industries" to encourage 
"a movement of manpower from one industry to another"152,, which was an unstated 
assumption behind ministers'ideas on planning. 
Cripps stated that the survey's forecasts were always uncertain, particularly 
given the prevailing inflationary pressure, but that it was important to provide as much 
information as possible to those involved in production. In a democracy the 
"economic plan" was not something of which "any Government" could "guarantee the 
execution". The Government was countering this inflationary pressure, by 
encouraging wage restraint and stabilizing prices, but remained opposed to fixing 
153 wage rates 
The Labour backbencher Ellis Smith, again calling for a four-year plan, 
attacked the Government's "present system" as "a device to prevent real democratic 
planning". He argued that the diversity of civil servants involved in planning, in the 
C. E. P. S., the Office of Economic Affairs, the Economic Section and the C. O. I. 
diffused their efforts. He called for "a Ministry of Economic Affairs with full 
authority"154. Smith's line had been supported by seven fellow backbenchers and the 
DaiLy Lk&r which advocated a planning commissionI55, though this probably 
undermined Smith's credibility in Labour circles. His views were echoed by the 
Communist M. P., Phillip Piratin, and the Labour left-winger, Lester Hutchinson156. 
Piratin accused the Government of not adopting neither "a planned democracy" nor "a 
Socialist approach but a capitalist policy" which was simply "toadying to big capital 
and induStry"157. Even Conservatives, such as Oliver Stanley158 and Sir David 
Robertson called for the Government to fulfill its promise of long-term planning159. 
Lyttelton saw the survey as marking "the complete failure of planning" through which 
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the Government had intended "to direct the whole of the production and economic 
activity of the country from Whitehall" 160. 
As ministers attacked the far left for advocating undemocratic means161, they 
were similarly criticised by the ConservativeS162. Smithers, a far-right Conservative 
accused Cripps of carrying the "bludgeon of the totalitarian dictator"163 with policies 
164 that held "contempt for the law" and turned the public into government cyphers . 
Lyttelton believed, accurately, that as the Government had suspended the price system 
they faced the fact that without labour direction it was "manifestly impossible" to plan 
such a complex economy in the way the Government suggested165. Spearman felt, 
however,, that Cripps, unlike Dalton, had recognised that the Budget was "the prime 
instrument for guiding the economy" 166. 
There was common ground on the issue of controls. Labour and the 
Conservatives were not as far apart as some M. P. s made out. Spearman said Cripps 
also recognised that controls had only limited effectiveness in combating inflation, and 
numerous, trivial controls distorted the economy167. Harold Wilson, the President of 
the Board of Trade,, acknowledged the problems of controIS168. He was currently 
overseeing the removal of control as fast as inflationary pressure permitted169. He 
argued, however, that the Opposition's only policy for shaping the economy would be 
170 to increase unemployment 
Concluding, Cripps highlighted the degree of consensus and pointed to the 
"uniform acceptance of both the facts and the analysis of the facts" in the survey. Yet 
he suggested that the Opposition saw just two alternatives for the economy - either 
complete freedom or a rigid plan with labour direction. In fact Britain was pursuing a 
third option which was to achieve the best for the country without interfering with 
individuals' freedoms. He insisted it was wrong to say that democratic planning had 
failed171. The debate,. however,, encapsulated the bulk of the concerns that the 
Government had about its planning policy. M. P. s could see the dilemmas of trying to 
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predict the future accurately, and in attempting to execute a plan without curtailing 
personal freedoms. Nfinisters were less confident of their abilities than the brave front 
presented in the debate by Cripps, Wilson and Jay suggested172. 
The survey clearly alerted the public, officials and politicians to the problems 
that Britain was facing. It also showed how essential Marshall Aid was to any kind of 
recovery. Though 1948 can be seen as the last year that any section of the press really 
believed in the possibility of planning, the faith of politicians lingered for another year. 
Given the crises in the British economy there was an expectation across the spectrum 
of newspapers and among many M. P. s, that the Government would have to effect 
some sort of plan to revive the economy Nothing as co-ordinated as this ever 
materiahsed. 
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Chat)ter Ve 
The Economic Survey for 1949 
With Robinson in Paris involved with Marshall Aidl his job in preparing the 
economic survey fell to the C. E. P. S. 's William Strath and Butt of the Economic 
Section2. Butt disliked Robinson's Gosplan-style approach, though he did not oppose 
including all targets. In fact, Butt fought to prevent the survey becoming a collection 
of vague aspirations. Following the success of the previous popular survey, the 1949 
version took a further step towards becoming a brochure for the Government's 
economic policies3. It encouraged the public to express its patriotism through harder 
work and sacrifice. However,, the previous hints of socialist realism were replaced 
with a more patronising, tone. 
The first hurdle that the compilers had to overcome was opposition from 
officials4 to producing another "Economic Survey of the traditional kind"5. Clarke 
complained that it would put "fantastic pressure" on the Treasury. He felt that the 
existing workload meant the quality of statistics was "falling off' and left insufficient 
time to "apply policy" to them. Clarke wrongly believed that Cripps would not press 
for another economic survey6. Hitchman, Plowden's deputy, sympathised but made it 
clear that the Chancellor's enthusiasm meant a survey had to be produced7. Hall felt 
that Clarke was exaggerating the burden8. 
Hall and Butt were keen to start work on the survey to avoid last minute re- 
writing. By September 1948, Butt was making suggestions for the form the survey 
should take9. Clarke remained recalcitrant. Even in November he would not submit a 
Programmes Committee report which was vital to the survey". Clarke argued that it 
was too late to implement any import policies within that financial year. Consequently 
any problems the survey revealed would "have solved themselves" by the time of 
publication. Additional figures would just burden ministers unnecessarilyll. 
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The function of the surveys continued to be debated. It was seen, probably by 
Douglas Jay, as: 
"lamentable that both officials and Ministers should consider the 
Survey annually prepared for them merely as material for 
exhortations to voters. it 12 
The surveys did represent "a general check up" of the economy, but it was argued that 
planners had to be "prepared to take a'serious' Survey seriously" or not bother. The 
alternative was a "White Paper wholly designed from the beginning to meet public 
relations needs"13. 
Butt suggested creating two surveys, one each for ministerial and public 
consumption. Fleming, the Deputy Director of the Economic Section, felt the 
"window-dressing Survey" for the public should be the E. I. U. 's job14. Butt 
emphasised that the survey should present ministers with a set of recommendations 
rather than having the C. E. P. S., "prescribe" a solution separatelyI5. Dow of the 
Economic Section wanted the survey to be more a review than a forecast. "Forward 
planning", he argued just fell "apart into a continuous series of imperfectly co- 
ordinated decisions". The Government's economic tools could only be "a predictable 
modification of trends which can be forecast rather than potent instruments of 
conscious decisions". Dow did acknowledge that the surveys could be "an aid to 
exhortation" 16. Fleming was sympathetic but believed devoting half of the survey to 
the previous year was too extreme17. 
Despite such debates the established procedure was in progress. It was clear 
that Cripps was keen to proceed and to include material from the recent Long Term 
Programrne'8. In mid-September 1948, Plowden sent Bridges the first timetable for 
producing the survey. This envisaged the survey being considered by the E. P. B. and 
the E. D. Committee before Christmas 1948 and by the E. P. C. in the new year. Delays 
meant that these meetings were held in February 194919. Ultimately the Production 
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Committee, rather than the E. P. C., scrutinized the survey before it went to Cabinet20. 
Clarke was proved correct in identifying the burdens placed on the officials. In 
February 1949, Butt wrote of the "intense pressure" of the work leaving "no time for 
consultation"21 with departments. 
Though the E. D. Committee acknowledged Clarke's concernS22, Hall,. 
Plowden and Bridges did not doubt that there would be a survey. The key question 
was its form. It was recognised that Cripps had created the expectation, in fact a false 
one, of a: 
"new concept of handling Government economic and fiscal policy as 
a whole on the basis of annual reviews of the economic position of 
,, 23 the country 
The survey had to inform the British public what the Americans and the O. E. E. C. had 
been told and outline the investment decisions ministers had taken24. As Cripps's 
target publication date of 20th January came before the balance of payments figures 
would be available, material prepared for the O. E. E. C. was used to fill the gap25. The 
E. D. Committee decided that "manpower targets and chapters dealing with specific 
commodities might be omitted from the 1949 Survey"26. The preparation of the 
survey was put under the "general supervision" of lEtchman27. By October 1948 
work was underway28. 
The American European Co-operation Administration (E. C. A. ) confirmed that 
the British could publish the survey on 20th January 1949 without upsetting the plans 
of the U. S. Congress. The fear was that as the survey contained elements of the 
programmes submitted to the O. E. E. C., it might be undermined by the Americans 
publishing these programmes first29. 
In fact, it was soon apparent that the original timetable could not be fulfilled. 
The review of 1948 had been produced in October, but the forecasts took longer. 
Owing to the varying times when different statistics became available, in November, 
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Jackson and Saunders of the C. S. O. suggested dividing the survey into a version 
covering production released in February with a financial section following in ApriJ30. 
Hall dismissed this as going against "the whole idea" of the survey as a comprehensive 
view of the whole economy3l. 
By December, Hall reported that the compilers had been working "very much 
against the clock" to get even the first draft completed32. By late December the date 
of publication had been pushed from 20th January to 8th March 194933, thus adopting 
a similar schedule to the previous year. Cripps subsequently agreed to push 
publication back a further week34 to incorporate figures on profits and wages35. It 
was difficult to keep figures up-to-date when they had to be scrutinized by the E. P. B., 
the E. D. Committee and the Production Committee36. Between January and mid- 
February the compilers were showered with "a hail of suggestions"37 fi7om across 
WhitehaII38. 
The section on controls,, which the Production Committee had been eager to 
include, suffered the MoSt39 from the "horrid scramble'140. The Board of Trade's 
paper arrived just a month before final publication and Butt was forced to have its 
elements "blended in". Though it was "not what Ministers asked for"41,. it caught the 
essence of what they had sought42. The paper recognised that controls were obstacles 
to enterprise and efficiency. They were expensive both in money and manpower and 
so would be simplified or removed43 when no longer necessary for countering inflation 
or for "production plans or other purposes of economic policy, 44. 
The E. I. U. was able to produce the "short" survey45, Survey '49, almost 
independently. It aimed, however, to exhort the public to tackle the problems 
indicated in the full survey. The short survey was designed to appeal to the general 
reader and made use of numerous photographs showing things such as housing, 
different forms of production, imports, and the type and destination of exportS46. Six 
charts originally included were discarded due to the Ministry of Fuel and Powees 
-210- 
opposition to any details on the coal industry and the E. P. B. 's and E. D. Committee's 
feeling that if the survey contained charts they had to cover the whole econoMy47. 
The tone of Survcy '49 was patronising throughout48. Mass Observation 
noted that the compilers did not grasp the difference between "popularisation" and 
11vulgarisation" nor that to "talk to everyone is not" to "talk down"49. Survey'49 also 
smacked of American-style advertising which Rogow states was becoming more 
commonly used by British companies at the time50. The 48-page5l short survey broke 
the economic position into simply titled issues like "Our Food", "Our Jobs", "Making 
Ends Meet",, "The Coal Plan" and "For Us to Choose"52. They relied on numerous 
rhetorical questions to draw the reader in, but some were overly complex53. From the 
start the survey stated that 1949 could not be "an easy year"54, but represented "a 
55 further step" to economic independence for Britain . 
Above all, the survey 
emphasised the need to boost exports and this depended on the "wisdom (or folly)" of 
the choices the public made56. The "four big ideas" which ran through the survey 
were: increasing dollar exports and production, assisting recovery in Europe and 
developing the Sterling Area57. The popular survey emphasised the economy's 
dependence on imports from the Western Hemisphere58. The difficulties faced in 
securing sufficient exports to buy these were stated as: increasing production; other 
countries' import restrictions and the difficulty of finding sufficient buyers "at our 
present prices"59. This was not an indication of the forthcoming devaluation but part 
of the survey's consistent call for wage restraint60, 
Current sacrifice for a better future was another theme6l,, for example limiting 
home consumption to allow exports which in turn paid for necessary imports62. 
Survey '49 stated that consumer shortages were likely to persist for "a few years 
more". The benefits from increased production could not be realised quickly. Extra 
production was going into increased exports, new construction, health and education 
rather than to reduce prices. Thus the reader should: 
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"remember that when we feel that our personal incomes are not 
going up as we should like - it is coming to us in other ways. 1,63 
Budd claims that the popular survey"'read like a cross between a sermon and a call to 
arms, '64 and this part certainly had a sermonising tone65. Choices about where 
exports went could only be made by "some of us" but behind them stood "others in 
which millions have a voice"66. This led neatly into productivity, and a choice for the 
ordinary worker67. The "choices" sections were asking for wage restraint, harder 
working, and an acceptance of shortages for years to come. 
Parts of the popular survey had a more traditional approach and covered 
similar manpower and output objectives as the White Paper. In particular details were 
taken from the Agricultural Expansion Programme68. Survey '49 set no productivity 
targets. Throughout industry there were now shorter working hours and longer 
holidays which affected productivity, so the way to improve output was to embrace 
new practices69. 
Budd has commented that the popular survey's "discussion of inflation was 
particularly pious,, 70. The choice was "how much to take today or save for 
tomorrow"71. The "final choice" for everyone was whether to follow the "easy way" 
and "be selfish",, spend savings and "press for higher wage rates" or pursue the "harder 
way", but by implication, the necessary one: "hold back a little longer, to make-do and 
mend", to limit wages and to release sufficient for export72. SUMY '49 painted an 
unappealing picture but fitted with Leslie's goal of presenting the benefits "of a 
disciplined, informed democratic people, '73. The only critique of the popular survey 
came from Robin Marris who was sensitive to its public reception. He questioned 
some of its more dubious claims, for example that tractor production was a current 
triumph, that the Prices of basic groceries would fall or that an additional 7-12 minion 
tons of coal could be mined74. 
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Histortans tend to portray the surveys' decreasing number of targets as a 
gradual denudation75. However, one can point to clear decisions in 1949 which 
initiated the discarding of particular targets. Gaitskell, at the time the Minister of Fuel 
and Power, was strongly opposed to targets for the coal industry. In January 1949, 
Butt feared the re-writes would at the "last minute attempt to convert the document 
into a 100% vote-catcher"76, but the motives for re-drafting instead arose from a lack 
of confidence in forecasts. 
In January 1949 the Production Committee agreed that the survey should 
include no target for coal output or manpower. Officials felt this decision would be 
"very damaging" in terms of "political consequences"77 and would make drafting 
diffiCUlt78. The alternatives were to drop all the targets from the survey or to continue 
without figures for coal, which would arouse comment. Butt felt the generally 
"cheerful" survey could "easily carry a few confessions" that the Government was not 
"om-niscient,, 79 
. 
He expected a revival of the "old controversy" of how far the 
planners were giving hostages to the press and Opposition by setting targets. Butt 
believed that commentators welcomed "honesty and frankness" in the surveysSO 
The National Coal Board had produced targets for individual pits. Its 
chairman, Lord Hyndley had announced that at the current rate of production, output 
would not exceed 202 million tons of deep-mined coal. The Daily Telegmp-h later 
highlighted the difference between this and the 210 million tons necessary to fulfill 
Britain's comniitments to the O. E. E. C. 81. Butt felt it essential to support the 
nationalized industries' targetS82 and enlisted the help of Plowden and CrippS83. 
Despite Cripps's intervention, Gaitskell continued to oppose including any coal target. 
He did not expect total production to exceed 217 million tons, and was unwilling to 
face a repeat of the previous year's criticism when output of 208 million tons fell 3 
million tons short of the target. Gaitskell felt it better to face criticism for leaving out 
a target in the early months of 1949 rather than for not fulfilling it later, closer to an 
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election84. The furthest Strath would go to "meet" Gaitskell's objections was to 
include an "estimated" range of 215-220 million tons, 7-12 million tons more coal than 
in 194885. 
Butt resented the "reactionary suggestions" from ministers to drop statistical 
tables which undermined the basis "a complete survey"86. As late as mid-February 
Strath complained of demands for a "holocaust" of tables87. The question over how 
productivity should be defined88 was evaded and Hitchman felt the best approach was 
to make any section on it as unnumerical as possible". Butt was frustrated" by the 
Production Committee setting a range for steel output between 151/4-151/2 million 
tons9l. This compromise, however, was included in the final draft92. Officials 
mistakenly hoped that Jay could resist the Production Committee's tendency to discard 
statistics93. Jay did feel the Government had "now gone too far in getting away from 
'Targets"' and opposed the "defeatist" approach including aforecast of 725,000 for 
mineworkers rather than the previous target of 736,00094. The Ministry of Labour 
countered that the industry could absorb no more miners. It felt that the failure to 
meet the 1948 survey's coal and textile manpower targets of the previous survey had 
led to unwelcome American criticism. 95. 
As in 1948, planners criticised the Ministry of Labour for being overly 
cautious. Hitchman saw the manpower table as "a vital feature" and felt the ministry 
wished to omit it because it revealed "a real and unsolved problem"96. However, the 
Ministry of Labour now had the support of the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the 
E. P. B.. In January the E. P. B. favoured general appeals rather than manpower targets,, 
due to the problems in increasing labour in the undermanned industries. The Board 
however,, did support certain production targets97. Hall believed that the manpower 
targets would be unattainable without additional foreign labour, but the Ministry of 
Labour publicly ruled out much increase from that source98. 
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The E. P. B. considered the first full draft of the survey on 6th January. Hall 
portrayed the outlook as reasonably hopeful, but for "publicity" purposes the survey 
would explain that in "climbing out of a deep pit it was possible to climb a long way 
and still not be at the top" and that economic improvements were heavily dependent 
on E. R. P. aid. The Board suggested that the survey should: make more of the success 
in wage restraint; indicate ways to raise productivity and show the effects of co- 
operation with the O. E. E. C. 99. Subsequently the E. P. B. pressed for the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power to produce a section on oil. Details had been excluded on grounds of 
security and commercial considerations. The main point made to ministers, however, 
100 was to omit the charts 
The E. D. Committee's meeting of 13th January on the survey was mainly spent 
on minor alterations. Hall portrayed the survey as still being "experimental" and 
including "tentative" figures, particularly affected by uncertainties over relations with 
the O. E. E. C.. The officials felt it was "useful" to blame labour immobility for the 
failure "to meet the targets". The committee recommended that in future, "forecasts" 
rather than "targets" should be used - an approach now prevalent at all levels of 
102 
govermuentlOl. The subsequent meeting on the published version added little 
The Production Committee, scrutinizing the survey on 26th January, still 
perceived it as an "effective instrument for economic planning" but felt that previously 
it had included "too much in the way of forecasts". The survey illustrated "notable 
achievements", but also that "the Government's powers of control were insufficient for 
the effective implementation of its economic policy". The committee felt "feeble and 
defeatist" sections on manpower distribution and exports to hard currency areas 
should be re-drafted to demonstrate the Government's "intention to continue to tackle" 
these issues. There was a concern, however, not to "suppress the true facts" for 
example on the electricity supply shortfaIII03. Debate continued on the 22nd 
February104 and briefly in Cabinet on 28th February. The coal manpower target of 
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795,000 was retained; the principle of referring to "requirements" rather than "targets" 
was enshrined and small amendments were made to avoid upsetting U. S. and 
Commonwealth sensibilities105. The survey was now ready for publication. 
The compilers worked to a very tight schedule, with revisions still coming in 
through February. The deadline for amendments was set for 2nd March, and the 
publication date as the 15006. Cripps was closely involved in the finishing touches. 
The NEnistry of Labour still resisted his attempts at compromiseI07 and even wanted 
the word "forecast" discarded from the coal section. They suggested the inclusion of a 
global figure of 795,000 workers in the industry to conceal specifics about coal 
manpower108. It took Cripps's weight in Cabinet to resolve this long running dispute. 
As Strath showed, arguments had become "fighting over trivialities", representing less 
than 1% of the coal industry's labour force109. The attempts to remove or generalize 
targets and quantitative forecasts reflected the fear that unfulfilled or inaccurate figures 
would lead to intolerable criticism. The E. D. Committee still acknowledged that 
"mistaken estimates in forward planning could not always be avoided and should not 
be concealed"110. However, Hall felt the survey had been "emasculated" to "the 
minimum" that would "get by Permanent Secretaries" and ministers111 
Some issues remained to be resolved. The definition of productivity had been 
settled as output per man-year, but arguments arose about the expected increase. 
Following the E. P. B. and Production Committee meetings of mid-February, the figure 
was lowered from 3% to 21/2%, the same as used by the C, S. 0. for the national income 
estimatell2. Between 1946-8 productivity had risen on average 41/2% per year. Even 
without governmental intervention between 1924-35 it had been rising at 2.8% 
annuanyll3. 
The balance of payments figures and the estimates of the national income and 
114 
expenditure were the last elements to be included so that they could be up-to-date 
Clarke produced the trade figures so late that they could not be properly scrutinized. 
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Cripps adjusted them himself before they were included in the survey. Hall resented 
the way that the Treasury's Overseas Finance Division had been able to evade the 
E. S. W. P, E. P. B. and E. D. Committee stages through which all other contributions 
115 had had to pass 
Jay reported that ministers on the Production Committee had been concerned 
about the length of the White PaperI16, particularly as it was to include a fourteen 
page investment appendixI17. Ultimately, however, it was no longer than the first 
draft. Many of the amendments suggested, particularly by Jay118,, were to simplify the 
language and make the tone more positive but left the White Paper less detailed than 
its draft. The review of 1948 was halved for the final versionI19 and the language, 
especially in Part R, was softened120. Forecasts were more generalized and references 
to agricultural "targets" were discarded121. However, the White Paper was less 
hesitant about investment than the first draft122. The one section which was expanded 
between the first draft and the White Paper, was on E. R. P. aid. The first draft focused 
on reserves, the White Paper instead tied the question of American aid more explicitly 
123 to saving and earning dollars 
The first draft had predicted a "very low figure for unemployment". It railed 
ncrainst manpower targets, as 1948 had shown that high targets were unattainable 
without "very drastic measures"124. The White Paper emphasised the successes in 
agriculture and textiles using nothing harsher than the Control of Engagement 
OrderI25. The stance towards foreign labour changed dramatically. Though neither 
version expected that more than 5-10,000 foreigners could be recruited, the first draft 
emphasised how important it was to have direct control over foreign workers. It 
argued "most of them" were "unlikely to make good industrial workers"126. The 
White Paper talked of continuing to bring in foreign workers without going into much 
detail127. Both versions complained of the resistance of the British to the employment 
of foreigners. 
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The first draft believed that wage restraint could not "be expected to persist 
indefinitely" and that it would be easy to return to highly inflationary conditions. The 
"cure" of deflation "would be worse than the disease"128. In the White Paper detailed 
analysis was replaced with general commentS129. The White Paper also neglected 
productivity, controls, the export of capital, and analysis of the balance of payments 
problems in relation to E. R. P. 130. Whereas the first draft argued that productivity was 
really a matter "primarily" for "management", the White Paper encouraged the whole 
population to greater efforts, but acknowledged that there was a prevalent "mentality 
conducive to stability rather than progress"131 
The draft expressed the fear that the E. R. P. allocation would impose 
11unwelcome" conditions that Britain would find difficult to accept132 such as greater 
European integration. Even if this was so, Britain could not refuse the aid which paid 
for three-fifths of its imports and without which the country would be in danger of 
industrial slump and unemployment. In contrast, Britain was supplying less than 1% 
of the U. S. A. 's imports133. 
The White Paper consisted of 63 pages, with three main sections and an 
appendix on investment programmes134. The review of 1948 demonstrated in general 
terms that despite the failure to fulfil the coal and textile targets, output was sufficient 
to allow exports. Steel producfion had been a particular success. Despite a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the balance of payments and national income and 
expenditure had all improved allowing more for domestic consumption. The survey 
stated that civil employment had increased by more than expected, prices had remained 
stable and wage restraint had persisted, though without going into detail135. 
The White Paper included coal and steel output forecasts, though it 
acknowledged the difficulties in reaching them. Other raw material supplies were 
affected by the ability to pay for imports and the amount of aid Britain was allocated. 
Electricity remained a "disappointing" sector as growing demand exceeded generating 
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capacity. The textile industry was set clear targets as its products were still seen as 
important for export. The Agricultural Expansion Programme determined the 
136 agricultural objectives though the survey indicated the progression towards these 
The survey recognised that it had proved difficult to reduce investment in the 
past, and it encouraged the public to save, thus enabling investment. Investment 
programmes were expected to exceed 1948s by L120 million, but delays would mean 
actual investment would be below the forecasts. There would be a slight fall for 
housing and social services but a rise for education. Investment in railways, electricity 
and petroleum production would increase whilst that in roads, shipbuilding, and 
commercial vehicles would fa11137. 
Britain had achieved a current account balance of payments surplus of L30 
million in the last half of 1948, - 
from a deficit of E150 million in the first half The 
running deficit stood at f630 million, compared to the overall deficit of L200 million 
for 1949/50 anticipated by the Long-Term Program-me. It remained essential to 
cultivate non-dollar sources of supplies. The Government aimed to spend no more 
dollars than could be earnt or supplied through E. R. P., which at around $1.26 billion 
(1313 million) was currently sufficient138. All the survey's forecasts were based on 
continued receipt of dollars through the E. R. P.. However, a major British goal was to 
be economically independent as soon as possible and so the U. K. had to work with 
Europe, the Commonwealth and the colonies to improve the economic position139. 
Export targets were included unashamedly. The overall aim was 155% of the 
193 8 volume. Except in textiles, the previous year's targets had been achieved, despite 
the worsening terms of trade. The vehicle and machinery industries had been 
particularly successful. It was felt that the peak in U. S. demand for primary products 
had been reached and the prices would fall, benefiting British industry140, The import 
programme was set to match the increase in supplies. Shipping, tourism and general 
export receipts were expected to rise, but uncertainty over the level of E. R. P. aid after 
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June 1949 made predictions of the balance of payments further forward, difficult to 
compile. As the survey was produced in March, this showed it could only look three 
months ahead141. 
There were five main objectives for trade: saving on dollar imports by greater 
domestic food and chemical production; increasing exports to the dollar area; 
diversion of imports away from countries demanding dollar or gold payments; 
development of the colonies and the surpluses they earnt, and assisting the Sterling 
Area to economize on its dollar imports. Britain needed to produce more goods 
which could compete in the free market and British manufacturers had to "overcome" 
their "reluctance" to undertake new ventures142. Recognition was developing that the 
British economy could not be forced back into its pre-war patterns. Yet the 
attachment to textiles remained as their raw materials were more readily available than 
those for machinery, vehicle and chemical production. 
Manpower figures were calculated on a new basis that included all workers 
over pensionable age, domestic servants and part-time workers previously omitted, 
giving the total industrial population as 22.075 million, 2.6 million higher than on the 
old basis143. The working population had fallen by 100,000 in 1948, only a third of 
the anticipated level. There was still the hope that employment in the undermanned 
industries could be increased and the Control of Engagement Order was deemed 
sufficient. Recruitment to the coal industry was matching the loss of 70,000 workers 
per year. Any expansion was hindered by an unwillingness to accept foreign labour. 
Unemployment was to reach 350,000, mainly consisting of workers between jobs144. 
The survey warned that its national income and expenditure "calculations" 
could not "claim to give more than a broad illustration of the tendencies at work". 
Consumption forecasts, formulated before the Marshall Aid payments or the bumper 
potato harvest, had been "unduly pessimistic". In 1947-8, consumption had risen at a 
rate slower than the growth in national income. Food consumption was set to rise but 
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would remain below the wartime average. Rationing, though removed from footwear, 
remained necessary for food and clothing. Government expenditure was to increase 
by L125 million from fl. 914 billion in 1948, mainly due to N. H. S. expenseS145 
Disinflation would continue in 1949 with a current account surplus of L415 
million and restrictions on home consumption to allow increased exports. Personal 
savings of U 10 million were needed to fund the required investment. Investment was 
unlikely to reach the forecast level but restraints would remain on credit to prevent 
excess investment. Combating the "evils of inflation" was "necessary for economic 
and social stability" and the public had to restrain wage demands or face fewer 
146 imports, falling standards of living, and rising unemployment 
The public were also urged to greater productivity to increase British 
prospenty and eventually enable economic independence. The Government would 
ensure that controls did not "distract the energies of management and hamper the 
progress of efficient firms" and by promoting initiatives such as the B. I. M. and the 
Training Within Industry scheme of vocational training for workers by the industries 
themselves. Joint consultation on improving efficiency in the workplace was also 
encouraged. Given prevailing full employment, workers were told not to perceive 
change "with suspicion"147. 
The main part of the survey concluded that the country had left the period of 
"re-adjustment" and "the improvisations of crisis" and moved into the era of "steady" 
policies of a long-term programme. It wrongly predicted that there would be no great 
changes in 1949148. Though the survey suggested that export prices were too high, 
this was used as an argument for restraining labour costs rather than for hinting at 
devaluation. The dollar and gold reserve figures should have raised greater concern 
than appears to have been the case. 
Despite the reluctance to include quantitative forecasts, the sixteen-page 
investment appendix was very detailed. It outlined the anticipated investment for 
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many of the economy's key sectors and compared these with the 1947 and 1948 
actuals149. The Government of Northern Ireland handled its own investment of 
L27 million but the survey stated it would ensure "harmony" with Great Britain's, 
though no details were given of its plans. Coal investment was aimed at improving 
output and making the job more attractive. The previous year's predictions of the rate 
of investment for the electricity industry had proved to be overly optimistic. Despite 
this, the 1949 targets were double the pre-war rate of expansion and treble that of 
1948. Most of the investment in gas would go on new equipment and extension of the 
system. However, such expansion was hampered by the heavy demand for machinery 
for other projects and for exports. To alleviate the pressure on coal and to reduce 
dollar expenditure, the domestic British petroleum industry had seen vast growth. The 
Government had decided to double British refining capacity by 1953 and this was 
150 linked to developments in the petro-chemical industry 
Railways were unlikely to receive much new investment as the cost of 
maintenance was so high and renewal could only be permitted where it was necessary 
for safety. Roads faced similar treatment and maintenance was limited to avoid 
drawing labour from agriculture and building. The number of commercial, and public 
service vehicles, such as buses and trolley buses available to the domestic market 
would be slashed to encourage exports. Investment in shipping would be limited by 
steel and would focus on tankers to tie in with the increase in British oil refining. The 
work on ports still had to replace heavy war damage and to accommodate the growing 
size of shipping. Civil aviation investment would concentrate on new aircraft and on 
developing Heathrow Airport. To make up for the wartime backlog Post Office 
investment focused heavily on telephones. Industry and commerce would receive 
priority over domestic consumers who would face continued delays in connectioni5l. 
Agriculture and forestry, control of which was mainly in private hands, were 
already tied into long-term plans - agriculture within the five-year Agricultural 
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Expansion Programme, and forestry through the fifty-year scheme of 1946. The 
Government's contribution to farming would be in research and college facilities plus 
workers' houses. Mechanization had increased greatly and it was hoped that this 
would annually increase output per worker per year by 21/2%152. 
Steel,. still in the private sector, was crucial for a number of investment 
programmes. Investment would go into increasing blast furnace capacity though some 
earlier schemes were coming to fruition. Investment in manufacturing had revived 
after a dip in early 1948 and most of the building licences were now being aimed at 
industries which would "substantially" increase exports or save dollar imports, would 
overcome shortages of common components or that were developing technical 
advances153. 
Housing investment in England and Wales was set to fall from E465 million to 
L375 million,, however, in Scotland the pattern was different. Generally house building 
had attained a better balance of construction in relation to the labour and materials 
available so the construction of temporary houses was being halted. In education, the 
number of pupils had risen from 4.7 million in January 1947 to 5.2 million in 1948 due 
to the school leaving age being raised from fourteen to fifteen in April 1947154. A L40 
million building programme was being started to provide additional places155. School 
canteens, teacher training, and schools for the handicapped would get little. Most of 
the investment in the N. H. S. covered building work and maintenance, which had been 
neglected during the war. Construction would focus on relieving mental institutions' 
overcrowding and on nurses' accommodation, as 60,000 beds were empty for lack of 
staff, presumably in England and Wales alone156. 
None of the armed services had reached their 1948 targets for new buildings 
and repairs as much due to staff as raw material shortages. Their focus continued to 
be on reconstruction. Investment in government buildings similarly aimed to 
overcome wartime neglect and build some new Civil Service premises157. 
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ZALs. they were circulated with the survey for the first time, the investment 
programmes received a higher profile, even though the Government recognised how 
limited was its ability to direct investment. Yet, sections such as those on electricity, 
steel, agriculture and forestry clearly included plans which looked further ahead than 
just a year. 
Shortly before the survey's publication, Sir Oliver Franks, now the British 
Ambassador to the U. S. A., was concerned that it would displease the Americans. 
Consequently the Foreign Office (F. O. ) asked for the survey to be re-checked with 
"Washington repercussions and frayed tempers in mind"158. The survey was already 
with the printers, and Hitchman re-assured him that F. O. staff had seen the drafts 
which had been written with an eye to American reactions159. A 3, -000-word 
summary had been produced for American journalists160 who would receive special 
attention at the launch161. The summary talked of the "timely assistance" of the 
U. S. A. and the "great" E. R. P. 162. Though much was taken from the White Paper, the 
order was changed. Consideration of trade was placed before rather than after the 
production statistics. It emphasised that the British would "continue" their "exertions" 
to achieve "economic independence" 163. Britain would "develop a keen and 
adventurous spirit" and make "a further major effort", in production, productivity and 
exports. In contrast to the private apprehensions concerning European integration, the 
summary stated that Britain was "joining whole-heartedly" in the "endeavour", 
including the co-ordination of the long term plans with other O. E. E. C. members164. A 
165 
brief summary of key statistics from the survey was produced for the British press 
The survey was released on 15th March 1949 almost two months later than 
originally intended and less than a month before the Budget. Cripps presented both 
the White Paper and the short survey version to Parliament and then hosted two press 
conferences,, first with the Americans, and then with the general British press. A day 
earlier,, Jay addressed the lobby correspondents, who had received an advance copy. 
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Further press conferences followed for the City editors and for the industrial 
correspondents, handled by senior officials including Strath, Hall and Butt166. The 
Balance of Payments White Paper was launched on the same day, but only the City 
editors were expected to refer to it167. Unlike in 1948,, officials expected Cripps to be 
168 too busy to make a radio broadcast 
There were again attempts to anticipate the questions that would be asked at 
the press conferences. Officials' concerns revolved around issues such as targets, 
investment control, balance of payments, productivity, the standard of living and the 
nature of the survey itself169. An assault on the whole basis of the surveys was 
expected such as: 
"does the Government now recognise that precise planning is 
fruitless,. and that all that is possible is to gauge the main trends and 
go with them? " 170 
Some proposed responses seemed to fit that mould. The answer suggested on 
productivity stated that it was "impossible to generalise with precision". It was argued 
that the Government had never aimed to "undertake precise and comprehensive plans" 
and its system of encouragement and restraint had proven to workl7l. Plowden was 
concerned about some of the suggested answers and put forward amendments but 
added that precise plans were "impossible and undesirable in our sort of 
democracy"172. In talking to the press, the Chancellor had to be careful not to reveal 
Budget details nor comment on controversial issues such as housing. The survey 
expressed housing targets in money terms. Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, had 
avoided answering the question on the target number of houses in Parliament, but had 
not withdrawn the figure of 140,000 from the Investment White Paper. Cripps was 
173 
advised to be evasive on the issue 
Cripps did announce some supportive measures for the survey's policies such 
as helping exporters to the Western Hemisphere by providing dollars for advertising. 
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Cripps stated that the exchange rate would remain unaltered even if there were 
persistent difficulties in exporting, though six months later the Government 
devalued174. He portrayed the survey to American journalists as an "instalment" of 
the Long-Term Programme, yet was evasive on how conflicting O. E. E. C. countries' 
programmes would be reconciled. Cripps said he believed the sellers' market was 
coming to an end, but did not fear German or Japanese competition in the year ahead. 
He welcomed the restoration of exports by other O. E. E. C. countries to rival British 
ones. 
Rearmament was already a concern for the American public and the British 
Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker saw "spending on war" hanging "over the 
whole Survey"175. Cripps, however, said he assumed no change in British armament 
176 expenditure At the press conferences Cripps also corrected errors in the 
survey177. The questions proved to be more straightforward than anticipated and 
Cripps was able to get through it with a combination of generalities, evasion and 
reference to Budget secrecy. He was helped by the failure of the British press to make 
much use of the conferences for challenging the Government. The Daily Maill, 
Evening Standard and Spectator, for example, had no coverage of the 1949 survey. 
The survey was broadly condemned by the press178 as "uncertain" and 
"confused" 179. However, both the Manchester Guardian180 and The Times praised 
the "excellent" popular survey181. The most negative view came from The Dailly 
Worke which saw the survey as "full of blatant capitalist propaganda" 
182. In 
contrast, the News Chronicle felt the survey was written "with unusual care and skill" 
that allowed "every citizen" to "understand his role"183. Unsurprisingly, the Dailly 
Herald,, stated that it was a "citizen's duty" to buy a copy, understand and discuss it184. 
The Wall Street Journal's coverage of the surveys became more sympathetic by the 
year. As in 1948, it portrayed Cripps as proceeding cautiously to improve Britain's 
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trading position and emphasised that the British public would continue to face 
185 economic hardship 
The Manchester Guardian186 Dail Financial M_eS188 y Telegraph187 Ti and The 
Times all argued that if the counter-inflationary policy was to succeed, attempts to 
curb investment had to be accompanied by cuts in tax and public expenditure189. The 
Daily Telegraph focused on the difficulty of increasing exports to the U. S. A. when a 
slump was expected there. The price of British exports and other countries' import 
restrictions were also obstacles"O. However, the Financial Times alone raised the 
question of devaluation. It stated exporters were happy to make easy profits in soft 
currency markets with overpriced goods, but this just perpetuated the disequilibria 
with the Dollar Area which would bite once Marshall Aid ended191. 
The Manchester Guardia countered the survey's claim that the Government's 
labour policy had "'met with a large measure of success"' and pointed to some "large 
increases" in wages192. The Dafly Worke complained, though, that production had 
increased in 1948 by 12%, but wages had risen by only 1/2%. Increased production 
without increased consumption, it argued, could only lead to redundancies and mass 
unemployment. The newspaper argued that the survey suggested "a greater degree of 
exploitation" of the workforce to achieve improved productivity and criticised it for 
appearing "quite happy" about unemployment at 350,000193. -Cripps claimed this was 
below what "had been considered the'practical minimumml%. 
The Financial Times195,. the Manchester Guardian196 and The Economist 
criticised the survey's lack of "any positive signs of policy or planning"197. The New 
Statesman & Natio believed it marked the adoption of "a Keynesian regimen of full 
employment, low interest rates and controlled capitalism" 198. Thus, some of the press 
continued to see the survey as the public manifestation of planning, though the focus 
was increasingly on what it revealed about finance and trade. 
1)'7 
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Opening the Commons debate on 6th April Cripps suggested that it was now 
"generally accepted" that the Government had to frame the Budget "with the fullest 
200 regard" to their "economic plans"199, a trend welcomed by Labour backbenchers 
Such a connection was in fact never made in Government policy-making. Cripps felt 
that the survey had successfully warned the public about the economic conditions so 
201 they would not be shocked by the Budget 
Strangely, Labour's George Wigg saw CriPpss "Tory Budget", as "the 
Economic Survey carried to its logical conclusions" and believed it neglected signs of 
deflation202. The Conservative frontbencher, Harry Crookshank, welcomed the move 
away from the previous "over-enthusiasm for planning" which meant ministers had 
"overlooked" the fact that it was impossible to forecast in such detai1203. However, 
Labour's Ellis Smith continued to call for a "real plan" and the adoption of "a scientific 
method of planningo1204. Harold Wilson again pointed out that opponents of the 
Government's economic policies had been unable to suggest viable alternativeS205 
In 1948 the Conservative frontbencher Oliver Lyttelton, had believed that that 
year's targets had not been feasible and felt the dollar problem would falsify those for 
1949. He thought the survey neglected the part played by U. S. aid and private 
industry in the improving the balance of payments206. Lyttelton argued a 21/; z% rise in 
productivity would be difficult to achieve given the prevailing high level of taxation 
which sapped incentive207. In 1949 the Government did not face a sustained attack on 
the survey either from the Opposition or its own backbenchers. In general the survey 
was taken as a valid core set of statistics to be used to reinforce points made by M. P. s 
208 on either side 
The launch of the survey ended five months' work. Compilation had taken far 
more time than previously. Together the C. E. P. S. and Economic Section had worked 
on data generated across Whitehall. There had been lengthy arguments on both the 
general nature and the specifics of the survey. The E. I. U. had become far more 
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involved than before and the popular survey was very much its product. The 
preparations also showed up how much the annual survey was now trying to be 
something for everyone. The first draft was an internal document to inform and alert 
officials and ministers to the current and anticipated economic problems. The White 
Paper was for a wider audience and generally outlined the economic trends. The 
popular survey was a manifesto with a proselytizing approach to exhort the public to 
greater self-restraint and effort. Concern over presenting the right image to the 
different audiences and avoiding statements which could cause embarrassment,, 
overshadowed work on the survey even more than in previous years. Consequently 
there was a rising tendency to opt for safe, generalized statements which undermined 
the survey's key role of alerting people to the reality of Britain's economic 
circumstances. The age of "Joy through Statistics" was coming to an end and the 
bonfire of controls was now followed by a holocaust of targets. 
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Chapter 
The EcDnomic Survey for 1950 
By Autumn 1949, compilation of the surveys had become routine. The first 
E. S. W. P. meeting on the 1950 survey in October 1949 stated that "the usual 
arrangements" would be followed'. In line with Cripps's decision the compilers aimed 
for publication in mid-March 19502. Hall recognised that the first draft would form 
the basis for the White Paper but the two would differ3. Later he made it clear that all 
of Part 11, "Prospects for 1950", of the first draft, was unsuitable for publication. All 
"secret,, controversial or undecided points" were highlighted4. The large amount 
which fell into these categories emphasised the extent of the variation between the two 
versions. 
By mid-December the first full draft was complete5. The handling of 
amendments was particularly important in 1950 because, with ministers busy with the 
coming election, more initiative was left to officialS6. The E. D. Committee considered 
the first draft on 6th January7 and the version for publication on the day of the general 
election8,. 23rd February 1950. Bridges stated it had been prepared "without very 
close Ministerial scrutiny", consequently it would "be more confined to factual 
matters" than before9. Officials considered it wrong to conceal "unpleasant facts" 
about rising prices and felt that the assumption of the level of E. R. P. aid for 1950 had 
been overly optimistic. Unlike the E. P. B. which wished to highlight the issuelo, the 
E. D. Committee wanted no "undue" emphasis on trade uncertaintiesil. 
The Production Committee considered the first draft in late January12. CrippS 
believed that the concerns of officials and the E. P, B. about the survey's optimism were 
unjustified. The committee also felt that production targets were acceptable but for 
manpower there should just be forecasts. However: 
"[ilt was argued that the existing policy of publishing annual 
Economic Surveys was open to the criticism that it did not provide 
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an adequate framework for effective planning related to the actual 
rhythm of production. "13 
Given the long-term nature of programmes such as housing, it was felt the annual 
surveys caused "unnecessary and wasteful fluctuations in the flow of production". 
Now the "main purpose of the annual Economic Surveys was not to serve as a basis 
for planning"14, but the survey still provided "a convenient occasion for reviewing past 
progress and for laying down the broad objectives of economic policy"15. Despite 
some ministers' qualms, production of the survey continued as before. 
The Production Committee rubber stamped the public version in March16. At 
its meeting of 16th March, the Cabinet did not discuss how anything the survey 
suggested could be implemented. It was mainly concerned with style, especially to 
avoid offending the Americans or making "unduly optimistic promises". It also aimed 
to make the survey "easily understood by the intelligent reader" as some paragraphs 
were "far from clear to most members of the Cabinet" 17 
By February it was apparent that publication on 15th March was impossible. 
Plowden allowed an additional week's work18. A dispute arose between the 
C. E. P. S. 19 and the I. P. C. 's secretariat now staffed by the Economic Section". Both 
sides disclaimed responsibility for reconciling different sets of investment figures in the 
survey which conflicted. Eventually the I. P. C. secretariat took on the work2l. 
Despite the ever increasing emphasis on trade, the survey's introduction 
opened with production. In 1949 industrial productivity had risen 31/21/o and output by 
51/2%. Production in shipbuilding, vehicles and engineering had risen sharply. The 
survey conceded that without "any measure of potential productive capacity" it was 
impossible to know whether to "feel satisfied with this result or whether we should 
iM have done better The deterioration in reserves had proved far greater than 
anticipated and Britain had faced problems of over-priced exports. Devaluation in 
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September 1949 had been the last resort, but it had broken the "world deadlock" of 
exchange rates23. 
The "elimination" of the Sterling Area's dollar and gold deficit of $1 billion 
(1357 million)24 remained the "most urgent task". Commonwealth finance ministers 
had agreed to reduce it and produce a surplus in 1950. Britain needed to boost its 
dollar exports and invisible trade25. However, the language of the public version was 
toned down from that of early drafts which complained that there was "no certainty 
that British exporters, if left to themselves would make the efforts required"26. 
The survey hoped British exports would rise in volume by 5-6%27. British 
invisible trade was expected to improve except with the dollar countries, the largest 
earnings coming from oil. Britain's overall imports, which were increasingly governed 
by what was available from non-dollar sources such as Argentina and Eastern Europe, 
were expected to rise by about 4%, particularly of food, feedstuffs and petroleum. 
Imports of U. S. tobacco, machinery and manufactured goods would be restricted. 
Currency re-adjustment was expected to mean an 8% rise in average import prices28- 
The survey recognised the difficulties of maintaining export saleS29 and gave the first 
specific warning in a survey of German and Japanese competition3O. 
The survey also featured the Gross National Product (G. N. P. ) for the first 
time. The survey argued that increased productivity was the only real way to greater 
output. The forecast of a 21/2% rise in productivity, equivalent to an additional L250 
million to the national product3l was retained, though it had been exceeded in 194932. 
The G. N. P. in 1950 was expected to be D3.1 billion, with a trade surplus of E20 
Million33. Public consumption would take two-thirds but Government expenditure 
and capital formation, with a sixth each, had absorbed the bulk of the previous year's 
rise34. There was "no firm information" available on national or local government 
expenditure, but it was assumed that the former would not rise and the latter would 
increase by L50 million35. These were unrealistic assumptions in a normal year that 
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were completely falsified by the impact of the Korean War which broke out in June 
1950. To avoid revealing Budget secrets, all taxation, and social welfare payments at 
L735 million, were assumed to continue unchanged. However, subsidies were to fall 
from L515 million in 1949 to L485 million. These figures gave a Budget surplus of 
1550 million,, up 170 million on 194936 
Fixed investment was similarly difficult to forecast. The survey could only 
"guess" at the level of stockbuilding. Increased profits meant more funds were 
available for investment. Previous attempts to reduce investment had proved to be 
slow,, though the Goverment felt it had successfully restrained bank credit37. The 
aim for the end of 1950 was to reduce the yearly rate of investment by L140 million 
38 down ftom E2.133 billion . 
For consumption, the survey suggested about a 1% increase in goods and 
services available to the public in real terms. It was expected that this would not mean 
excessive demand remained". Prices of some consumer goods had fallen, particularly 
for the home and especially radios40. Other prices were rising, some more than the 
increase in import prices brought on by devaluation4l. The price of utility clothing 
and household textiles had been brought down by the Government42. This section on 
prices and profits was detailed and perceptive but potentially contentious when 
officials felt so uncertain of their statistics. If published it could have upset the wage 
restraint agreement. The survey anticipated slight increases in expenditure on clothing 
now that rationing had been abolished and on food, household goods and fuel. As 
more essential items, became readily available, expenditure on travel and alcohol was 
expected to fall, and on tobacco and entertainments to stabilise. Shortages of many 
household goods had "disappeared" and daily food consumption had returned to the 
pre-war level of 3,000 calories43. 
The survey also featured the now traditional details on production. Despite the 
falling workforce, productivity had increased 3.4% in the coal industry. Sufficient 
had 
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been mined to allow exports of 3 million tonS44. The slow increase in electricity 
generating capacity was blamed on previous poor investment45. Shortfalls during 
peak demand periods would continue "for many years to come". As raw material 
supplies had improved steel was given a more positive output forecast of 15.75 million 
tons,, allowing 2.2 million tons of finished steel for export. Demand remained 
uncertain with cuts in construction balanced by increased demand from metal-using 
industries46. The massive demand from rearmament was unforeseen. As always the 
assessment of British agriculture was comprehensive. Output, particularly of 
livestock, had risen successfully in 1948/9, though it remained below pre-war levels. 
Guiding farmers' planting choices and gauging shifts in land use were difficult 
especially with changing supply conditions and subsidies47. 
Engineering provided work for a ninth of those in civil employment, and two- 
fifths of exports by value. Delivery times, of eighteen months on average, meant 
difficulties in satisfying the expected rise in demand brought on by devaluation. This 
worry was apparently brushed aside and not revealed in the public version. Vehicles 
represented a tenth of all Britain! s manufactured exports. Car output had risen 20% in 
1949 and exports were triple the pre-war high48. 
The "ambitious" targets for textiles had been met or exceeded, except in cotton 
and synthetic yam. Productivity was rising though some sectors' recruitment remained 
"disappointing". Wage restructuring, initiated by the industry itself, to encourage the 
manufacture of cloth demanded by the Commonwealth shows an isolated step lacking 
elsewhere in economic planning. To thrive, the rising rayon sector needed "a 
substantial change in consumers' habits". In addition, the continuation of utility 
clothing, which was produced cheaply to government set specifications, and high taxes 
on clothes and textiles hampered domestic sales and the ability of manufacturers to 
switch between domestic and export markets49. 
-242- 
The final part of the main survey considered the "general pattern of 
employment". Most trends were still running counter to the Goverment's objectives 
but no great change was anticipated. Labour continued to enter the consumer 
industries and coal manpower to fall. Unemployment was low, at 340,000,1.7% of 
the insured working population, close to the 1949 forecast5O. No target was set for 
195051. An early draft suggested "a high level of general unemployment "52 might be 
necessary to increase employment in the undermanned industries and reduce the 
quantity of labour in the building and building materials industries in line with 
investment cuts. However, it was recognised that there was "no direct way" of 
bringing about the Goverment's desired pattern of labour distribution except by 
continuing to "control the movement of labour from job to job", though by 
"persuasion rather than compulsion" using the Control of Engagement Order53. 
The detailed investment appendix showed the main objective was to reduce 
fixed investment by 6.5%, or D40 million, in 1950 to allow more resources to flow 
into projects deemed "urgent", especially industries earning or saving dollars. Britain 
stiff faced a maintenance backlog and the need to expand electricity generation54. 
This, rather than new projects would take the bulk of investment. Cuts were to fall on 
those sectors over which the Government had greatest influence such as social 
services, defence construction and government buildingS55. Housing faced the 
reduction from L499 million to f, 475 million56 
Investment in the coal and gas industries was projected to continue steadily. 
However,, in order to save dollars and boost the chemical industry, investment in 
petroleum was to literally double in 195057. Railway investment was kept up due to 
the vast costs of depreciation and maintenance. The purchase of buses and haulage 
vehicles was to be cut sharply to restrain investment and act as an incentive to increase 
exports. Investment in roads would be reduced, bringing maintenance to below its 
pre-war level. Much of the work connected with ports and shipbuilding would be 
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directed towards boosting the oil industry and repairing war damage58. Expenditure 
on civil aviation was to be slashed. Other sectors continued to follow their investment 
programmes as planned". The survey acknowledged that investment cuts could only 
be achieved by "vigorous and sustained action on a whole number of fronts4,60. Even 
so, it was doubted whether any further disinflationary measures would have an impact 
on the high level of domestic demand or the destination of exportS61. These so-called 
"controversial" paragraphs on investment were included, however, to "avoid future 
embarrassment in reconciling forecast figures with actual achievement"62 
A section on the long-term balance of payments problem was produced at the 
end of December 194963. The investment appendix was not ready until February 
195064,, two months after the body of the survey. A concluding section65,, and one on 
Marshall Aid66,, compiled mainly to please the AmericanS67, were added in March. 
Not all the additional material was incorporated, for example Cripps's piece on 
bilateral trade agreements. This section had been unpopular with Eddie Playfair, the 
relevant under secretary at the Treasury". 
The E. I. U. was keen to have "good quotable" statements on E. R. P. in the 
survey for use in Washington, rather than "scattered and indirect" oneS69. Leslie 
supplied an appropriate paper showing that the health of the British economy remained 
closely tied to E. R. P.. Marshall Aid had financed imports equivalent to 2.5% of 
Britain's Gross Domestic Product and was particularly important for food, metals and 
machinery. However, trade with Europe had increased, aiding European recovery and 
saving on dollar imports, Britain still aimed to achieve economic independence by 
195270 
The impetus for the paper on the longer-term balance of payments position 
seems to have come from the E. S. W. p. 
71 and the E. P. B. 72. It acknowledged that 
Britain faced a "stupendous task" in earning sufficient dollars to replace the annual 
$1.27 billion (f. 454 million) input of Marshall Aid and Canadian credit. Interest and 
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loan repayments would take $168 million (E60 million) per year and reserves were 
insufficient to settle these debts73. Officials and ministers had become wary of the 
susceptibility of the British economy and Sterling Area exports to the vagaries of the 
American economy, such as its 1949 slump. Reserves were a fifth of their pre-war 
level and had to rise considerably before convertibility or another U. S. recession could 
be faced74. It was hoped that imports from the U. S. A. would fall below 20% of the 
British total in 1950 compared to 231/21/o in 1938 and 37% in 1947. Viable alternative 
non-dollar supplies were needed which also implied buying inessential items to keep 
open markets for British goods in the Sterling Area, South America and Eastern 
Europe75 
The survey had been drafted "in such a way that it could be handled rapidly 
after the Election". Labour returned to power with a majority of SiX76 and an intention 
to publish the survey. Progress began on parts which focused more on policy, 
including the conclusion entitled Part IV. It emphasised that the most had to be made 
of the opportunities derived from devaluation. To achieve "security, independence 
and improving standards of life", efficiency and productivity had to rise and 
"competitive grabbing by each sectional interest" avoided. Good progress was being 
made on the path to fulfilling the objectives of the Long-Term Programme. The goal 
of exports equivalent to 150% of the 1938 level had been achieved in January 1950 
and had to be maintained77. The dangers of the "vicious spiral" of inflation were 
highlighted more forcefully in a new version written a fortnight later78. 
By mid-March all the survey's additional elements and the popular version, 
Survey'50 were ready". Both Part IV and the investment appendix had arrived too 
late to be altered much before inclusion. Suacy '50 was similar to its predecessors 
though more rhetorical than patronising in tone. It asked the reader "who are you? " 
and went on making statements in the vein that " [t]he effort cannot be too great: it can 
very easily, and disastrously, be too little". It aimed to make it apparent that all 
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economilc developments impingled on the individual. it was well lustrated with 
photographs showing production and trade8O. There was an attempt to make the 
survey appear relevant to everyone and u) have a down-to-earth feel. Early passages 
rambled on abmit the, possible Weatity of thereader and contained an eclectic range of 
rhetorical questions" 
To counter the public's insularity, the survey tried to show that Britainis 
econmnc, political and mi-fitary mission in Europe and the World continued. Britain 
was tht World's second largest exporter, almost half as mulch again as the rest of 
Europe combined. It was the greatest importer, buying in twice as much as the whole 
of South America. Together the U. S. A. and Canada supplied a third of Britain' s raw 
materials and a sixth of its food82. Britain also had a role supplying coal and 
machinery to O. E. E. C. countries in return for food, raw materials and some 
manufactured goods. The growth of multilateral trade in Europe was reducing the 
dependence on dollar imports and U. S. aid83. 
Survý,, V '50 described the usual factors upon which the economy depended, 
such as low production costs, sufficient exports and a mobile workforce. It portrayed 
the economy as a table "having four legs: production, trade, investment and 
consumption". These were interdependent and if anything went "wrong with one of 
the legs", "some of the things" would "start to slide off '84. However, the "prospect" 
was "on the whole cheerful and encouraging". Raw material shortages had been 
overcome and a rise in exports was anticipated85. Survtýy '50 stuck mainly to very 
general terms and exhortation without much explanation or many statistics. It said 
there had to be self-sacrifice, people had to move with their families to different towns 
and into essential industrieS86. If overall demand in the economy increased faster than 
the amount of supplies it would lead to prices rising and exports falling. Thus the 
public had to prevent wages rising out of step with productivity and production costs 
had to be kept down to allow dollar exportS87. The future balance of trade was 
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uncertain as it could not be assumed that British exports would compete successfully 
or that U. S. business activity would thrive. The price of imports could rise more than 
expected and, despite cutting dollar imports to 75% of the 1948 levet, the deficit with 
dollar countries persisted88. 
The survey did give some of the facts and figures that the public had come to 
expect - on jobs, food, consumer goods and housing. Unemployment remained low. 
As supplies improved, the wartime distortion of the pattern of consumption was fading 
and people were buying more food, clothing, household items, cars and televisions. 
One begins to detect hints of the coming consumer boom of the 1950S89. Like the full 
survey, Surv?, y '50 stated that the backlog of wartime repairs and maintenance was 
taking up to a fifth of Britaids output. Investment remained at about L2.25 billion, 
around L100 per employed person. Slightly over half of this would go directly into 
buildings and equipment". Savings by the Government, companies and the public 
were still important, but it was anticipated that the public would get 12-300 million 
more to spend than in 194991. 
Untypically, Survey'50 concluded with technical notes rather than inspirational 
ones and listed the trends in the British economy which the public should follow 
through government publications. Statements which concluded the popular survey, 
for example that the Government would not be concerned if unemployment was less 
than 500,000 and details of the agreement with the T. U. C. on wage demands92' were 
points strangely missing ftom the White Paper. 
By mid-March, the White Paper was ready for publication. The first drafts of 
the survey had been produced by the joint secretaries of the E. S. W. P., Downie and 
Kelley but J. G. P. Spicer of the C. E. P. S. brought together all the amendmentS93. As 
before, his immediate superior, Douglas Allen, acted as a clearing house for survey 
material coming into the C. E. P. S. 94. 
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The level of productivity to be included was a controversial issue. Douglas 
Jay, backed by Cripps, favoured a 3-31/2% target as a psychological boost to the 
public". Plowden supported by Allen, countered that any increase above 21/2"/o could 
only come from a vast rise in engineering output and entailed even greater investment 
at a time when it was being slashed96. Allen did not "think that anybody" was a 
"sufficiently accurate prophet to be able to decide whether 21/2% or 3W would be 
"nearer the actual outcome"97. Plowden's and Allen's figure of 21/2%, though lower 
than the figure given to the O. E. E. C. 98, prevailed". 
The White Paper produced in 1950 can be seen simply as a summary of the 
draft version with much detail discarded. It adopted a familiar pattern, with four main 
sections plus the investment appendix. The review of 1949 highlighted the 
improvement in the gold and dollar reserves following devaluation and the 
continuation of disinflationlOO. The survey showed Britain was increasingly facing 
"keen and growing competition" in "important markets". Though the "greatest 
possible increases in output per head" were required, no productivity target was set. 
The balance of payments remained a central issue. Despite Britain achieving a trade 
surplus with non-dollar countries, a dollar deficit of $785 million (L280.4 million) was 
anticipated in the U. S. financial year 1950/1. Devaluation had "opened up great 
opportunities" and it was hoped to increase overall exports by f250 million thereby 
reducing the general trade deficit below MO million. The survey warned repeatedly 
how "comparatively small variations in United States' demand" had 
"disproportionately large effects" on the British economy. The White Paper was not 
optimistic about Britain's chances of exporting to the U. S. A.. The Sterling Area! s 
dollar imports were to be restricted to 75% of the 1948 level, though increased trade 
liberalization would make this difficult. The revival of Japan and Germany was 
another worry. Given all the uncertainties "no detailed forecast" for trade could be 
includedlOl 
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National income and expenditure was handled equally hesitantly. Much data 
was "incomplete and provisional". It was even admitted that with "different 
assumptions the conclusions themselves would be different". The goal for savings was 
a rise of E55 million on 1949 to L245 million. Wage restraint, had to be "adhered to 
strictly" so consumer prices would only rise in line with import prices. Cutting the 
trade deficit would provide an additional BOO million worth of goods and services to 
102 the domestic market,. half the 1948-9 rise 
The White Paper's coverage of production was shorter than that of the draft. 
The agriculture section was particularly terse. Controversial elements had been 
removed, for example on electricity103. The manpower objectives of 1949 had been 
"substantially realised", though some industries remained undermanned. 
Unemployment was expected to rise by 100,000 to 400,000 by the end of 1950, 
104 through cutbacks in civil servants and investment in building . Investment received 
a cursory consideration in the main body of the survey. Over half the cuts would fall 
on building, just under half of that on public sector construction105. The survey's 
conclusion warned particularly of the danger of inflation. It ended with the familiar 
cry for moderation in income demands and a willingness to save106. 
The White Paper was, as senior officials had predicted, comparatively short 
and contained little speculation. It reiterated the well-worn themes of wages, exports 
and labour mobility. The greatest detail, as before, came in the investment appendix. 
The perceptive analyses of trends in sectors such as agriculture and textiles 
had been 
discarded. These were for officials and ministers alone, not for Parliament or the 
public. 
The launch of the White Paper followed the established pattern, though it was 
the first to be handled by Gaitskell as Minister of State for Economic Affairs. He 
had 
been appointed to the post in February to relieve the burden on the ailing 
Cripps. The 
che er Guardian saw Gaitskell's "assumption" of "economic planning" as Man 
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encouraging, expecting naively that it would lead to improvement in the administrative 
"empire" of the Treasury. It praised Gaitskell for not "parrying awkward questions" as 
Cripps had done107, though Gaitskell was able to evade difficult questions by referring 
to the secrecy of the Budget, with which Cripps still dealt. 
Meanwhile Leslie tried to anticipate questions Gaitskell might face. These 
tended to be "less sensible and penetrating" than officials had expected108. Much 
attention was paid, however, to the Manchester Guardia 's discussion of the lecture 
delivered at Manchester University by the leading Swedish economist, Gunnar 
MyrdaI109. He attacked planning in the democratic countries as leading to inflation, a 
disincentive to take risks and a tendency to autarkyllO. Myrdal focused on the 
financial aspects which concerned officials rather than physical ones that apparently 
most interested ministers"I. Leslie's suggested answers reflected both points raised in 
the articlel 12 and officials' concerns. Suggested questions included ones on the export 
drive, the reserves, the end of E. R. P., wage rises, productivity increases, investment 
and the recruitment of minersI13. The E. I. U. 's Guide to the Economic Survýy for 
1950,, a summary for journalists,, included answersI14. Uncertainty about the future 
was again the universal response to difficult questions. 
The survey was published on 28th March 1950. After presenting it to 
Parliament Gaitskell faced 200 journalists at the press conference. Gaitskell stated that 
there were no production targets as the objective was unlimited. It was "'unwise"', 
however,. to predict anything more than a 2'IYYo increase in productivity. He portrayed 
115 
the survey as providing the background for the Budget debate 
Officials' concerns about potential criticism of the surveys was vindicated by 
letters to the press over errors. The whole validity of the surveys was attacked in 
newspapers and in Parliament on the grounds that the global figure for Government 
expenditure in 1948 had been raised by 1145 million and that for gross capital 
formation by E238 million, between the 1949 and 1950 surveysI16. All the estimates, 
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particularly covering investment and those including local government expenditure, 
were subject to revision as more information became available117. However, such 
revisions continued to dent officials' confidence in the surveys. 
The right-wing press118 saw the survey as "non-committed" and demonstrating 
"the paralysis" inflicting the Government's policies119. As usual the Wall Street 
Journal focused on the implications for British trade and consumption. It again 
reported Cripps. as continuing with the domestic austerity programme to promote 
exportS120. The Daily Mail claimed the survey was "wildly inaccurate", and along 
with the News ChroniClel2l and the Evening Standard, saw the survey as "a chilly and 
joyless document"122 implying continued restrictions on consumption123. The left- 
wing R-mmold's News and the Daily Worke also criticised124 the continuing 
Trippsian austerity policy,,. Whilst shareholders' earnings had risen by 61/2%, workers 
earnings had gone up only 1%. The Dait-y Worker believed the survey encouraged 
workers to tolerate restricted social services and wage restraint to meet the anticipated 
"low wage competition" from Germany and Japan125. 
As before, a major press criticism was that the survey failed to indicate 
remedies to the problems it highlighted126. The Times and the D&N Herald tried to 
present it as a "steady as it goes"127 survey lacking "positive plans for workers"128. 
The S12ectatorl29, The Economist130 and the Manchester Quardi felt that the survey 
had dropped the "pretence" of planning. The Government no longer tried "to suggest 
that its own actions" could "determine whether or not" its "guesses" would come 
truel3l. The DaijIy Telegraph believed "true planning" now had to allow others to 
begin organising the emerging "abundance" 132 
The Financial Times sided with what it called the "majority" of M. P. s who saw 
the survey as lacking any indication of poliCy133. The Economist saw the survey as a 
"wager" on the economy not facing great difficulties because ministers were r: ý 
"determined to do nothing about the dangers ahead"134. The Daily Mai 135, Daily 
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Mirror136 and the Daily Herald emphasised the "'formidable task"' 137 Britain faced and 
the problems likely once Marshall Aid expired138. 
The Manchester Guardian139,. The Tim 40 and The EcQnomist accurately 
saw the survey as marking the abandonment of "any pretence of manpower policy" 141 
with the ending of the Control of Engagement Order. However, this was welcomed 
wholeheartedly by the Wall Street Journal 142. The picture drawn of the distribution of 
labour may have been "'realistic"' but it did not "suggest much sign of planning - or of 
policies to achieve the result of planning"143. Reduced government expenditure was 
the only economic remedy144 that publications such as The Tim 451, the Daily 
Telegraph146, the S12ectator! 47 and the Financial Times could suggest. These 
newspapers felt that the priorities which the Government gave to different demands on 
the national income were wrong. As a result they argued that public expenditure 
should form "the real residual items in any coherent system of planning" rather than 
investment and consumption which were the elements that, at the time, faced most 
restriction148, In 1950 there was more Civil Service analysis than in previous years of 
the press's reaction to the survey. Officials believed the press saw it as suffering from 
"undue complacency and optimism". This concern about the optimistic tone had been 
149 aired at almost every stage of the survey's preparation 
The final dispute concerning the survey was over demarcation of 
responsibilities. Spicer was angered that the EIU, had sent the final version to the 
printers a day earlier than anticipated thus further damaging the surveys' poor 
reputation with the H. M. S. O.. Spicer arranged that in future the C. E. P. S. would act 
as editors and oversee the White Paper. The E. I. U. would handle the popular survey 
150 and all the press conferences 
The combined Budget and survey debate started on the 18th April. Cripps 
played up the benefits of such a combinationl5l,, but Butler152 and Eden153 on the 
Opposition frontbenches argued that there was too much to assimilate to prepare for a 
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five-day debate and the speeches did not follow on from each other in the topics they 
covered154. Cripps again emphasised the "large measure of agreement" between the 
parties. He countered accurate press claims that economic planning had been 
abandoned and reiterated his 1947 statement on the subject. The overall objective was 
"to create a Happy Country [sic]", not an "easy" task as it had to be "accomplished by 
persuasion, consultation and other free democratic methods" without rigid targets or 
forecasts for all sectors of the economy. Cripps portrayed the Budget as "the most 
powerful instrument for influencing economic policy which is available to the 
Government". This did not imply that it was superior to planning or an alternative to 
it. Instead it suggested that financial tools were the most effective ones for shaping 
the economy. Cripps did claim, however, that the successes of the previous year were 
due to the willingness of the public to follow the directions given in the 1949 
155 survey 
Churchill accepted the concept of planning but argued that whereas the 
Conservatives would "plan for choices" the Government planned for "rules"156. Both 
Douglas Jay157 and Oliver Lyttelton158 articulated the consensus for the need to move 
from direct to financial controls. However, the range of opinion on the Opposition 
benches remained wide. The Conservative, George Beresford Craddock, even 
challenged Keynesianism as a valid long-term economic policy, and the budget 
surpluses and the high taxes which the philosophy supposedly encouragedI59. Fellow 
Conservative,. Aubrey Jones suggested that the large size of the Budget meant that 
there was no spare capacity which could be used in a Keynesian way to stimulate 
demand in a slump160. 
Despite having previously argued that exports were overpriced, Conservatives 
such as R. A. Butler161,, attacked the devaluation. Lyttelton argued that the survey 
tried to explain away the inexplicable decision to devalue as bowing to the inevitable, 
revealing that the Government was simply governed by the turn of events162. Spencer 
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SummerS163 and Butler similarly portrayed the abandonment of the Control of 
Engagement Order as an indication that efforts to affect labour distribution had 
"totally failed"164. Nigel Birch still saw labour direction as "the real essence of 
Socialist planning" and its demise marked "the intellectual dead-end of democratic 
Socialism", leaving only "'[d]on't know' planning"165. Aubrey Jones, perceptively 
argued that effective planning should not aim to "petrify" or "mummify" the 
distribution of manpower, but to respond to changes effectively and maintain fun 
employment166. Correction of figures used in the previous year's survey was again 
savaged, mainly to score political pointS167. The Opposition also sustained its 
argument that what it saw as an excessive Budget was threatening to undermine the 
country's institutions. There were also the usual complaints that the high level of 
taxation was weakening incentives168. 
Labour backbenchers' contributions were positive, though Ernest Fernyhough 
169 was concerned that the survey showed unemployment was expected to rise 
Against the prevailing trend Marcus Lipton argued that the movement of manpower 
into retail and distribution implied that the Government should take over controls on 
170 raw materials currently operated by private industry 
There was a sense on both sides that the survey marked the end of the 
immediate post-war recovery phase and the time to move from direct physical controls 
to financial ones. This represented an acknowledgement of the replacement of 
planning by Keynesian demand management. The main difference between the parties 
was over the question of inflation, with the Government favouring Budget surpluses 
and the Opposition preferring a reduction in governmental expenditurel7l. However, 
the Korean War, which broke out just two months after the debate, upset any 
assumptions that politicians had made about inflation and controls. 
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hapter Vg 
The Economic Survey far 1951 
The 1951 survey was distinguished from its predecessors by the rearmament 
factor. Though there was a fear that another World War was imminent, the rapid- and 
sustained increase in military manpower and arms production had been provoked 
specifically by the Korean War which started in June 19501. The balance of payments 
and reserves had been sufficiently healthy to end ERR payments to Britain from the 
start of 1951,. a year ahead of schedule. The U. K. now had to convert its strongest 
export sectors, engineering and the metal-using industries, to war production. It also 
faced-a- sharp rise in import prices, especially of raw materials, as countries scrambled 
to stockpile. 
During work on the 1950 survey ministers had tended to be more confident of 
the future than their officials. In 1951 the position was reversed. Jack Downie of the 
F-cono Section- said- that ministers saw the- first report- on the. impact of the, defence 
programme as overly optimistic. They preferred the "premonitionary rumblings" of 
the balance of payments report and the National Income Forecast2. Hall remained 
positive about Britain's position and felt that ministers were unaware of how 
favourable conditions really werd. 
Downie pressed for the preparation of the survey to be delayed until at least 
November 1950 to ensure that the figures were as up-to-date as possible. This delay 
meant that the survey was not published until 3rd April 19514, only a week before the 
Budget. In September 1950 ministers requested an assessment of the economic 
impact of rearmament. This additional work would have put an impossible burden on 
the survey's compilers. Hall correctly believed that the main problems caused by 
rearmament would be apparent in the survey anyway and the request was effectively 
ignored by officials. 
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Defence expenditure had been planned at E780 million per year up to 1953/45. 
However,. by August 1950 ministers had adopted a three-year defence programme 
which initially cost 0.4 billion6. By incorporating details of this programme, the 
survey looked further ahead than any of its predecessors7. Work on the survey did not 
begin until January 195 1, two to three months later than usual. It was inevitable that 
officials would be under immense pressure to complete it promptly. Plowden thought 
that ministers would have insufficient time to digest the survey before the Budget 
debate. However, given that in January officials were still awaiting ministerial 
decisions on the defence programmes, there was no altemative9. 
Officials produced a kind of proto-survey, Economic Pro=cts for 1951,, 
discussed by the E. P. B. in December, the time when normally the survey's first full 
draft was circulatedlO. This document,, being less concerned with past achievements, 
was concise and perceptive in a way which the surveys, aware of the need for eventual 
publication, failed to be. It warned of "disastrous" consequences if the U. S. A. did not 
pay heed to the needs of other countries' economies. Reserves were expected to 
, deteriorate substantially from the $3.5 billion (11,25 billion) level anticipated for the 
end of 195011. Britain's trade position had improved primarily through dollar import 
cuts, an approach which would prove impossible to maintain during rearmament. The 
U. S. trade deficit, and the profits the Sterling Area's primary producers had been able 
to make as demand for their products rocketed, had boosted earnings. Now, however, 
now an "enormous rise" in imports and import prices was anticipated which would 
12 counter such gains 
It was feared that the sharp rise in domestic expenditure would leave 
insufficient resources for exports and force workers to demand wage increases to 
match the rising cost of living. Raw material shortages and industrial dislocation also 
threatened recent productivity gains13. There was "a substantial difference of opinion" 
amongst officials on the issue of production with some believing productivity would 
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fall below the 1950 average, others, that this was "unduly pessimistic". The 
"compromise" forecast of a 4% increase in production above the 1950 average meant 
effectively maintaining the level of the fourth quarter of 195014. 
Economic Prospects for 1951 recognised that there would soon be hard 
decisions to be ahead such as possibly denying supplies to the domestic market to 
allow increased exports. The necessary consumption cuts to achieve the target trade 
surplus of 1100 million meant that average living standards would fall, causing 
"genuine hardship for the lower income groups", "social strains" and "industrial 
unrest" 15. Raising taxes to limit consumption could lead to less saving thus restricting 
the finance available for investment, so a careful balance was necessary16. 
Economic Prospects for 1951 was superior to the survey because it identified 
the assumptions on which it was based and considered the consequences if events 
turned out differently. If the raw material shortages became "more acute" it could 
provoke the "[c]omplete reversal of the whole trend of post-war economic 
development". Without "a more austere fiscal policy" the cost of living could rise and 
supplies to consumers would drop causing a "severe setback" in productivity and 
certain exports17. Whatever the developments, rearmament meant declining exports 
and standards of living plus investment below 1950 levels. 
The paper demonstrated that officials could provide incisive analysis rather 
than just "public relations documents"18. Though ministers would have received the 
same information from departments, it apparently did not come in this concise, 
comprehensive form. Its effect was to focus concern on production and maintaining 
exports. The E. P. B. felt that some parts of the paper were "optimistic". It doubted 
whether the 4% rise in production was possible and feared another coal crisis. The 
Board opposed risking domestic consumption levels to achieve a trade surplus and 
began the shift towards a :: LLO target, that is an exact balance of payments and 
receipts19. 
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By the end of January, the timetable20 and the layout for the full survey had 
been determined. Both resembled the previous years' pattern. The survey would 
conclude with "a prose summary and a collection of exhortations". A "brutal 
exposition" on the balance of payments was now felt necessary, which demonstrated 
the changed attitude towards trade prospectS21. Butt wanted a return "to the customs 
of 1947 and 1948" when the surveys were "interesting". Like other officials he saw 
the post-war recovery as coming "to a climax in 1950", and expected a mixture of 
"happy congratulations" and "dismal forbodings [sic]". He added that the greatest 
danger would come from ministers unwilling to take the tough decisionS22 
The investment appendix was discarded in favour of "vaguer" detaiIS23. The 
"primary purpose" of the survey, officials were told, would be to "describe the 
economic consequences of rearmament and 'sell' the policies involved" with a "wider 
sweep" than previous surveys. Rearmament was not expected to have much of an 
impact until 1952 and this made it difficult to determine what assumptions to make24. i 
Strath noted that unlike previous years when the surveys' analyses had inspired policy 
decisions, now the survey outlined actions which had been forced upon the 
Government. It had to indicate the scale of rearmament and demonstrate the "desire 
to pay for the defence effort as far as possible out of the present and as little as 
possible by making drafts on the future", without becoming "dependent on our rich 
1; 25 -relations 
The need to gauge the impact of rearmament led to a re-assessment of the 
nature of the survey. The E. S. W. P. believed the survey would be "a forceful recital of 
problems and policies", but "much more positive" than before. The only way the 
survey could be completed in time was for the E. S. W. P. to guess "likely decisions" 
ministers would take, though no department was to be bound by these26 
The annual report to the O. E-E. C. had forecast a productivity rise of 4% 
for 
195127,, a figure supported by Butt. The Mnistry of Supply and Board of 
Trade 
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opposed this figure because of the anticipated shortages28. The 4% figure was 
adopted for the survey with the caveat that it depended on sufficient raw materiaIS29. 
For trade, Gaitsk-ell, the new Chancellor, wanted aI LO figure. The Board of Trade, 
however, had already forecast a deficit of L250 million in 1951 excluding strategic 
stockpiling. Butt, fearing it might reach 13-400 million, favoured forecasting a deficit 
of L100 million,, making it easier to explain if it increased30. Butt wanted trade at the 
"forefront" of the survey3l. However,, Samuel Goldman, Chief Statistician to the 
Treasury's Overseas Finance Division, did not expect the reserves "situation to become 
really serious" and played down their importance for the survey32. 
The sections on the defence programme and on output were drafted first, in 
February33. Other elements followed through March34. Peter Wright of the C. E. P. S. 
handled the minor amendments35. In mid-February it was decided to ornit manpower 
statistics as the figures for each sector rarely changed year-to-year36. As before, coal 
proved to be a stumbling block. The Ministry of Fuel and Power and its three 
successive ministers had been on the defensive over coal since the 1947 fuel crisis and 
wished to avoid giving hard figures. This caused unnecessary difficulty for the 
Chancellor. Gaitskell faced the same conflict with the Minister of Fuel and Power, 
Phillip Noel-Baker, that he himself had caused for Cripps two years before. In 1950 
the compilers had been uncomfortable with a5 million ton range for expected coal 
output. For 1951 the suggested range was 10 million tons. The lower limit of 200 
million tons was below 1950's output37. The coal section was not ready when the 
survey's first complete draft was considered by the E. S. C. and the E. P. B. on 12th 
March, less than a month before publication3g. 
HaI139 and Plowden complained that the Ministry of Fuel and Power was "not 
willing" to produce anything more than the summer coal budget. Bevan, now Minister 
of Labour, was "strongly opposed to the inclusion of any manpower or other coal 
figures in the Survey", but Plowden believed that such an omission would attract 
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criticism in Parliament40. Gaitskell was willing to compromise4l and asserted 
sufficient pressure on the Ministry of Fuel and Power for them to produce something. 
Gaitskell wanted coverage of the calendar year. Noel-Baker would not allow 
coverage beyond the summer until a review in May42. The ministry contributed only a 
review of previous successes and vague predictions of the winter stocks43. Hall feared 
a coal shortage might be overlooked44. Butt, frustrated by the lack of ministerial 
debate on the issue, drafted his own coal section,, including the deep n-fined coal target 
favoured by Gaitskell, of 208-212 n-fflfion tons45. 
When the Production Committee considered the survey on 19th March, the 
issue was unresolved. Despite Gaitskell's pressure, Noel-Baker remained adamant, 
believing that "the publication of an estimated range" in 1950, had been "harmful to 
production"46. The five Paragraphs on coal finally included in the survey resembled 
Butt's draft, though omitting all mention of stocks47. In contrast, - 
Butt saw the 
1148 Ministry of Fuel and Power's contribution on electricity as "complacent 
Other disputes also reflected concerns of how the survey would be received. 
Butt,, Leslie49 and Hall5o favoured including praise of the A-A. C. P. to curry favour 
with the Americans. Allen felt this would mean lauding British Government's own 
initiatives too, which was not the survey's job5l. Plowden ruled that reference to the i 
A-A. C. P. would stay52. This dispute reflected how far, for some of the compilers, the 
survey had become an end in itself rather than a means of illuminating important 
economic trends. 
Leslie was keen to include a statement of the four main assumptions on which 
the survey was based: that productivity would rise by 4%; there would be sufficient 
exports to achieve a balance of payments; import prices would rise and that there 
would be no great increase in wage levelS53. The commitment to a balance of 
payments was soon dropped, Though the E. S. C. opposed an explicit statement of the 
assumptions, Leslie continued to argue that if any of them was "falsified", the survey 
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would be undermined. It was crucial to demonstrate clearly the economic position and 
provide the planners with a rejoinder when reality diverged from the forecastS54. The 
concessions that were made fell short of Leslie's wishes55. 
Butt felt the survey had "become a collection of bits" with "no obvious logical 
connection" and so was "less effective than its predecessors". This was a particular 
problem in 1951 due to the differing opinions of officials and ministers on the 
economy's prospects56. After its launch Hall felt the survey was "bad and 
uninformative" and symptomatic of "the dying Government"57. Sir Henry Tizard, a 
senior scientific and defence adviser to the Government,, savaged the survey58. Such a 
contribution from a relative "outsider" was unique. Perversely Tizard particularly 
attacked the survey for "pretending" both that there was still a labour shortage and 
that there were great difficulties in sharply raising coal output. However, in contrast, 
he felt the survey was over-ambitious and that it had ignored "the remarks of many 
experienced industrialists"59. As a result of his comments some amendments were 
made, but many points remained unaltered as Gaitskell wanted "to reserve exhortation 
to his speech" in Parliament6O. 
The E. P. B. feared the survey was "somewhat optimistic", particularly on the 
increase in production. It expected the economy to suffer more than the survey 
revealed. Both Cunningham and Tewson wanted the survey to emphasise the need to 
keep down export prices and make the most of U. S. demand for consumer goods. 
The Board doubted that the textile industry could increase sales by the L65 million 
suggested. Ince, expected unemployment to rise well above the 300,000 shown in the 
survey, once raw material shortages and armaments production had begun to bite" 
In contrast to the E. P. B. 's contributions the scrutiny provided by the E. S. C. 
62, 
Production COMMittee63 and the Cabinet was cursory64. The main controversy at the 
E. S. C. was over the 4% rise in production, but with Plowden as temporary chairman 
in Bridges! s place, supporting this figure, it was included65. The Production 
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Committee's main concerns were whether the increases in exports and productivity 
could be achieved. Gaitskell said that "the publication of the figure in the Survey was 
not equivalent to a commitment by the Government that the figure would be reached". 
He was more optimistic than some of his Production Committee colleagues who 
feared "industrial dislocation" provoked by defence requirementS66, but little was done 
to allay these fears. On 22nd March the Cabinet simply approved the decisions taken 
at a lower level without discussion67. 
The survey itself showed little difference between the first draft and the White 
Paper. Owing to the rapid changes in the economy, officials and ministers would have 
been better informed by the monthly journals from the economic departments rather 
than by a one-off, general survey. As- a result the survey very much highlighted what 
the Government was aiming to do and the general trends anticipated. It was about the 
same length and -followed a similar pattern to previous years' economic surveys. 
The survey's review of the previous five years was a record of proud 
achievement for the Government. Production was 30% higher than at the end of the 
war,., and exports had increased by 60%, leading to a trade surplus of E189 million in 
1951. Reserves had moved from a deficit of $4.131 billion (LI. 475 billion) in 1947 to 
a surplus- of $804 million- (LZ8-7 millicttfý by 1950. Britain- had been-able- to, give- up 
Marshall Aid before repayments began on the U. S. and Canadian loans at the end of 
1951- 
The survey- was far more overtly politicat than its predecessors when 
considering the Soviet "menace, 168. Though rearmament was the Government's "first 
of 
ý, 
it could not. be the " sote" one. A well-balanced industriat base and healthy 
balance of payments were necessary to support the military, Consumption had to be 
sacrificed to ensure that no industrial- capacit-y or manpower was- wasted- Raw- 
materials69,, and to a lesser degree machine tooIS70,, were key determinants of success 
in achieving these goals. The survey also warned that if incomes rose 
faster than 
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output this would lead to rapid price increases, "social injustice" and obstruction to 
export and munitions production". 
Much of the defence programme had been outlined in the Prime Minister's 
parliamentary statement (Cmd. 8146). It demanded expenditure of L4.7 billion 
between 1951 and 1953, compared to L810 million in 1950 and f5 billion in 1944. 
Two-fifths would pay for the armed forces with the rest on associated equipment and 
building72. Rearmament needed "substantial movements" in labour distribution. The 
armed forces would rise from 713,000 in April 1950 to 860,000, two years later. By 
1953/4, over I million workers would be needed in war production, especially in the 
engineering, metal-using and textile industries. Unless Britain faced immediate attack, 
however,, "compulsions entirely unacceptable in peace-time" would not be used73. It 
was hoped to attract back the I million women who had stopped work between 
1945-8 by offering acceptable working hourS74 
The published version of the survey looked at raw materials in far less detail 
., 
but emphasised the "disturbances" shortages cou d cause They than the first draft, I 
had already meant the reintroduction of some controls. Particularly critical were 
supplies of non-ferrous metals, sulphur and sulphuric acid. It was hoped that the 
International Materials Conference, established by the British, U. S. and French 
Governments in December 1950 in Washington" to allocate scarce raw materials on 
an international basis,. could alleviate some of the difficulties76. 
import prices had risen 18% above the 1950 average and overall imports were 
expected to cost 0.2 billion, including another L150 million of raw materials 
for 
rearmament. Strategic stockpiling was expected to cost an additional VOO million77. 
Invisible earnings had seen an "outstanding" rise of flOO million up to L450 Million78. 
Visible exports faced "exceptional difficulty". In 1950 they had earnt L2.2 
billion, but 
in 195 1, to avoid a trade deficit this had to reach L2.75 billion. The engineering, 
metal-using and raw materials industries which provided 55% of 
British exports were 
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pre-occupied with rearmament, leaving clothing and textiles "to bear the brunt" of the 
export drive79. 
Raw material shortages threatened continued rises in productivity and 
production. Since 1948, productivity had risen annually by 7% for manufacturing, 
mining, construction and public utilities. The industries which were to bear the brunt 
of rearmament, such as the metal-using sector, had seen even higher figures 80. These 
sectors were to face the greatest raw material and machine tool difficulties and 
curtailment of production for the home market. One of the largest inconsistencies in 
the survey was that the textile industry was supposed to make up for much of the fall 
in engineering exports yet, it too, faced raw material problems. Investment in 
agricultural machinery was also hit by defence demands. However, agricultural output 
was already 40% higher than pre-war, close to the Agricultural Expansion 
Programme's ultimate target for 1952/3 of 50% above the inter-war average8l. 
In 1950, for the first time since before the war,, Britain had achieved a 
to reasonably satisfactory" balance of payments. Sterling Area trade was thriving as the 
prices of its exports of primary products had risen sharply. Reserves were their 
strongest since 1939. Shifting trade patterns, however, meant that Britain's trade with 
the Area would fall and "a further improvement in the gold and dollar position" would 
be sacrificed to defence concerns82. 
The national income and expenditure forecasts showed an increase in domestic 
resources of L350 million though with a fall of f, 50 million in civilian conSUMption83. 
Consumption cuts would hit clothing, textiles, engineering and metal goods. The 
greatest inflationary pressure now came from import prices, governmental expenditure 
and military wages. Savings of L445 million were "needed" to "avoid inflation", 
but a 
fall in voluntary savings of E100 million was more "likely". Disinflation was 
apparently vindicated by the moderate rise in consumption in the past year and 
had to 
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be "continued and strengthened". As usual, the survey asked for no "unreasonable" 
demands for increased incomes84. 
Compared with previous surveys, the conclusion was muted in tone. It 
portrayed 1951 as "harsh and unpleasant". Rearmament was Britain's "duty" as "the 
price of peace". The public had to accept "with patience the shortages and high 
prices". The task for the Government was to sustain an economy robust enough to 
carry the burdens of rearmament with the weight falling as lightly and fairly on the 
public as possible". 
There was no detailed preparation for the launch of the survey or attempt to 
guess likely press conference questions. With the imminent Budget and Cabinet 
tensions over N. H. S. chargeS86,. the Financial Secretary, Jay, hosted the conference. 
With Gaitskell's appointment as Chancellor,. there was no longer a Minister of State for 
Economic Affairs to do this job. Controversially Jay stated that "no increases in 
dividends were justified" but that some increases in wages were"87. The Financial 
Times saw this as "injustice" to investors88. Jay also suggested that the reduction in 
consumption would equate to 11 per head and that Britain could "'remain independent 
of foreign aid"'89. 
No popular edition was produced in 195 1. The reason why is unclear. As a 
result though, the newspapers were even more important than usual in disseminating 
the survey's message. Only Communist commentators, who saw defence expenditure 
pushed up by "American pressure"90 and weakening the British economy, opposed 
rearmament9l. Newspapers such as the N ews Chron icle92,. Man chester Gu ard, ýýnU 
___ne? 
6 expressed Dai-by c &. -S-k-d-ch94. 
Evening Stand "r95 and Financial Tim 
grudging admiration for a survey which emphasised defence and the need to maintain 
normal conditions for civilians, though there were questions about 
Britains earlier 
"neglect of defence"97 when supplies had been cheaper. Yet again, the 
Wall Street 
Journal referred to persisting austerity in Britain and the fact that rearmament made 
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the country's attempts to return to a balance of payments harder". Though it could 
still attack British attempts at socialist econornics99,, its comments were now pitying 
rather than critical. 
The Daily Mail attacked the "annual orgy of pompous prediction" which was 
always "so wildly inaccurate" and could "be knocked sideways by a slight boom or 
recession in America or even by a whiff of grapeshot in Korea". However, as the 
newspaper showed, between 1948-50 the economy had fared better than the surveys 
had predictedlOO. The Daily Herald101 and Fin ial Times recognised more openly 
how far Britain had come since 1945102. 
The press were alert to the uncertainties of what the Daily Telegraph called the 
survey's "statistical guesswork"103. Many newspapers detected that the necessary 4% 
rise in production was dependent securing adequate supplieS104. The Econonfist 
condemned the "very detail" of earlier surveys which had lent "an air of unjustified 
reliability". It saw the assumptions for 1951 as "hopeful" and "flimsy 11 105. The 
Manchester Guardi described them as basically "'hypothetical"' 106. The 
EconomisI107 and the Daily Telegraph claimed that "the planners" had been 
"flummoxed by the economics of rearmament" leaving the survey "not so much a plan 
as a prayer" 108. 
Across the press spectrum it was clear that "[n]o Chancellor ever gave a 
clearer hint" of tax rises in the Budget than Gaitskell in this surveyl09. The Daily 
Telegrao expected a rise of L150 millionllO. With profits slumping from L300 
million in 1950 to f80 million and the "scope for taxing higher incomes" having been 
exhausted, The Times preferred additional tax to fall on "lower wage-incomes, married 
women's earnings and children". However, it generally saw tax increases as 
indefensible because they undermined the "incentive to effort and enterprise". The 
Times favoured allowing inflation to rise thus discouraging consumption and 
consequently permitting sufficient resources to be -available 
for rearmament 
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Unlike previous years, officials made no analysis of newspaper comments on 
the survey. However, they were attentive to the views of seven economists, including 
Tress who had worked on earlier surveys, as outlined in the Bulletin of the London 
and Cam ridge Economic Service of May 195 1. The planners saw such comments as 
"valuable" though they argued that commentators had only a partial picture and an 
"immunity from responsibility". Tress called the survey "lucid and intelligent" and in 
general the economists were positiveI12. This seems to have bred complacency 
among the survey's compilers. The economists criticised the survey for not 
emphasising the worsening coal position sufficientlyI13. However, this would have 
been difficult given the recalcitrance of the Nfinistry of Fuel and Power. The 
assumptions about savings were also attackedI14, as they had been in the press, but so 
had the only viable alternative, of raising taxes. Dow points out that by July 195 1, 
officials had come to accept the economists' opinion that the survey had been "over- 
optimistic" 115 on prospects for prices, wages and increased exports. 
Opening the Budget debate on I Oth April 195 1, Gaitskell stated that though it 
encompassed the survey he would give it little coverage116. Controversy had raged 
within the Cabinet over the health charges that Gaitskell was to introduce in the 
Budget. Within a fortnight these led to the resignations of Bevan, Wilson and John 
Freeman, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply. Generally the Budget 
was well received as it was not as tough as expectedI17. Gaitskell did mention some 
aspects of economic planning. He stated that physical controls remained necessary 
in 
addition to fiscal and monetary ones118 but declared that the Government would not 
countenance wage controll". Brian Brivati has highlighted Gaitskell's "abiding 
faith 
in physical controls"120 and "vivid refutation" of Hayekian-style attacks on the 
incompatibility of planning and fteedoM121 from members of the Opposition122. 
Gaitskell had emphasised his position in a memorandum to the E. P. C. in January 
1950123 7 and reiterated 
these stances in his Budget speech. 
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In the debate, Wilson did focus on the survey124' picking up a theme 
developed earlier by fellow Labour M. P., Anthony Crosland125. To them the survey 
showed what a great recovery had been made since 1945, and but for the Korean War, 
this would have meant an improved standard of living126. Ellis Smith suggested the 
improvements would have been even greater if the economy had been planned "as it 
should have been planned"127. However, looking at the debate from the present day 
one can detect a sense that the 1951 Budget debate drew the final line under the whole 
experiment of planning. The Conservatives Ralph Assheton128 and Oliver Lyttleton 
were pleased that the survey's authors had "decided to abandon the practice of 
prophesying" 129. Only the Liberal leader, Clement Davies, wished the survey had 
included more on production and how far the standard of living was going to suffer 
from rearmament130. 
There were attacks on the Government's tardiness in buying raw materials and 
rearmingl3l and against devaluation, still portrayed by Conservatives in the way it was 
characterised by Ulster Unionist Douglas Savory, as a "catastrophe" 
132. However, as 
the Labour M. P. John McGovern pointed out, it was rich for the Opposition to 
complain about the slowness of rearmament when they had previously pressed for 
faster demobilizationl33. Labour's Austen Albu,. who like Crosland would become a 
Minister of State for Economic Affairs, responsible for handling planning in the 1960s, 
believed that the Government had underestimated the improvements that industry had 
made for itself134. The Conservative Martin Smith shared this view and expected the 
4% productivity target to be exceeded135. Highlighting the raw materials 
difficulties, 
Labour's Fred Mulley argued the opposite136, The issues of the survey and planning 
were in the background to the wider economic debates. The survey remained 
the 
standard source of information for parliamentary discussion, 
but the sense that it was 
the basis of long-term plans had faded. It had come to be recognised as simply a 
summary of the economy in the previous year. 
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Chapter Vh 
Thc, 
-Economic 
Surveys - Conclusions 
Having considered all of the annual economic surveys 1946-51 one can now 
tease out the developments suggested at the start of the chapter. This is assisted by 
reference to the most comprehensive study of the published surveys which was 
produced in 1952 by Professor Ely Devons, a wartime member of the Economic 
Section and Nfinistry of Aircraft Productionl. Like all commentators of the time,, of 
course, Devons was unaware of the two previous, unpublished surveys2. Devons 
portrays the 1947 survey as containing three elements: plans for individual industries; 
"budgets" for manpower and national income and expenditure; and an analysis of 
particular prevailing economic problems. He characterises these three elements in 
combination as forming the basis of "planning by economic survey". However, he 
believes that the: 
"full flowering of the 1947 Survey system of planning did not come 
until the Surveys for 1948 and 1949. f13 
He recognises that the Government suffered from: 
"doubt and hesitation about the significance and usefulness of such 
plans, and especially about the difficulties of implementing them. "4 
Each year saw "a gradual whittling away of the forecasts and plans" in the surveys as 
they turned "more and more into a review of the previous year"5. By 1950, the 
"targets" of the 1947 and 1948 surveys were merely described as "forecasts". Leruez 
claims that at least the 1948 and 1949 surveys resembled plans. The 1949 survey in 
particular was able to use information gathered for the Ung Term Programme6. 
As seen above,. in contrast to Morrison's statements that the surveys would 
improve as more experience was gained, elements were discarded as it became politic 
to conceal them or apparent that the predictions were proving inaccurate. 
Devons 
states that: 
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"By the Survey for 1951 a good deal of the planning system 
portrayed in the first [ 1947] Survey had disappeared. "7 
By 1949, trade figures looked only six months ahead. Such figures continued to prove 
problematic and were dropped from the 1951 version8 Manpower targets were 
reduced in 1949 to cover only coal and textiles. By 1951 even broad manpower 
figures were ornitted9. The 1950 survey was a turning point. Specifics on manpower, 
currency and individual industries, apart from coal, steel and agriculture, had been 
discarded. In 1951 "glimpses into the future" for production were replaced with 
actuals for the past yeario. 
Devons rightly suggests that the gradual reduction of detail occurred as the 
goverment leamt: 
"... how difficult it is to try to put forward precise plans for the future 
in the spring [sic] of each year... "" 
In contrast, Dow wrongly claims that between 1947-5 1, the Economic Surveys 
"became progressively more quantitative, confident and elaborate. " 12. However, even 
he concedes though that despite the increased sophistication, the forecasts "were not 
conspicuously successful"13 and gives examples. He shows that the consumer 
expenditure forecast was short by 1350 million in 1947, by DOO million in 1949 and in 
1951 it exceeded the actual total by L25 million. The public authority expenditure 
forecasts were 1125-150 million less than the real figures until 1951 when the cost of 
the defence programme fell below expectations. Similarly the gross domestic 
investment figures were short by L300 million in 1947 and L550 million by 195114 
15 
The surveys estimated that unemployment would reach 550,000 by the March 1947 . 
This was revised to 450,. 000 for the end of 1948, still implying an annual rise of 
150,, 00016. In fact between 1945-51, unemployment did not exceed 400,000,, or 2% 
of the insured working population, except during the fuel crisis of early 
1947, when it 
touched 2 million17. The discrepancy in forecasting arose primarily 
because the 
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anticipated post-war slump did not materialise and the movement of manpower 
between industries was smoother than expected. Though the surveys included such 
large errors, these forecasts provided figures for policy-making. 
Devons states that the surveys' investment figures were "dogged by 
misfortune" and he doubts "whether the publication of the detailed plans served any 
useful purpose"18. However, as investment was felt to be a crucial part of national 
income and expenditure accounts which could be targeted according to social 
priorities, these were seen as important. Separate white papers also handled 
investment alone and in 1949 and 1950 details were appended to the economic 
surveys. There were discrepancies between the survey's figures and those of the 
investment white papers. The 1948 survey stated that 1947's fixed investment had 
been fl. 55 billion compared to the investment white paper's figure of V. 8 billion19. 
The 1948 survey predicted total domestic investment of fl. 8 billion for 1948 
compared to the actual L2.59 billion shown in the 1949 investment white paper. In 
addition,, Devons shows that the survey only correctly predicted half of the elements 
which made up the total figure and "did not cover the whole field of investment"20. 
The 1950 survey was the last to contain detailed investment figures, and it was not 
clear how the total investment figure of L2.435 billion had been reached from a fixed 
investment level of fl. 755 billion. The surveys indicated little of the thinking behind 
the prioritization of certain investment. Their main fault, however, lay in the 
"ignorance" of the contributions made to investment changes by factors such as 
repairs, stocks and price increases2l. Devons is justified in believing that it had to 
be 
recognised that the surveys "involved estimates" which were "little more than 
guesswork"22. 
Devons highlights other flaws in inflation forecasting. Given high levels of 
investment,, government expenditure and consumer purchasing power 
it was 
unsurprising that the compilers of the surveys 
detected inflationary pressure. The 
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1950 survey even acknowledged that with "'different assumptions the conclusions 
would be different"'23. The balance sheet method the surveys used was too crude to 
show which elements were inflationary and which were deflationary or to indicate the 
development of a wage-price spiral. The 1951 survey used more "traditional" methods 
for gauging inflation such as stock and price movements, the interest rate and bank 
advances24. 
Gaitskell later described the 1951 survey as having been "very prescienV25 
Dow sees it as being "most ambitious"26 and argues that by overestimating 
government expenditure it stimulated a "fairly sensible" policy for dealing with 
inflation and the balance of payments27 . 
It provided useful forecasts of defence 
expenditure and price riseS28 - 
Though the figures may have been inaccurate the 
surveys played an important role in the Government's adaptation to some large 
economic changes. 
Compilers were often aware of the difficulties of accurate forecasting which 
led- to a "tentative and hesitant" -approach apparent 
in the surveyS29. They faced a 
period of upheaval which made it hard to produce accurate predictions. Combined 
with this was a lack of faith in what they were doing but also a failure to appreciate 
how far the shortcomings undermined the surveys. The surveys were intended to 
shape the public's perception of the economy. Their publication represented the hope 
that providing economic information would win people over to greater sacrifice. 
Though this approach was controversial among officials, as the White Paper of the 
1947 survey stated, it was felt that a democratic government had to take the public 
into its confidence30. 
The 1947 survey sold 200,000 copies. The 1948 edition sold twice that. As 
demonstrated above, newspaper coverage of all of the surveys was extensive. 
Nfiddlemas argues that the surveys were successful in increasing public confidence in 
the admi m-stration Of the economy, and in winning support for austerity". 
Mass 
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Observation and Rogow, demonstrate how little of the surveys the public understood. 
Misunderstanding, however, did not prevent people putting up with austerity or 
working harder, for other reasons. Leruez states that there was increasing scepticism 
about the surveys as people had expected to be warned about the fuel crisis of 1947, 
the dollar shortage and the devaluation of 194932. The surveys did, however, 
highlight the forthcoming fuel, raw materials and dollar problems. The fuel crisis 
broke when the 1947 survey was in its final stages of preparation, yet it emphasised 
fuel and power as a key diffiCulty33. 
By 1949 Hall believed that the public and the Government had lost interest in 
the surveyS34. Their launch was no longer anything special. As Leruez notes, by 1950 
the surveys contained more reviews than forecasts and predicted only what could be 
expected to develop naturally in the economy, rather than as a result of specific 
govermnentat planning35. The surveys had lost the sense of winning support for the 
production drive and simply become reports on the economy. 
The Labour Government fell on 25th October 195 1,. when preparation for the 
1952 survey was beginning. Caimcross has claimed that the incoming Conservative 
Government saw planning as an "anathema". Though the surveys continued to be 
produced until 1961, the new Chancellor, R. A. Butler, strongly opposed the inclusion 
of forecasts and they were on-fitted36. Caimcross and Watts state that there were 
often complaints under the Conservatives about the large number of forecasts 
produced for ministers. The surveys were never again submitted to the Cabinet 
though they were considered by the nfinisterial E. P. C. 
37. 
Catherine Torrie has argued that planning continued to be an issue within the 
Labour Party through the 1950s and 1960S38. Brian Brivati has shown that as Labour 
leader,, Hugh Gaitskell, despite being a "revisionist", retained an "astonishing faith" in 
the need to plan the economy using a mixture of economic tools. Among these tools 
Gaitskell included physical controls combined with demand management and 
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"indicative" planning39. Thus, despite the failure to plan effectively 1945-5 1, there 
was a degree of continuity in Labour thinking until planning was revived as a major 
policy by the Labour Government in 1964. This policy followed on from the 
Conservative developments in this direction from 1961 onwards40. However,, these 
issues fall beyond the scope of this study. 
In summing up, one can view the record of the economic surveys as a story of 
good intentions. The Government wanted to be well informed about the economy and 
to teach the public about it too. However, older concerns about secrecy and above all 
the fear of appearing to have blundered meant that the surveys steadily withered and 
became more general and less informative. Increasingly they were aimed simply at 
winning support for the government's policies at home and abroad. In addition they 
often formed the battleground for feuds between departments and were unable to 
develop as the unemotional analyses of the economy that were necessary for sound 
econonk planning. 
-287- 
1 Biographical details in Alec Cairncross, ed.,. Ely Devons, Papers on Planning and 
Economic Management, (Manchester University Press, 1970), pp. 1,5-9. Article,, 
"Planning by Economic Survey", pp. 67-83. 
2 bid 
5 p. 83. 3 Ibid, p. 71. 
4 Ibid., p. 70 
5 bid, p. 82. 
6 Jacques Leruez, Economic Planning and Politics in Britain, (Martin Robertson & 
Company, 1975), London, p. 60. 
7 Op. cit., Devons, p. 82. 
8 Ibid, p. 73 & Alec Caimcross, Years of Recovený. British Economic Policy 1945- 
51, (Methuen, 1985), London, pp. 323-4. 
9 Op. cit., Devons, pp. 72 & 74-5. 
10 Ibid, p. 72. 
11 INd, p. 83. 
12 J. C. R. Dow,, The Management of the British Economy 1945-60,, (Cambridge 
University Press,, 1964), London, p. 130. 
13 I6id, p. 13 1. 
14 ibid 
15 P. R. G.,, CAB 134/188,, "Draft White Paper on Econonfic Survey for 1946-47", 
E. D. Committee Joint Secretaries,, 3/4/1946. 
16 The Times,. 10/3/1948,. "Unemployment. An Expected Rise" - 
17 Sidney Pollard, The Development. of the British Econow 1914-1990, (Arnold, 
1996), London, p. 206. 
18 Op. cit., Devans, pp. 76-7. 
19 Ibid, pp. 77-8. 
20 Ibid, p. 77. 
21 ibid 
22 Ibid, pp. 78-9. 
23 Ibid, p. 8 1. 
24 ibid. 
25 Op. cit., Dow, p. 64. 
26 Ibid, p. 134. 
27 Ibid, p. 135. 
28 Ibid, p. 134. 
-288- 
29 Ibid., p. 72. 
30 P. R. O., 
,T 229/46, Economic-Survey for 1947, (H. M. S. O., 1947). 31 Keith Middlemas, Power. Cm* inn nnrl tl -- - ritain in Search of 
Balance 1940-6 1, (Macmillan Press, 1986), Basingstoke, p. 15 1. 
32 Op. cit., Leruez, p. 60. 
33 Op. cit., P. R. O., T 229/46, Economic Suva. 
34 Alec Cairncross, ed., The Robert Hall Diaries 1947-53, (Unwin Hyman, 1989) 
London, 18/3/1949 entry, p. 54. 
35 ibid 
36 Sir Alec Cairncross, Managing. the British Econo= in the 1960s. A Treasufy 
Perspective, (Macmillan, 1996), Basingstoke, p. 7. 
37 Alec Caimcross & Nita Watts, The Economic Section 1939-1961, - (Routledge, 1-989), London, p. 174 
38 Catherine Torrie, "The Labour Party, Ideology and Domestic Economic Policy", 
Twentieth Century British History seminar, Institute of Historical Research, 17.00, 
20/11/1996 & correspondence, 12/1996. 
39 Brian Brivati, Hugh Gait sUll, (Richard Cohen Books, 1996), London, pp. 292-3 & 
298. 
40 Op. ciL. Caimcross p- 7. 
-289- 
Chapter VI 
Atte ts at Longer-lerm PI 
Introduct on 
After Labour came to power in 1945 there were regular calls from officials, 
ministers, M. P. s, business and the press for a long-term plan. The closest the 
Government came to such an enterprise was in the production of the Economic Survey 
for 1948-51 and the Economic Survey for 1948-52, which formed the basis of the 
Long-Term Programme, necessary for the allocation of Marshall Aid. Revision of this 
led to the abortive four-year Economic Survey for 1952. As seen above, by Summer 
194%, attempts to survey the whole economy comprehensively for more than a year 
ahead effectively came to an end. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Britain, 
however was obliged once more to present plans to the Americans to elicit "burden 
sharing" aid to contribute to the cost of rearmament. This work involved C. E. P. S. 
members,, Plowden in particular. 
These longer-term surveys shared common problems with the annual economic 
surveys, namely that the economy was changing rapidly and was susceptible to crises 
that were beyond the Goverment's control. The compilation of long-term surveys 
generated greater friction between departments than preparation of the annual ones. 
Contributors felt that it would be difficult to deviate from a long-term plan to which 
they believed they were being tied. The Long-Term Programme had the additional 
complication of input from the Americans and from Britain's partners in the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O. E. E. C. ). The O. E. E. C. was 
established to administer the European Recovery Programme (E. R. P. ), which shared 
out Marshall Aid. 
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The Economic Survey 1948-51 
The idea of a four or five-year plan was discussed as early as 19451. In 
January 1946, while at the Board of Trade Robinson stressed to Meade the need for 
the co-ordination of the plans then being formulated by a number of departmentS2. 
Meade was suspicious of Robinson's intentions but his response was positive. 
Robinson's enthusiasm coincided with the general support among officials at the start 
of 1946 for a four-year plan. Meade backed a survey of the likely economic 
conditions in 1950 by when it was expected the economy would have returned to 
normal3. Such an exercise would be usefal for predicting developments in particular 
in the regions and specific industries, and for indicating future inflation or deflation. 
Meade particularly wanted to establish target national income and expenditure figures. 
Such a plan would be a basis for demand management and could be used to counter 
the "particularizations" of planners like Robinson who were seen as being too 
favourable to surveys which set detailed targets for sectors of the economy4 
Nothing was done until December 1946 when Alec Cairncross of the Board of 
Trade sought to revive interest among officials in producing a long-term survey. He 
was keen to verify whether an export target of 175% of the 1938 volume by 1950 was 
adequate and feasible and to calculate its manpower implications5. In October 1946 
the Economic Section had already begun work on the so-called Preview Papers, 
considered below,, which would later form the basis of the long-term survey. Meade 
wanted the E. S. W. P. to handle the survey6. However, there was no formal 
organization of the work until January 1947. At two E. S. W. P. meetings staff were 
allocated to the compilation of figures covering sectors of the economy 
for the 
Economic Review of 1948-5 1, which was aimed to be completed by March 19477. 
By March twenty-nine Preview Papers had been produced. Though many 
focused on investment plans, they did not yet constitute a coherent survey. 
The 
Economic Section drew on detailed information from a wide range of ministrieS8. The 
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Section also attempted to determine assumptions about the economy upon which the 
review would rest. These focused on the financial side. Many of the assumptions 
suggested a return to pre-war patterns. Some appeared reasonable, such as a 2.5% 
increase in output by 1951, whereas others were faulty and shared errors with the 
annual surveys. For example, employment in coal was expected to climb 50,000 to 
9101.000 by 1951, when in fact it kept falling. By contrast, unemployment was 
forecast to be 450,000 by the same year9. 
Many of the statistics produced for the review were detailed. However, 
concerns about the accuracy and difficulty of forecasting were still raised'o. The 
enduring question of implementation was discussed in March 1947 in the context of a 
long-term survey. Tress of the Economic Section argued that the long-term plan 
could not be treated like the annual surveys with the E. D. Committee suggesting cuts 
in projects to close any gap between resources and demands. It had to be based on a 
phased programme rooted in a balanced Budget, with targets for the national income 
and distribution of resources at each stage. Potential inflationary pressure had to be 
calculated and possible divergences from the programmes had to be written in too, 
particularly the chance of a U. S. slumpi 1. 
In April 1947 Tress began creating a survey based on the Preview Papers. Hall 
took over supervision in anticipation of his succeeding Meade as Director of the 
Economic Section five months later12. Hall briefed Plowden on the work13. One 
central exercise was determining priorities between consumption and investment and 
among investment programmes14. Responsibility for what was now termed the "plan". 
remained with the Economic Section and C. S. O. but on his appointment Plowden was 
given the final say on its form and details15. The objective was to send the plan to 
ministers by 31st October and to publish in time for discussion in Parliament on the 
20th December 194716. The first draft was produced at the end of April17. 
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The draft review was unremarkable. The uncertainties were emphasised from 
the start. However,. the review aimed to include consistent targets based on optimistic 
but workable assumptions, primarily that there would be sufficient fuel and raw 
materials to sustain full employment and that inflation would not drain stockS18. The 
review's assumptions were based on those of the annual surveys. This remained the 
case throughout the long-term surveys produced in 1947-8. 
The review followed the annual surveys' style considering basic industries first. 
It gave forecasts and targets for four years and made suggestions of alternative paths 
the economy could take. For example, different developments were predicted if the 
pre-war pattern of employment was recovered or if more labour moved from metal- 
using to textile industries. Similarly there were different sets of figures for the case 
when coal demand changed little and for if it rose by 5-7% by 1951. These different 
models now all seem unrealistic. For example, the most pessimistic view expected 
fewer than 100,, 000 workers to move from metal-using industries into textiles, whereas 
in fact textile manpower barely grew and engineering mushroomed". 
Manpower followed production in the survey. Typically prospects for 
increasing coal manpower, the fall in engineering employment and the loss of female 
labour were all overestimated. However, the competition for labour that basic 
industries faced from the distributive sector was properly recognised20. Productivity 
forecasts were given by sector. The average goal for manufacturing was a 21/2% rise 
in productivity per year and for coal and agriculture a total rise of 71/2% by 195 1. The 
review expected the effects of the fuel crisis to restrict productivity improvements until 
the 1950S21. The balance of payments section reiterated the export and import goals. 
It was feared that even with a sharp rise in exports this would prove 
inadequate to 
secure a reasonable level of imports. Alternative models of development were offered 
but, again, the review neglected the more realistic option - that of 
deteriorating terms 
of trade22. 
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It was not until the sixth section that the review focused on financial concems. 
The review took the safest approach by assuming that trends would continue as they 
were, thus giving priority to the balance of payments and to the investment programme 
over consumption. Defence expenditure was expected to fall sharply by 1951 with the 
armed forces reaching half of their 1947 strength. Domestic investment was expected 
to peak in 1950-1 at fl. 2 billion, almost double the level of 1946, and then fall off as 
the demands of reconstruction subsided. It was assumed that by 1951 consumption 
levels would only be 10% higher than those of 1946 and remain distorted towards 
wartime patterns with high demand for entertainments, alcohol and tobacco. The 
survey also claimed the demand for travel had been high, though clearly this was not 
possible to fulfil in wartime23. 
Another assumption which persisted was the critical need for savings to enable 
investment. By 1951 11.3 billion in savings, 12.7% of the national income would be 
needed compared to the 1721 million or 6% saved in 1946. This concern had not yet 
changed into a belief that Budget surpluses would remain necessary for many years. 
Despite the high level of public expenditure it was felt that the tax burden could fall 
from 21.1% of the national income in 1946 to 15.2% by 1951. The review portrayed 
continuing consumption restrictions, yet failed to indicate policies necessary to 
reconcile tax, savings and investment24 
Additional Preview Papers were produced in May 1947 bringing the total to 
thirty-four25. Circulation of the draft alerted officials to the fact that they were 
providing material for a four-year plan, which it appears they had given little attention 
26 to before . 
As a consequence, throughout Summer 1947 disputes between 
departments and the compilers increased. In June Hall told officials from all the 
economic and social ministries that the review's figures were not simple forecasts 
but 
real targets. Several were unhappy discussing targets when there was no 
indication of 
how they would be achieved. There were concerns about investment programmes 
for 
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education, that food imports were being treated as a residual and that the manpower 
targets for the essential industries were unattainable27. 
Complaints poured in from across Whitehall during the following weeks. The 
Ministry of Supply envisaged difficulties in increasing staff to administer the controls 
necessary to execute the plan28. There was also concern that officials were neglecting 
"basic research" and were "in danger of pretending" they knew too much about the 
economy in order to demonstrate their enthusiasm for planning". The G. P. O. 
questioned the basis of the review's figures30 and the Ministry of Transport was hurt 
by the draft's reference to the inadequacy of investment in road and rail transport3l. 
The Ministry of Works savaged the "draconic [sic] use" of "oppressive" controls that 
the review implied were necessary in construction. The ministry believed these would 
lead to unemployment and boost the black market32. The Ministry of Education was 
one of the most bitter critics, arguing that L50 million assigned for all social services 
investment was far too little. They claimed education needed DOO million over four 
years and advocated cutting what they saw as the unfeasible housing and factory 
33 building programmes, to provide it . Such acrimony 
demonstrates the difficulties 
which would have been encountered routinely if planning had become properly 
established. 
In mid-July a second draft was produced, the Economic Survey 1948-1951, 
based on amendments sent in by departments, though they all reserved their final 
positions34. This draft emphasised the financial side and food much more. Manpower 
35 
and the balance of payments were portrayed as determinants of the national income . 
The draft stated explicitly that "very considerable 'controls"' would "continue to be 
necessary even in 1951"36. However, its general approach was cautious. It was more 
"chary" about the prospects for increasing manpower in the undermanned 
industries 
and recognised that restricted investment would limit the improvements 
in transport37. 
Pessimism continued into the discussion of the balance of payments. Given the 
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deteriorating terms of trade it was recognised that by 1951 imports only equivalent to 
90% of the 1938 level could be afforded. Despite recognition of the difficulties of 
selling sufficient exports the 175% target was retained38 
Unemployment was not expected to rise above 400,000. A level of 500,, 000 
was seen as the maximum that would be tolerated by the public, compared to 
Beveridge's 550,000 figure, 3% of the insured population39. The productivity targets 
were less detailed than before. The manpower targets were unchanged from the first 
draft40,, though the text had been amended to satisfy the ministries of Education and 
Works. Social investment was raised 50% to L75 million. The house building 
programme was to be cut, that for factories,. maintained4l. The consumption section 
was re-written to emphasise that it was not regarded as a residual. Three models were 
put forward for potential consumption, but a return to pre-war standards and patterns 
was expected by 195142. Much of the redrafting was done to satisfy officials' 
complaints rather than as a reassessment of the economy's prospects. 
By August 1947, with key staff absent on leave, the process of producing a 
long-term programme was losing momentum. By October Tress had left Whitehall for 
London UniverSity43. The greatest upset was the failure of sterling convertibility. 
This meant rethinking the survey's assumptions and tied the C. E. P. S. to analysing the 
latest developments44,, sometimes using material gathered for the survey45. As a result 
work on the survey was returned to the Economic Section46. Marshall Aid had been 
announced in July. Copies of the survey were provided for the U. K. Delegation in 
Paris for the first talks on the aid47 and for the British end, the official European 
Economic Co-operation Committee (E. E. C. C. )48. 
By October officials were "struggling" with revision of the survey49. Butt, 
who replaced Tress as secretary of the E. S. W. P.: 
50, was losing faith in targets. He 
feared that setting manpower targets would lead departments to feel their plans were 
being shaped by the Ministry of Labour5l. Cripps, the newly appointed Minister of 
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Economic Affairs, pressed for the revision to be completed by mid-November. This 
put immense pressure on officials. The new emphasis on trade and reserves meant that 
the thrust of the survey had also to be altered52. Departments began sending in 
revised materia153, though Otto Clarke,, who, habitually provided the balance of 
payments figures, was recalcitrant54. 
The survey continued to change, with an increasing emphasis on the prospects 
for 194855 and the balance of paymentS56. This spelt -the beginning of the demise of 
the first long-term survey. Robinson recognised this and, in Butt's words, flew "into 
passions of rage and sorrow". Butt also claimed that Robinson felt the 1948-51 
survey no longer differed from the annual surveyS57. Butt and Robinson both believed 
that their respective units should handle the long-term surveys with the other dealing 
with short-term issues58. By October Plowden had retitled the exercise as the 
Economic Survey for 1948 and the following month's redraft explicitly stated its 
similarity to the 1947 survey with no links to a longer term picture". It was polished 
by the C. E. P. S. before going to ministers and the E. P. B. 60. As seen in Chapter V, the 
1948 economic survey was redrafted but its basic nature had been established as a 
revision of the four-year survey. 
The Economic Survey for 1948-5 
Robinson renewed pressure for a long-term survey in 1948. An E. S. W. P. 
meeting in April 1948 which he chaired discussed gauging Britain's long-term trade 
and industrial patteMS61. This was followed by a C. E. P. S. paper on the likely 
economic background of the 1950S62. This restarted work on long-term 
forecasts. 
Preparation for the 1948-52 survey was similar to that for the 1948-51 document. 
RobinSon63 and Alec Nove64 at the Board of Trade produced detailed papers 
in the 
summer with Hall providing relevant material from the Economic 
Section's flow of 
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discussion paperS65. Papers focused on trade, investment and fiscal measureS66 and 
recognised the demands the E. R. P. would make on British forecastS67 
Butt warned that given the data available, forecasts had proved to be 
"hopelessly inaccurate" even for a year in advance. Planners had to determine both the 
varied degrees of certainty of different forecasts and which factors in the economy 
needed immediate or long-term adjustment68. Butt believed that investment was the 
only key element which needed action five years in advance. He felt forecasting 
investment or trade patterns for 1952 indicated little of the picture for each year up to 
then69. The O. E. E. C. had recognised this and called for annual progranunes as well as 
the long-term oneS70. Butt,. however, also criticised the O. E. E. C. 's work,. scorning 
attempts to produce a long-term survey before the share-out of aid or other countries' 
objectives were known. 
Butt's suggestions established important assumptions for the British. These 
were: an austere but tolerable level of U. K. consumption and optimistic figures for 
investment, productivity and for European exports to the rest of the World. He felt 
the O. E. E. C. could be satisfied with a brief statistical exercise which would not be too 
burdensome for Whitehall and yet would aid the production of the "real plan", the 
1949/50 programme7l 
Robinson's work on a long-tenn survey continued unabated. It appears that he 
was aided by Robin MarriS72 and an unnamed working party73. Robinson made no 
formal contact with the E. S. W. P. or departments about this survey. This particularly 
upset the Ministry of Labour74. By August 1948, the Economic SurvQy for 1948-52 
was ready75. Robinson was poised to return to acadeniia76 and Butt was to assume 
responsibility for the survey77. It had become clear that the O. E. E. C. would 
be 
demand a long-term survey and it was soon accepted that Robinson's would be the 
foundation of Britain's contribution78. 
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From the outset Robinson's survey aimed to indicate the problems Britain 
would encounter in achieving a viable economy by the time U. S. aid terminated in 
1952. It was not supposed to be published, but was expected to fuel discussion within 
government that could produce a revised version suitable for parliamentary debate. 
The C. E. P. S. took sole responsibility for the document and other departments were 
only consulted on the main points. The objective had been to create an internally 
consistent picture of the country's resources and use of them. As a result some of the 
figures differed from those being used within departments79. Robinson's approach, 
however, avoided further C. E. P. S. -Economic Section infighting. 
Robinson emphasised that it was impossible to predict accurately the future 
economy but argued that slow-moving elements within it, such as investment and 
labour distribution, needed as much advance information as possible. The 
Government could not be "a passive spectator". The assumptions Robinson made for 
the survey covered trade with Eastern Europe, world prices and productivity. He felt 
his views were optimistic but realistic. The survey centred on a balance of payments 
which allowed full employment, a good standard of living and improvement of the 
nation's capital such as factories and railways. Incentives, prices and differentials had 
to work in the direction the Government desired, rather than counter to it80. 
Unlike other surveys, Robinson drew on his expertise as an economist to 
include details going back into the early nineteenth century to indicate long-term 
changes. Good use was made of the Economic Section's and Board of Trade's 
predictions of world demand. The survey aimed for British exports to reach 145% of 
the 1938 level by 1952, the figure that Robinson himself felt was feasible. Robinson 
showed how dependent Britain remained on Western Hemisphere imports. To get the 
right balance by 1952, L76-100 million worth of imports from that region had to be 
supplied from elsewhere. Overall imports would not exceed 75% of 1938's and yet, 
such a low level could hamper exports8l. 
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Robinson saw an annual productivity increase of 21/2% as reasonable, This was 
another figure gaining acceptance among planners. Robinson felt that the predicted 
level of annual investment, 12.15 billion, though f275 million above the current level,, 
and a continuing Budget surplus of D-500 million, were barely sufficient. He 
advocated restricting consumption by price to allow greater investment in induStry82. 
He was not optimistic about expanding British food production and expected 
"discontent" from the public over continued limits of food supplies, expected to rise 
just 3% by 195283. Robinson similarly could only set out aspirations for manpower, 
which he saw as the chief obstacle to achieving the survey's objectives. However, he 
backed free collective bargaining while urging that negotiators recognise the condition 
of the economy84. This survey included nothing outrageous or radical and tensions 
with the Economic Section arose simply over the issue of faith in long-term figures. 
Nicholson saw the survey as valuable, though he portrayed it as simply 
forecasting the development of current trends. The balance of payments section had 
already been discussed by the E. P. C. and the E. E. C. C. 85 which included Hitchman and 
Strath from the C. E. P. S. 86. The survey established objectives which were to persist 
into the programme for the O. E. E. C.. Like Robinson,, Nicholson felt that the 
predicted level of investment was "dangerously low". Nicholson favoured fiscal 
measures to promote saving and permit greater investment87. 
The E. P. B. shared Nicholson's views,, for example on the low level of 
investment forecast. However, they thought public opinion would not tolerate 
continued Budget surpluses. The Board felt the export targets were too pessimistic 
and that the productivity forecast, though only a fraction higher than the pre-war 
annual increases,, was over-optimistic. If these were not achieved, much of the survey 
would be falsified. The Board took a gloomy view of the future with a government 
apparently able to do little to alleviate conditions88. 
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In the same week that Robinson's survey was circulated, the O. E. E. C. set a 
very tight timetable for production of the Lmme and the annual 
programme for 1949/50. The deadline for both was I st October 1948, less than two 
months after they had been formally requested. They were to be forwarded to the 
European Co-operation Administration (E. C. A. ) the American body handling Marshall 
Aid which had missions in each of the participating countries. The E. CA had to 
receive it by 15th November for submission to Congress in January 1949. As was to 
become apparent, such a timetable was not feasible. Bridges warned, however, that 
failing to meet it could damage Britain's prospects for the allocation of aid89. 
Ultimately Britain was the only country apart from Iceland" to submit by the 
deadline. Plowden had criticised Robinson's survey as being based on "irrelevant" 
inter-war patterns but acknowledged that it proved useful in producing the Long-Term 
Programme, on time. The balance of payments figures were lifted straight from it9l. 
Additional material produced to strengthen Robinson's survey was used in the new 
programme92 
The Long-Term Programme 
Plowden. has written that the Long-Term Programme was "the first and only 
long-term economic plan to be issued by a British government before Labour's 
National Plan of 1965"93. The impetus to produce it came mainly from American 
pressure arising from Marshall Aid. The aid programme was initiated by General 
George Marshall on 5th June 1947 and was followed quickly by the formation of the 
Committee for European Economic Co-operation (C. E. E. C. ) of potential European 
recipients, including Britain94. Each country had to complete questionnaires on the 
expected development of their economies which the C. E. E. C. scrutinized. Most of 
this work for Britain was handled by Clarke". 
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British ministers were keen to avoid U. S. interference in the domestic 
economy and felt uncomfortable supplying information to the Americans. They also 
wanted to avoid generating anti-American feeling in Britain by appearing too beholden 
to U. S. generoSity96. The whole process was expected to be "embarrassing and 
distasteful", but Cripps demonstrated that refusing Marshall Aid would mean serious 
damage to Britain's reserves and level of importS97. Britain, like all the aid recipients, 
had to sign a bilateral agreement with the U. S. A.. In effect the first version would 
have removed the British Government's ability to set sterling's exchange rate with 
other currencies. It also insisted on a balanced budget and restricted what Britain 
could buy with E. R. P. dollars. These conditions were deemed unacceptable98. Attlee 
and Cripps negotiated one with less U. S. interference" and by July 1947 officials 
could start compiling the information requestedlOO. 
As a result of this work additional Whitehall committees were created. The 
key one was the E. E. C. C., commonly known as the London Committee. It met 
between July 1947 and November 1951. It was chaired by Leslie Rowan, a Second 
Secretary of the Treasury and a former Principal Private Secretary to both Churchill 
and Attlee. The committee included a range of officials concerned with economic, 
foreign and Commonwealth affairs. It generated a raft of sub-committees handling 
individual topics like supplies, programmes and stockpilinglOl. Most important for 
planning was the Working Group on Long-Term Programmes, also chaired by Rowan, 
and this working group's Sub-group 'C' established in December 1948102 which 
concentrated on revising the Long-Term Program-me. Ffitchman chaired it, Marris was 
103 the secretary and Strath and Patricia Brown were members 
Eric Roll of the C. E. P. S. was a member of the U. K. Delegation to C. E. E. C. in 
Paris. The delegation was headed by Sir Oliver Franks104 who was elected to chair 
the C. E. E. C. by representatives of the participating countries105. Roll later became 
chairman of the O. E. E. C. 's Programmes Committee and member of the so-called 
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"Committee of Four" which decided the allocation of aid between the different 
countries. Plowden and Cripps asked him to remain in Paris as part of the U. K. 
Delegation, now headed by Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, a deputy secretary at the Foreign 
Office. Roll,, however,, remained responsible to the C. E. P. S. 106 with whom he had 
irregular contact107 until he became a permanent member of the U. K. Delegation in 
January 1949108. Roll's main concern was with European recovery in contrast to 
Foreign Office officials who focused on "pleasing political masters at home"109. In 
August 1948 Robinson still expected to return to Cambridge once again110, but 
instead joined the U. K. Delegation for the final quarter of 1948. As a "willing slave of 
the organisations he served"111, Robinson focused on working for the O. E. E. C.. He 
was pessimistic about Britain's chances of achieving viability by 1952-3, but in public 
112 he had to support the objectives of the British programme 
Presenting the case for the allocation and use of E. R. P. aid did not really 
intersect with the planners' work until August 1948 when the O. E. E. C. requested 
long-term programmes from each of the sixteen participating countries to demonstrate 
how they would be "viable" by 1952 when the E. R. P. would terminate113. Viability 
meant that a country could trade with the dollar area without the need for external aid. 
The nature of the Long-Term Programme was partly dictated by the O. E. E. C.. It 
provided tables and questionnaires for the participating countries to complete114 and 
assumptions to which all the programmes had to work. As a result British statistics 
were modified. For example, 1948/9 prices were used throughout, rather than the 
1947 prices of Robinson's survey115. Countries were to progrannne for a balance in 
trade overall and aim for the largest dollar surplus they could116. Strath was put in 
charge of work for the programme and material came in from many departmentsI17. 
118 Clarke's Programmes Conunittee produced the vital balance of payments figures 
Thomas Finletter, head of the E. C. A. Nfission in Britain, urged the British to 
take the lead, as he felt that Washington had a "phobia" that Britain was shirking this 
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role. He was impressed, though, by Robinson's survey119. Unlike the E. C. A. which 
favoured an acceleration in investment and output in the latter years120, the British 
preferred a steady improvement. Additional directions came from W. Averell 
Harriman, the U. S. Special Ambassador with the E. C. A.. He emphasised the need for 
internal financial stability, balanced budgets, improving productivity and a good level 
of investment without inflation. He did not want aid dissipated on raising 
consumption standards. Harriman believed that the supply of strategic raw materials 
to the U. S. A. would be an important dollar earner for Europe and its dependent 
territories,, the first hint of the American concern with rearmament. Harriman 
strengthened Keynesian tendencies by encouraging the production of national income 
121 figures 
By September, E. E. C. C. officials could scrutinize the draft programme. At 
only eleven pages long, plus a balance of payments chapter, it was short compared to 
122 the annual economic surveys and there was room for amplification of many points 
This draft made additional assumptions, for example, a reasonable level of East-West 
and intra-European trade, sufficient U. S. aid for the duration of E. R. P. and a high level 
of world economic activity. It acknowledged that falsification of such assumptions 
would endanger Britain's bid for viability. 
Consumption standards would rise little and it was felt politic to omit the food 
consumption forecasts. Other targets were more optimistic than Robinsows had been, 
particularly on trade with dollar countries. For 1952, overall exports were set at 
150% and imports at 80-85% of the 1938 level, possibly reaching 175% and 95% 
respectively. It was anticipated that the other O. E, E. C. countries would run a deficit 
with Britain and the Sterling Area as a whole. The programme's references to joint 
activities between O. E. E. C. countries appear superficial and uncommitted123 
Sterling was presented as a tool for international stability and a basis of 
multilateral trade, so the British emphasised the importance of strong reserves. 
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Newton states that this attitude was correct and motivated by true necessity rather 
than delusions of grandeur. He claims that the stance was vindicated by events in 
1947-50, which demonstrated that the dollar shortage was at the heart of international 
trade problemS124. The programme anticipated adjustments to exchange rates to 
125 reduce trade disequilibria but suggested this was unnecessary for sterling 
The E. E. C. C. was reasonably happy with the programme though they, too, 
favoured a larger investment programme126. In contrast, Butt felt that it had been "a 
shame" to be involved with the programme which he characterised as being futile 
given the lack of economic tools to implement it. However, for him it "was this or 
nothing"127. Both Plowden and Hall felt there had to be more on European co- 
operation128. Plowden feared that without'a clear policy on the issue Britain would 
become embroiled in unpleasant American "grandiose schemes"129. The British 
embassy in Washington felt that the programme was impressive, but Franks, now 
ambassador and conscious of the American perspective, also wanted more on working 
with other O. E. E. C. countries; the A-A. C. P.; the willingness to sell raw materials to 
the U. S. A. and the importance of reserves for Britain130. The U. K. Delegation in 
Paris emphasised the need to amplify production targets and the investment 
programmes as these would be scrutinised in particular depth by the specialized 
Technical Committees of the O. E. E. C. 131. 
Guided by such advice, redrafting proceeded rapidly and the document was 
ready by the deadline of I st October. The programme had been fleshed out to forty- 
one pages, with rhetoric to appeal to the audiences in Paris and Washington. The 
Government was still wary of being bound to any forecasts and emphasised that the 
programme remained provisional. This was particularly the case as it was felt it had to 
be properly discussed with the Commonwealth132. 
The prime objective of the Long-Term Programme of the United Kingdom was 
viability. Interaction with the Commonwealth, the O. E. E. C, countries and the U. 
S. A. 
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was important in securing that. It emphasised the need for continuing consultation 
with the other O. E. E. C. countries. However, given the scepticism of officials about 
other countries' plans and what could be achieved through co-operation in Europe, it 
is difficult to believe such statements were sincere. The programme spurned a laissez- 
faire approach though it recognised that long-term planning was a "novelty" for 
democratic countries133. It smugly presented Britain as a country which had already 
established a system of annual plans onto which work for European recovery could be 
grafted. The programme stated that the economic picture was elaborated to the public 
through monthly statistics and publicity134. The economist Joan Mitchell claims, 
however, that the Government was "extraordinarily timid" in mentioning Marshall Aid 
in public, and attempts to make the two sides of industry understand the implications 
of E. R. P. were half-hearted135. 
The 150% target for exports was retained. Britain's conunitment to 
multilateral trade was emphasised though it was recognised that great structural 
economic, changes were necessary to facilitate such a system. The need for strong 
reserves was reiterated. The programme anticipated Britain would have a surplus with 
the O. E. E. C. countries which they could not settle in gold or dollars until the early 
1950s. However, it believed that in the meantime trade could be balanced through 
third countries in the so-called "three nons" regionS136,, i. e. non-dollar, non-sterling, 
non-O. E. E. C. countries,, for example, in South America and the Middle EastI37. 
Production plans were included for coal, oil, engineering, chemicals, textiles, 
shipbuilding and tourism and, for agriculture, drawing on the Agricultural Expansion 
Programme. The level of detail was high, for example covering face, cleaning and 
haulage machinery for coal and the output of plastics, dyes, soda ash and nitrogen 
fertilizers fi7om the chemical industry. The objectives for 1952 were ambitious. The 
programme aimed for output of 250-60 million tons of coal by then which represented 
an increase of 5% each year 1948-52. Oil refining capacity would rise 
from 2.5 million 
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tons to 20 million tons, whilst engineering production would be 70% higher than in 
1938. Tourism, given minimal attention in the annual surveys, received greater 
coverage, because of its dollar earning potential. Even in 1947 there had been 
300,000 tourists visiting Britain and it was hoped that by 1952, tourism would earn 
$150 million (f, 53.6 million) per year in hard currencies138. 
The investment section gave figures in dollars. It hoped that by 1952 the limits 
imposed by shortages would have lifted and investment could reach 20% of the 
G. N. P., equivalent to $8.5 billion (12.1 billion) per year. This included programmes 
such as $2 billion (1496.2 million) for electricity generation and $1.66 billion (MI. 9 
million) on housing. The emphasis was on developing basic industries, the 
139 infrastructure and new sources of raw materials 
Investment in the Commonwealth as an important boost to dollar earning, 
received its own chapter. Unlike the dominions, Britaids forty-five actual colonies, 
like those of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, counted as participants in 
the O. E. E. C.. Details were taken from current long-term development programmes, 
which aimed to improve the living standards of colonial peoples. However, as primary 
producers these countries were vital for dollar earning and saving. Colonial 
investment plans were to reach $480 million (f 119.9 million) in the decade from 1946 
along with $750 million (L186.1 million) in seventeen other long-term colonial 
programmes. It was hoped that by 1952, the colonies would supply $950 million 
(f235.7 million) of imports to Britain and buy $1 billion (1248.1 million) worth of 
British exports. Such colonial development it was stated would help provide the 
140 U. S. A. with strategic supplies 
The programme used four assumptions to provide a trade forecast. These 
were: sufficient E. R. P. aid; substantial progress in West European co-operation; a 
reasonable level of trade between Eastern and Western Europe and a high level of 
world economic activity. This was the first occasion when attention was drawn 
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specifically to the Western Hemisphere, reflecting concern about an approaching U. S. 
slump. The export forecast for 1952, included 40 million tons of coal, a level higher 
than the 1927-9 peak. Most ambitious was the objective of $1.053 billion (1261.2 
million) in invisible earnings compared to $140 million (04.7 million) in 1948/9. 
Even with such optimistic improvements in overseas earnings imports would not 
exceed 85% of 1938's levell4l. 
Though exports to the Western Hemisphere were expected to rise 20% by 
1952, a $300 million (04.4 million) deficit would remain with the region but viability 
was seen as "unquestionably" possible. The only other deficit would be $175 million 
(MA million) with the "three nons" countries, half of it with the Eastern bloc. Britain 
would have good surpluses with the Sterling Area and O. E. E. C. countries, causing, it 
142 was recognised, a sterling shortage in the latter 
The programme concluded by showing that $1.263 billion (013.4 nfillion) of 
aid was needed for Britain's successful recovery. It reasserted how willing the British 
143 were to modify their plan in line with the needs of their O. E. E. C. counterparts 
The programme presented both an optimistic view of the British economy at the end 
of the E. R. P. period and emphasised that Britain was deserving of aid. Once 
complete, the British programme was to be combined with those of the other O. E. E. C. 
144 countries to provide the Americans with a coherent plan for Europe 
The U. K. Delegation in Paris felt that the initial O. E. E. C. response to the 
British programme was favourable145. Plowden,, Robinson, Butt and other officials 
met Finletter and Lindsay from the E. C. A. staff in Paris. Plowden focused on what 
was to prove a stumbling block - Britain's wish to reduce the import of inessentials 
from the other O. E. E. C. countries. Lindsay, instead, grilled the British on a range of 
specific points including the oil, textile and agriculture forecasts, and appears to have 
been content with the answers. Most noticeable was his query about how rearmament 
would affect the programme. The British confessed that the "U. K. could not 
both 
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,, 146 recover and rearm as there were virtually no unused resources in the U. K. 
Marshall Aid was already beginning to become mixed up with American defence 
147 considerations , though this did not manifest itself formally until the creation of the 
Mutual Defence Assistance Programme in June 1951148. However,, as early as 
October 1948 the Ministry of Defence was brought into the London Committee's 
work149. 
The formal scrutiny of the British programme was to be by O. E. E. C. officials 
in Paris and British civil servants were soon preparing a defencel50. The general line 
was that Britain should be careful about making commitments, for example on 
convertibility and Sterling Area exports. The issue of British reserves was to be 
played down in the European arenal5l. In his address at the official submission of the 
programme to the O. E. E. C., Plowden stated he felt that those factors within British 
control such as counter-inflationary fiscal measures and investment control, were 
portrayed realistically in the programmeI52. He also believed that the programme's 
153 trade objectives were defensible , Counter to the prevailing rhetoric of trade 
liberalization, Plowden spoke of the need to reduce the import of inessentials and to 
promote basic industries to increase self-sufficiencyl54 
V^ 
R-obert Majolin, the Secretary-General of the O. E. E. C., responded to the 
British programme ahead of the official scrutiny. He encouraged the British to be 
more aware of other O. E. E. C. countries' ob ectives. He believed the British targets j 
for coal output and steel exports were too low to satisfy the others, and the anticipated 
oil sales exceeded the likely demand. The greatest difficulty was over the surplus the 
British expected with the O. E. E. C. countries. Maýolin believed the other O. E. E. C. 
nations would forecast deficits with the Sterling Area which they could only pay 
through surpluses with Britain. He urged Britain to import more food from France, 
Denmark and the Netherlands to save on dollar imports and to spend more sterling in 
Europe, thus avoiding making the pound as scarce as the dollar155 
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The British did concede they had been unrealistic in expecting the other 
countries to take a high level of inessential items from Britain which in turn aimed to 
keep out their inessential exports. The U. K. Delegation, however, was told by 
London that with such a restricted import programme Britain could not afford to 
import what they called "unessentials". The Working Group on Long-Term 
Programmes felt that refusing such exports would encourage countries to produce 
more essentialS156. Thus,, despite assurances of flexibility with the programme, the 
British attitude remained unchanging. 
At the end of October 1948 representatives of the U. K. Delegation, including 
Robinson, discussed the British programme with the French planners and foreign 
ministry officialS157. Herve Alphand, Jean Monnet's deputy in the French Delegation, 
emphasised concerns about Britain's autarkic attitude particularly towards machinery 
and bread grains. The British were willing to import around a quarter of the amount of 
bread grains from the whole O. E. E. C. that France alone hoped to export to Britain. 
The British remained intractable, fearing Britain would ruin its chances of achieving 
158 viability if it was too generous to the other O. E. E. C. countries 
Britain could effectively ignore criticism from other European nations but not 
that from the Americans. The E. C. A. 's detailed report on the British programme was 
released at the end of October. This called the programme an "outstanding job" and 
recognised that Britain had already made good progress towards its goals. The report 
focused particularly on investment, partly to encourage Congress to be generous to 
Britain. The E. C. A. wanted Britain to use more of its aid to buy imports which would 
mean that fewer capital goods would need to be exported and could be retained to re- 
equip British industry faster. The E. C. A. included social investment in its appraisal 
and felt the housing programme had been cut severely. They were satisfied that the 
nationalized industries were not getting preferential treatment, a concern to which the 
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British planners had given no thought but which reflected E. C. A. sensitivity towards 
possible criticism in Congress159. 
The E. C. A. was sympathetic to the maintenance of a strong pound as an aid to 
the return of multilateral trade. It accepted the British assumption that full 
multilateralism would be impossible by 1952/3 and that controls had to be retained in 
the meantime. However, Britain had to beware of creating a sterling shortage in the 
O. E. E. C. countries. This could be countered most effectively by importing more 
inessentials that would also provide incentives for the public160. By this they meant 
that people would be likely to work harder if there were more luxuries to buy in the 
shops. 
One key flaw was that the British had paid little attention to the difficulties of 
selling the exports, yet the E. C. A. deemed most of the trade forecasts to be 
reasonable. The E. C. A. encouraged a focus on boosting productivityl6l. The report 
accepted the production goals for the basic industries though it was concerned about 
recruitment to the coal and textile industries. Overall,. the E. C. A. saw the programme 
as comprehensive, effective and a worthwhile contribution to European economic co- 
162 operation 
By November British officials had started considering other countries' 
programmes and a revision of the British programme. Robinson warned that Britain 
had to have a clearer trade policy or it would fall foul of U. S. pressure for rapid 
163 ria, 0. E. E. C. liberalization Hall claimed that to overcome trade disequilib 
countries would have adjust their exchange rates. At this stage though, unlike the 
American E. C. A. officials who foresaw a general devaluation164,, Hall did not expect 
Britain to participate165. By early 1949, however, he and Plowden had come to 
166 
support devaluation to overcome Britain's export difficulties 
The Working Group on Long-Term Programmes, its sub-committees, the full 
London Committee and the Programmes Committee were all involved in revising the 
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British programmel67. Effective co-ordination was not helped by Clarke who kept the 
annual reports to the O. E. E. C. under the control of the Programmes Committee. Hall 
believed Clarke wanted to establish himself as "economic dictator" at the expense of 
Plowden168. Hall also felt that the Economic Section's work on revision was being 
ignored169. By December more attention was being paid to the Working Group on 
170 Long-Term Programmes's output, backed by the C. E. P. S. 's contributions . 
Revision continued into January 1949. Meanwhile the British programme was 
included within the O. E. E. C. 's Interim R lportl7l and published separately in the 
UX. 172. Inconsistencies between the different countries' programmes were exposed. 
For example, other O. E. E. C. countries expected to earn surpluses from Britain. They 
wanted to import less coal and steel than Britain aimed to export. The British felt that 
the other countries' import programmes and estimates of dollar sales were unrealistic 
which would mean greater dollar scarcity that could damage British plans. 
The French programme and that of Bizonia, formed by the fusion of the British 
and American occupation zones of Germany in 1947, with their grand investment 
schernes,, were seen by officials as particularly fbolish173. Ministers felt it unwise to 
adjust the British programme in line with the French one until the French had reformed 
their economy to ensure stability. They felt the French Government had 
misunderstood the British programme and the Chancellor was sent to Paris to clarify 
it174. The attitude to the Bizone programme prepared by the U. S. Military Governor 
in Germany, General Lucius Clay, was similarly negative175. Ministers believed its 
targets for production and exports were set too high, exceeding agreed levels of 
industry, and the expected level of food consumption appeared "extravagant". 
Ministers recognised, however, that they could do little in the face of U. S. and German 
176 intransigence 
Announcing the revision of the British programme to Parliament in January 
1949, Cripps said that to be part of the process Britain had to tolerate "impertinent" 
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enquiries into its economy by foreigners. He warned that the whole exercise was 
fraught with uncertainty and the necessary economic changes had to be introduced 
gradually rather than violently. The O. E. E. C. programmes had revealed that Western 
Europe could not expect to achieve viability by 1952/3, though by that time its trade 
177 patterns would have changed greatly 
Little progress was being made on revision as ministers were wedded to the 
policies they had adopted, for example continuing with the Agricultural Expansion 
Programme rather than importing more food from the O. E. E. C. countries178. As the 
original programme had been felt to be realistic it was difficult to identify elements for 
revision179. The only real changes could be made by increasing figures for total trade 
with the O. E. E. C. countries and investment in the Sterling Area180. The reluctance to 
revise was strengthened by the attitude that the programme was "not a plan in the 
sense of laying down a comprehensive course of action", just "the starting point of 
planning"181. This implied there was little point in altering figures that were likely to 
be falsified anyway. Hall-Patch took pains to make the American Congress 
understand that the programme consisted of "informed guesses"182. A revised 
programme was produced in February 1949 with minimal changesI83. By May,. 
Sub-Group'C' was recommending no further changes should be made184. 
The failure to thoroughly revise the programme did not damage BritaiWs 
position. Other countries were far slower in submitting their initial programmes and 
the scrutiny of them dragged on185. The European economy's vitality had been 
underestimated and by the end of 1949 it was clearly revivingI86. Across Europe 
agricultural output had recovered its inter-war levels. Exports exceeded the 193 8 
level,, in some countries they were three times higher187. The annual programmes 
continued to be submitted to the O. E. E. C., though ministers "succeeded in getting the 
level of detail reduced to one-eighth" of what had been previously demanded188. 
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Britain was able to give up Marshall Aid completely at the start of 195 1. benefiting 
from rising demand for Sterling Area primary exports to fuel rearmamentI89. 
In 1966,, Joan Mitchell made a detailed study of the outcomes of the British 
programme. She observes that "the planners were overwhelmed with the estimates,, 
forecasts and policy prognoses required". It was always unclear how prices would 
change and there was little inkling of the disruption that the Korean War and 
rearmament would bring"O. The outcome in 1952/3, Nfitchell suggests, was 
"tolerably close" to the forecasts. The programme gave "a good forecast on aggregate 
figures", for example exports reached 150% of the pre-war level. Exports were L2.8 
billion compared to L1.96 billion in the programme, imports L2.613 billion rather than 
L1.74 billion. Without the Korean War the figures would have been closerl9l. 
The planners were dependent on two factors beyond their control to achieve 
the targeted export sales: the efforts of businessmen and the willingness of overseas 
markets to take the exports. An optimistic target had to be set but there was little 
incentive to achieve it. The shortfall was filled by greater engineering exports which 
the programme had underestimated. Import forecasts were closer to reality despite 
the fact that controls were removed faster than had been envisaged192. 
The programme was accurate on industrial consumption levels, for example of 
coal and steel. It underestimated the difficulties in achieving manpower targets. By 
1952/3 total production was around a third above the pre-war level, as the programme 
had estimated, yet a number of individual production targets were not achieved. Coal 
output was only 200 million tons by 1952/3 compared to the revised programme 
figure of 225 million, with exports at 15 million rather than 35 million tons. Textile 
production and export levels were 10-20% lower than forecast. Agricultural output 
was close to the final Agricultural Expansion Programme targets, successes 
in 
potatoes, dairy products and pigs were balanced by shortfalls in other livestock and 
bread grains. One of the best results was in oil refining. By 1952/3 capacity exceeded 
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the 20 million tons forecast by I million tons. This was only achieved by diverting 
steel,, equipment, and licences into the industry and by bringing in foreign 
specialistS193 
Investment exceeded the programme's estimates by 8% equivalent to f 120 
million. Most of the extra came in engineering. The pattern was distorted by 
rearmament and changed government priorities for investment. Though the forecast 
pattern and levels of investment were roughly achieved by 1950, this did not guarantee 
that output reached the expected levels194. Consumption turned out to be close to the 
programme's forecasts, Though supplies of food, household goods and furniture 
improved, the availability of clothing barely increased195. 
Nfitchell recognises that the "relative closeness of the relation between 
Programme and performance does not prove anything". She adds: 
"the difficulties of making the forecast were so great and ability to 
direct the economy so limited that it signified hardly more than a 
hope. " 196 
Patricia Brown,. a member of Sub-group 'C' claims that the programme was a "dud" as 
the world did not conform to it. Officials were very surprised when it was fulfilled, 
197 
mainly due to a sudden surge in the economy in the last year of the programme 
The British programme incorporated established long-term programmes like the 
Agricultural Expansion Programme and policies, such as restricting imports from the 4ý 
U. S. A. and of "inessentials",, adopted to resolve the balance of payments problems. 
Hence,, the programme was an exposition of the policies the Government would 
probably have pursued anyway. For example, multilateral trade needed the removal of 
disequilibria which promoted sterling devaluation-198 
Mitchell writes that "after its publication in December 1948", the "Long-term 
Programme as such was put away to collect dust quickly by Ministers and officials 
alike"199. Plowden. claims accurately that with "the completion of the Long-Tenn 
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Programme, interest in long-term planning waned in WhitehaIP200. This was not an 
immediate result, however, as the Programme stimulated a final attempt, under the 
Attlee administrations,, to produce an effective survey of the economy up to 1952. 
The Economic Sumey fbir. 1952 
At a very small meeting of officials in December 1948, which included 
Plowden and Hall,, it was agreed that once revision of the Long-Term Programme and 
preparation of the Economic Survey for 1949 were complete, the C. E. P. S. could work 
on another long-term survey. Hitchman would chair an ad hoc official committee,, as 
the E. S. W. P. would be too buSY201. A working party was established in March 1949. 
It was in fact chaired by Hall and included Strath for the C. E. P. S.. Staff attended as 
individuals rather than representatives of their different departments. Their task was 
to re-work Robinson's survey202. Many of its assumptions were retained, such as a 
high level of U. S. econon-& activity, though a brief U. S. recession was 
approaching203. It assumed that Britain could take a greater share of the world's trade 
in manufactured goods and that the pattern of trade and trading policies would not 
change. Other assumptions were introduced from the O. E. E. C. programmes: that the 
U. S. A. would not introduce protection; West European rearmament would not 
increase and the terms of trade would deteriorate. Unlike Robinson's survey, the 
revised version anticipated a rise in trade with Eastern Europe204. The export target 
had been revised upwards to 150% and imports to 89% of the 1938 level by the 
British programme. However, now, more imports were expected from the "three 
nonsif countries and fewer from the Western Hemisphere2O5. 
New material came in Slowly206. It was not until May that an outline for the 
so-called Economic Sun= for 1952 could be produced. The layout was to be similar 
to Robinson's. Downie wanted to limit the focus to topics which needed immediate 
political decisions, such as the balance of payments, wage inflation, investment and 
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government expenditure. Most of the new material was to be compiled by the 
C. E. P. S. 207 though the Board of Trade provided detailed papers covering the long- 
term prospects for certain industrial sectorS208. 
The first three chapters were ready after three months' work and circulated in 
June 1949. The revised survey presented itself as "analytical" rather than 
"prescriptive", showing how far established policies were sufficient to achieve 
"viability" and a high standard of living by 1952. Its tone was typically cautious. The 
survey gave such wide ranges of figures, such as between 350-650,, 000 for 
unemployment in 1952, as to render them near useless. It assumed continued full 
employment, but with the "weapons of employment policy" so "crude and untried" 
policy had to proceed by "trial and error". Productivity was forecast to rise 2.4% per 
year, the same as achieved in the period 1924-37, though it was acknowledged that 
this could fall as low as 1.5%209. 
The survey referred the reader to other documents for information on the 
balance of payments. Most of the trade assumptions were taken ftom the Long-Term 
ProgEamme, but it was recognised that "the probable strength of competition from 
Germany and Japan" had been "previously underestimated". By the end of 1950 West 
Germany's output was a third higher than in 1936210. This led to the forecast for 
211 
exports being reduced from 150% to 145% of 1938's, close to Robinson's figure 
The trade picture was gloomy given strong U. S. competition and large payments from 
reserves to the O. E. E. C. and "three nons" countries. To maintain reserves even at the 
1400-500 million ($1.12-$1.4 billion) deemed necessary could mean cutbacks in 
imports leading to unemployment. Sterling Area earnings rose sharply with 
rearmament rather than continuing to fall as the survey expected212. Compared to the 
Long-Term Programme the survey was more realistic on Britain's trade prospects and 
considered potential problems for the British economy such as a poor 
harvest in the 
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U. K., a U. S. recession equivalent to that of 1938, an inflationary boom comparable to 
1948 and a Cold War economic blockade of Eastern Europe213. 
The survey anticipated a steadily growing crisis following the end of Marshall 
Aid, possibly requiring a cut of $500 million worth of dollar imports. Britain was 
dependent on specific imports from the dollar area which would be difficult to obtain 
elsewhere. Consequently, production, productivity, employment and consumption 
would suffer214. These gloomy forecasts were soon falsified by Western Europe's 
rapid recovery and the Korean War boom. The four-year Economic Survey for 1952 
represented the last attempt under the Attlee governments to produce a long-term 
survey of the economy. Officials were soon busy working on the Economic Survey 
for 1950 and material needed due the changes created by devaluation in September 
1949. 
Rearmament Planning 
Rearmament provided another area in which the planners looked ahead more 
than one year. It also drew staff from domestic work into the international arena. 
Rearmament disrupted the British economy. Lord Croham argues that this was a 
serious set-back at a time when recovery was almost complete215. In contrast,, Park 
suggests it was strictly a temporary phenomenon216. Caimcross has stated that 
investment did not recover its 1950-1 level until 1955 and in 1952 exports were 7% 
less than in 1950. These difficulties came at a time when German and Japanese 
exports were taking off217.1 believe that given the concurrent long-term weaknesses 
of the British economy the specific impact of rearmament is difficult to gauge. The 
country was unlikely to have experienced sustained economic growth in this period of 
increased competition, but rearmament certainly distorted the economy and retarded 
exports and certain sectors of industry. 
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The belief that a third world war was imminent was held widely throughout 
Whiteha11218. Hall and Plowden had been considering a rise in defence expenditure as 
early as April 1950. Park claims that civil servants like Hall,, thought ministers were 
"feeble" about defence. As seen above, officials did overestimate the economy's 
capacity to accommodate rearmament. By Autumn 1950 it was apparent that even a 
limited conflict in Korea would drive up raw material prices and force major export 
industries to convert to arms production thus affecting Britain's balance of 
219 payments 
In July 1950 the U. S. A. demanded rearmament plans from its allies in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N. A. T. O. ), which had been formed the previous 
year. Plowden chaired the working party that produced the British report. In 
anticipation of L550 million of U. S. aid, it aimed to spend DA billion on defence 
1951/2-1953/4. The American administration was angered by what it saw as the small 
size of the British programme220. The American standard of living had risen during 
the Second World War, so the U. S. Government failed to appreciate the burden 
rearmament placed on other countries221. The C. E. P. S. believed that rearmament 
might even mean the reintroduction of labour direction222. In fact, having expected 
substantial American aid,, the British had planned a programme too great for Britaids 
economy to accommodate223. However, following U. S. pressure, the C. E. P. S. and 
Economic Section began a reassessment of the British plans in September 1950 and it 
was raised to L3.6 billion. The Americans wanted the British to spend L6 billion, and 
by January 195 1, the planned figure had reached L4.7 billion224, though this was never 
fulfilled225. Despite continued pressure, the U. S. A. provided no rearmament related 
burden-sharing aid to Britain226. 
Plowden was part of the team which visited the U. S. A. in October 1950 to 
discuss rises in raw material prices provoked by rearmament227. In October 1951 
he 
was made one of the three "Wise Men" of N. A. T. O. 's 
Executive Bureau to scrutinize 
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each of the member states' rearmament programmes. He also sat in for Gaitskell on 
N. A. T. O. 's Temporary Council Committee (T. C. C. ) with Roll as his deputy228. Such 
work for an international organization differed from planning the British economy. 
For this reason and because the work of the "Wise Men" and the T. C. C. did not 
develop until Labour had lost power, they fall beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, like the work for the O. E. E. C. the process demonstrated how much Britain 
was at the mercy of international developments and American wishes and how little 
the country could plan on its own. 
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-Chat)ter VII Conclusions 
Having considered British economic planning 1945-5 1, in as much detail as the 
constraints of a thesis allows, it is possible to return to the groups of core questions 
set out at the beginning of the work. 
It can be argued that the new governmental bodies achieved very little in terms 
of economic planning. The response of Whitehall to this new policy approach was to 
produce structures which were traditional in nature. The C. E. P. S. was little different 
from the Economic Section, and the E. P. B. was simply a smaller version of N. J. A. C. 
and N. P. A. C. I.. Consequently, despite some early concerns, they fitted comfortably 
into the government machine. Likewise, the official and ministerial committees which 
were created to handle planning did not depart substantially from established practice. 
It is apparent that ministers lacked the ideas and the will to initiate any greater 
changes. 
The focus of the official and ministerial planning committees reflected the 
realisation that economic issues could not be separated from financial concerns. They 
also marked a recognition that in the post-war world, trade and the balance of 
payments were central elements in determining the health of the economy and so had 
to be monitored at the highest level. Parallel to this was the reassertion of the 
Treasury's primacy in Whitehall, unthreatened by any rival department in the economic 
field. As controls were abandoned and macro-econon* management became the key 
tool, it was natural that the Treasury should become the prime governmental mover in 
the economy. 
Kevin Theakston suggests that due to Labour's perception of the Civil Service 
they were unlikely to engineer great changes. This derived from the Fabian view of 
the state as being effectively a neutral instrument for the execution of political 
decisions. It combined with Labour's centralist and statist approach which needed a 
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strong Whitehall, plus the successful experiences almost all Labour ministers had had 
working with officials during the warl. As Chapter 11 demonstrated the Government 
certainly did not try to introduce radically different systems into Whitehall. Despite 
economic ministers like Cripps, Jay, Gaitskell and Dalton feeling discomfort during the 
devaluation crisis of 1949 about the attitude of civil servants to the issue, generally 
there were no complaints from Labour ministers about their officials2. Kenneth 
Morgan states that there was no evidence of Civil Service obstruction to the 
Government's policies. He adds that there was a powerful commitment to economic 
change throughout Whitehall, including in the Treasury3. However, as has been seen, 
this was directed towards Keynesianism rather than planning the economy. Theakston 
claims that as Labour's designs for planning, the welfare state and nationalization 
"were fairly vague"4, ministers were dependent on officials to sketch in the details. 
Throughout, ministers did not provide clear direction and ideas for planning. The 
suggestions which were made, were not pursued with vigour. Consequently planning 
officials could offer little to augment such a weak policy. 
What "value" then, did the planners add to government? Clearly more 
economists were brought into peacetime government service whether on a temporary 
or a longer-term basis. Though the C. E. P. S. 's tasks could have easily been undertaken 
by the Economic Section and C. S. O., its members added to what was a small pool of 
economic specialists, particularly in supplying information directly to the Lord 
President and Chancellor. Such material could provide a counterbalance to the rather 
traditional views held by the Treasury5. 
I would agree with Hennessy that the greatest legacy of the C. E. P. S. was 
in 
terms of the staff it brought to and promoted within Whitehall6. It 
is difficult,, 
however to say how far connection with the C. E. P. S. aided careers that would 11 7 
probably have been successful anyway. Plowden went on to chair 
important 
ll%ý hinery of government, the aircraft committees investigating atomic energy, the mac 
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industry and Civil Service pay. He headed the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
IL.;,. / 
Authority from 1953. His input helped shape the Central Policy Review Staff 
(C. P. R. S. ) created by Edward Heath in 1970 and scrapped by Margaret Thatcher in 
1983. Like the C. E. P. S., it was a body which provided information to a range of 
departments. To emphasise this the C. P. R. S. was located throughout its life in the 
Cabinet Office. Its scope was broader than simply economic7. However, it was 
headed 1974-80 by Sir Kenneth Berrill, a former C. E. P. S. member, who had been 
Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury 1973-4. 
Plowdeds secretary at the C. E. P. S., Douglas Allen, later Lord Croham, 
ultimately went on to become Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and later Head of 
the Home Civil Service. He helped Berrill in his move to the C. P. R. S. 8. David 
Pitblado became Permanent Secretary to the ministries of Power and of Technology in 
the 1960s9. Eric Roll, now Lord Roll, rose to become Permanent Secretary of the 
Department of Economic Affairs created by Harold Wilson in 1964 to handle 
economic planning which returned to fashion in the early 1960slO. There Douglas 
Henley and Douglas Allen worked under him as Assistant Under Secretary of State 
and Deputy Under Secretary of State respectively. Henley later rose to become 
second Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and then Comptroller and Auditor 
General,, 1976-8111. His deputy for three years was another former C. E. P. S. man, 
Phillip Cousins12. 
Geoff-rey Wilson was Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas 
Development 1968-7013. Alan Hitchman, a former Assistant to the Chief Planning 
Officer, became Permanent Secretary to the ministries of Materials and of Agriculture 
in the 1950S14. William Strath, Hitchman's successor at the C. E. P. S., became 
Permanent Secretary to the ministries of Supply and of Aviation 1959-6015. Like 
Plowden and John Croome, another C. E. P. S. man, both Hitchman and Strath worked 
for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority in the 1950s16. 
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On the question of whether the planners correctly predicted the econonfic 
problems the economy was likely to face, it can be argued that broadly they did. It 
was mainly political reasons which prevented their advice being heeded. As early as 
17 May 1946, officials were aware that a coal shortage was likely . 
Shinwell's 
concentration on issues outside his portfolio, such as attempts to regulate pay rises, 
prevented effective action. As shown in Chapter V, similar problems continued to 
occur due to the Ministry of Fuel and Power's enduring suspicion of others' views of 
their fiefdom. The planning officials also recognised swiftly in 1947 that it would be 
difficult to maintain convertibility given the position of Britain's gold and dollar 
reserves and the demands on them. However,, even if ministers had fully grasped the 
implications of convertibility they would have found it difficult to renege on their 
agreement with the American Government. 
More successffilly, the planners made ministers aware of how vital Marshall 
Aid was for Britain and guided them in the most effective way to elicit the greatest 
amount possible. With the planners' awareness of trade issues, Plowden and Hall led 
in pushing for devaluation, realising that an overvalued pound was making British 
exports uncompetitive. Devaluation is always a difficult move for politicians to make, 
but the persistence of Plowden and Hall converted the Cabinet to the idea and to 
accept a rate sufficient to remedy most of the trade and reserves problems". Planning 
officials were more hawkish than their ministers and encouraged the beginning of 
rearmament. Rearmament was a development, however, that was forced on ministers 
less by their officials than by world events and the Americans. In fact the planners 
underestimated the disruption to trade and the British economy that the 
degree of 
rearmament adopted would cause". The balance of payments 
deficit was L369 
million compared to the DOO million expected. The G. D. P. rose 
by only 2% 1950-2, 
rather than 6%. the rate it had been rising before rearmament20. 
However,. the 1951 
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economic survey was sufficiently incisive to encourage ministers to take steps which 
somewhat mitigated the effects on the domestic economy. 
Planning officials probably took no more initiative than anyone else in 
Whitehall. However, because their work focused on looking out for possible future 
crises they were in a stronger position to warn ministers. The British Civil Service is 
not a system which encourages its officials to take the initiative on policy. Rarely, 
though, did they do more than present the information and leave it up to ministers to 
produce, or fail to produce, a policy to respond. There were occasions when senior 
officials pushed certain lines, such as on accelerating demobilization or devaluation, 
which were accepted by ministers, others, such as harsh cuts following the failure of 
convertibility, were resented and rejected. Civil Service initiative in planning was 
generally more subtle - for example, guiding what should be covered in the economic 
surveys and in what order. Planning officials made sure that ministers' less relevant 
interests, such as Cripps's enthusiasm for bilateral trade deals, did not intrude too 
much2l. Officials ensured that what was written was not only inoffensive to the 
Americans but also calculated to appeal to their generosity. Most importantly, they 
determined the tone the surveys would adopt towards the public whether exhortatory, 
patronising or dully statistical. 
Most of the planners' work was involved with gauging short-term 
developments, little more than a year ahead at most. This cannot properly be called 
econornic planning. Consequently it is difficult to say when planning gave way to 
Keynesianism. The move towards Keynesianism had been underway since 194122. 
Even Tomlinson concedes that officials and ministers were using Keynesian concepts 
and arithmetic, particularly after 194723. Thus, despite the rhetoric of 
Labour's 
manifesto, immediate post-war planning can be seen more as a 
leftover from wartime 
than a new departure. It was a hiccough against a background of growing acceptance 
of Keynesian thinking in economics, if not full-blown Keynesian practice. 
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Given the minimal application of planning the question of how much influence 
either "Gosplanners" or "Thermostatters" wielded becomes irrelevant. The policies 
being pursued by the time Labour fell from power fitted the ideas of Meade, the key 
"Thermo statter" . very neatly. The Economic Section can be seen as the most 
Keynesian part of Whitehall, but there was acceptance of its attitudes and approaches 
to problems throughout most of the C. E. P. S. as clearly demonstrated by the 
partnership of Plowden and Hall, These opinions became more widely accepted as the 
years passed. The "Gosplanners" represented a small ginger group of probably just 
three men - Marris, Berrill and to some degree, Robinson. Their views were not as 
extreme as rivals painted them. They just approached planning with a desire for 
something more dynamic that could engage the public and could reach into all sectors 
of the economy. They certainly did not offer a substantially different vision of 
planning. The difference between the three and their more thermostatting colleagues 
was in terms of style and presentation. This was most clearly demonstrated by the 
debate over the number of statistical tables that the surveys produced in 1948 should 
contain. 
Though leading economic officials such as Plowden and Hall did not see 
economic planning as a long-term approach to the economy, there is no evidence that 
they consciously undermined it as a policy. In the Whitehall tradition they obeyed the 
policy directions that their ministerial masters dictated. The focus on short-term 
solutions, anyway, prevented any real attempt to plan the economy which might have 
highlighted the differences between the senior civil servants and ministers. 
Additionally, given the economic difficulties that Britain continued to face at the end 
of Labour's period of office, it must have appeared, even to those who saw planning as 
a temporary measure, that it remained a necessary policy for the time being. Only the 
hostility of the incoming Conservative Government to planning ensured that it was 
swept away briskly. Even then, within ten years, the Conservative Chancellor, 
Selwyn 
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Lloyd24, revived the interest in economic planning which formed a basis for Labour's 
subsequent National Plan of 1965. Such a revival reflected a wish to mimic what was 
perceived as the success of French planning. 25 It also demonstrates,, however,, that 
virtually all the problems associated with immediate post-war British planning had 
been forgotten very quickly. This was despite the involvement of experienced 
planning officials of the 1940s, such as Roll,, Henley and Allen in the Department of 
Economic Affairs at much higher ranks than they had held fifteen years before. Again 
this reflects the duty of civil servants to carry out the wishes of their ministers 
whatever the potential difficulties. 
This thesis has demonstrated how constrained ministers were in trying to shape 
the economy at any more than a macro-economic level. As Chapter IV highlighted, 
the Budget was never integrated with economic planning, despite both aspects coming 
under the auspices of the Chancellor and the Treasury from 1948. The Government 
was never able to develop a sophisticated credit or wages policy or tax system, all of 
which would have been necessary to shape the economy in absence of more direct 
controls. Though these ideas were often never fully developed as policies, intiatives in 
these areas were choked off quickly by vested interests in banking, the trade unions 
and the Civil Service respectively. 
The Government overestimated its ability to guide investment and to bring it in 
line with available resources and to focus on the sectors which it considered to be the 
most important. Connected with this was the "arms-length" control over the 
nationalized industries which had been established on the Morrisonian public 
corporation model. This meant that they could act with a good deal of autonomy in 
their investment rather than complying with the Government's objectives. Thus a 
strong influence by the state over large parts of the economy was prevented, 
particularly in encouraging investment. This contrasted with the 
French example 
where the state-owned ElectriciM de France was the largest 
industrial investor in the 
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country. The size of such business enabled the French government to provide stable 
markets for suppliers26 and consequently indirectly affect a large part of the economy. 
Wartime planning had rested on controls over manpower and raw materials. 
These needed a large administration to function, but this was seen as wasteful in 
peacetime. The increasing availability of raw materials made control of them 
unnecessary. Concerns about the impositions on liberty of the manipulation of the 
labour market inhibited the use of manpower controls. Thus as Chapter IV 
demonstrated,, by the end of the 1940s it had become impossible to implement 
planning on the wartime mode127, 
Taken as a whole, these problems demonstrate that the Governments 1945-51 
were unable to implement a new kind of economic policy with the economic methods 
and instruments that were in existence, partly because of resistance from different 
groups. Planning was impossible without fashioning new economic tools for the task. 
The only viable alternative, which had been favoured by many civil servants even when 
planning was in fashion, was Keynesian-style demand management. This approach 
allowed business to work and trade in the way it wanted and was easy to administer 
from the perspective of the Government and Civil Service. This development was 
accentuated by the Treasury developing its powers over the economic sphere of 
policy. 
On the question of whether Britain lacked a "developmental state", Plowden 
suggests that a British "take-off' was not retarded by the Korean War. I share 
Plowden's view that given the "poor management in much of industry, reactionary 
trade unions, orce and too great ., 
the poor education and training of much of the workf 
a concentration on old and declining industries" Britain was unlikely to 
have ever 
attained a post-war economic "miracleviM. Britain had deep rooted problems 
that 
despite a small window of opportunity following the war, were not going to 
be 
overcome by superficial changes to the government machine. 
This structure did not 
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provi e sufficient capacity or power for institutional and industrial adaptation to 
changed economic circumstances. 
The new French planning institutions were more successful for four reasons. 
First, France had suffered much more from the war and industrialists and workers alike 
were prepared to accept otherwise unpalatable developments in order to reconstruct 
France successfully29. In Monnet's words, - "Britain had not been conquered or 
invaded. She felt no need to exorcise history113O. Consequently, British employers and 
trade unions were not so amenable to the possibility or desirability of radical reforms. 
Second, the French Government, and importantly its Civil Service, had a clear 
objective for planning, which was to modernize the whole economy3l, Unlike the 
French planning objective of "breaking down any obstacles that the past might erect"32 
and creating a strong industrial and agricultural base that could compete in Europe and 
the World33,, British planning never had a clear goal. Its objectives involved a desire 
to revive inter-war industrial and trade patterns, thus recreating the problems of the 
old industries. It also aimed to protect the British balance of payments and reserves. 
However, ministers seemed only distantly aware that to achieve this objective, 
governmental intervention and strong investment were needed to promote successful 
export industries such as engineering. The U. K. Government aimed to preserve 
consumer fi7eedoms at a time of such severe economic crises that nothing more than 
survival could be achieved without stronger regulation. 
An additional problem was that, though planning was supposed to encourage 
the whole public to work harder and make sacrifices in times of shortages, the 
Government was very wary about revealing their economic forecasts, especially in the 
first two years after the war. Ministers and officials naturally feared that they would 
face criticism if reality turned out differently to the forecasts and thus undermine 
faith 
in planning. The Government also disliked revealing details of the planning machine 
to 
Parliament and the public. As a consequence the press tended to portray the planners 
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as faceless puppet-masters running the economy and not doing a good job of it. Of 
course, the planners never attained even a fraction of this power. Again this contrasts 
with the French example where the modernization plan was discussed with various 
interest groupS34 and published at the end of 194635. Copies were even personally 
delivered to the British Civil Service36. 
This thesis has shown that counter to Barnett's views that Britain's chances for 
strong economic revival were thrown away on building the "New Jerusalem" of a 
comprehensive welfare state37,. the economic planners concentrated on trying to 
engineer a healthy economy in terms of trade and production. Investment cuts focused 
on areas over which the Government had greatest control. As Chapter V 
demonstrated this often meant restrictions in investment in social services. ., 
health,. 
education and particularly public-sector housing. Such approaches, however, were 
shaped more by a recognition of Britain's limited resources than any clear ideology. If 
nothing else, the economic planners were usually very much aware of the restricted 
supplies of all kinds on which the U. K. had to survive. 
The third difference between British and French planning was that the French 
involved a thousand people in planning including numerous industrialists, trade 
unionists, farmers and experts. British planning never involved more than a hundred 
people at most, almost exclusively of the traditional Civil Service mould, working with 
people representing industry and labour who held conservative perspectiveS38. The 
French civil servants were technically better trained than their British counterparts39 I 
but contrary to Plowden's view", their power of initiative within the French 
constitutional framework was no greater than their British counterparts4l. 
The fourth difference is linked most clearly to the issue of the "developmental 
state". The French were able to graft their new institutions on to well established 
investment and tripartite bodies, some dating from the Nineteenth Century42. Britain 
had no such bodies, and equivalents had to be quickly created. Unsurprisingly they 
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were unpopular with industry which was used to a hands-off approach in peacetime. 
The new bodies also lacked clear functions or sufficient powers. 
This leads to the final core question. From the above points it is clear that I do 
not think economic planning is incompatible with democracy. In fact, as the French 
example demonstrated, planning can enhance it. I do agree, however, with von Hayek 
that planning was incompatible with the British capitalist system. Both British labour 
and industrialists were very jealous of their position and resented any interference. 
Given that Britain had been a victor and had not suffered foreign invasion there 
seemed no reason to diverge from what was established peacetime practice. The 
Government's ideas were not coherent enough,, nor could it draw sufficient support 
from any sector of society to press its innovations on to British industry in the face of 
obstruction by workers and employers. Though wage restraint was pursued 1948-50, 
this concession by the T. U. C. just strengthened its hand in resisting the introduction of 
initiatives, particularly on pay differentials that were important for enabling planning to 
be carried out43. These groups in society questioned the whole legitimacy of the 
attempts to plan which severely dented the confidence of those involved in planning 
that further weakened it as a concept. In the struggle to assert new models for 
running the economy, the Government's half-hearted attempt at planning was bound to 
fail. 
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App dix 
The Central Economic Planning Staff 1947-51 
Key 
[40] - age in 1947. 
Ministry of Food - Employer immediately before joining C. E. P. S.. 
(Ministry ofProduction) - Wartime employment. 
Sir Edwi-n-X Plowde [401 
C. P. lennant& Sons Co. 
(Chief Executive, Ministry of Aircraft Production) 
Chief Planning Officer 5/1947- 1953 
Chairman of Economic Planning Board from 7/1947- 1953 
Investment Programmes Committee 9/1947- 4/1948 
(Chair from 12/1947) 
Official Committee on Economic Development Working Group 
5/1949 - 10/1950 
Deputy Chairman of Economic Steering Committee from 10/1950 
Member of Government Organization Committee 
from 12/1949 
Committee on Proposed Franco-German Coal & Steel Authority 
from 5/1950 
Official Coal Committee from 11/1950 
Hugh Weeks [431 
Director of J S. Fry & Sons Ltd. 
(Minisfty of Supply 1939-43 & Head of Programmes & Planning Division, Minisfty of 
Production) 
Assistant to the Chief Planning Office 
Member of Economic Planning Board 
1947 - 4/1948 
7/1947 - 7/1948 
investment Programmes Committee 8/1947 - 4/1948 
(Chairman from 12/1947) 
Committee on Industrial Production 12/1947 - 7/1950 
Working Party on Marshall Aid 12/1948 
Executive Committee of European Economic Co-operation 
Conunittee 
E. Alan Hitchman [44] 
Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Labour 
(Ministry of Labour) 
Assistant to the Chief Planning Officer 
Chairman of. Productivity (Official) Committee 
Manpower Committee 
Member of Committee on Controls and Efficiency 
Economic Planning Board 
Import Diversion Committee 
from 1/1948 
1948 - 11/1949 
8/1948 - 9/1949 
3/1949 - 1/1950 
-C- - trom 7/1947 
from 9/1949 
7/1948 - 11/1949 
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William Strath [411 
Ministry Qf Aircrqft Production 
(Air Ministry) 
Assistant to the Chief Planning Officer 
Chairman of Import Diversion Committee 
Manpower Committee 
from 11/1949 - 1955 
11/1949- 1950 
1/1950 - 3/1951 Member of Committee on Economic Controls from 7/1947 
Economic Planning Board from 9/1949 
Investment Programmes Committee 12/1947 - 11/1949 
(Chairman from 4/1948) 
Douglas A. V. Allen [3 0], Board of Trade since 1939 
- Working Party on National Incomes Forecasts from 
Programmes Committee from 
Working Party on Long-Term Planning 
Secretary to Economic Planning Board 
D. J. Atherton - Official Committee on Economic Development 
Kenneth Berri-H [27], Cambridge University, (Army - R. E. M. E. ) 
- C. E. P. S. Economist 
1/1950 
9/1950 
5/1950 - 8/1950 
11/1947 - 10/1950 
5/1949 - 10/1950 
George B. Blaker [3 5], Board of Trade, (Ministry of Production) 
- Raw Materials Committee from 8/1951 
Neville Blond [51 Board of Trade, (Ministry of Production) 
C. E. P. S. memberl 
S. Boddington - Secretary to Economic Planning Board 
M. Patricia Brown [2 1 ], Cambridge University 
- C. E. P. S. member 
Dr. F. E. Budd,. Cabinet Office 
- Secretary to Materials Committee 
Phillip Cousins [241, R. A. E 
- Secretary to Industrial Building Committee 
Secretary to Investment Statistics Committee 
7/1947 - 11/1947 
12/1946 - 6/1950 
11/1949 - 1/1950 
12/1949 - 9/1950 
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John L. Croome [40], Minisay ofFood since 1939 
- Chairman of Committee on Colonial Development's Sub-committee on 
Import Programmes 1/1949 - 8/1951 Secretary to Investment Programmes Committee 12/1947 - 2/1948 
R. E. France, Ministry of Supply 
- Secretary to Fuel Allocations Committee 6/1947 - 4/1950 
AN. Francis - Sub-comn-fittee on Visible Exports from 9/1948 
Douglas 0. Henley [28], Treasury, (Army - 12th Infantry Brigade) 
- Official Committee on Economic Development from 10/1950 
Secretary to Economic Planning Board from 10/1950 
Miss. A. M. Jenkins 
- Chairman of Working Party on Long-Term Planning 
from 4/1951 
Committee on Productive Capacity 2/1951 - 12/1951 
E. Jones - Secretary to Investment Programmes Committee 7/1950 - 10/1951 
- Secretary to Raw Materials Committee 10/1950 - 12/1950 
Alfred S. Le Maitre [5 1 ], Admiralty since 1920 
- Economic Planning Board 7/1947 - 11/1947 
Kenneth W. S. MacKenzie [32], Assistant Financial Secretary - Kenya, 
(Colonial Administration, Basutoland andMauritius) 
- Secretary to Raw Materials Committee from 4/1951 
Robin Marris [23], Cambridge University, (R. A. E) 
- Secretary to Working Party on National Incomes Forecasts 1/1950 - 3/1950 
J. K. Ogilvy Webb - Secretary to Programmes Committee 
from 6/1948 
Secretary to Import Diversion Committee 7/1948 - 1/1949 
David Pitblado [35], Treasury, (Dominions Office) 
- Programmes Committee 
from 1/1950 
Working Party on Proposed Franco-German Coal and Steel Authority 
from 9/1950 
D. Pointon - Secretary to Import Diversion 
Committee 1/1949 - 1950 
-345- 
E. Austin. G. Robinson [501, Cambridge University, (Ministry ofProduction) 
- Investment Programmes Committee from 8/1947 
Overseas Negotiations Committee from 10/1947 
J. A. C. Robertson - Programmes Committee ftom 9/1951 
Working Party on Proposed Franco-German Coal and Steel Authority 
from 9/1951 
Efic Roll [40], Ministry ofFood 
- European Economic Co-operation Committee's Programmes 
Committee (Vice-Chairman for O. E. E. C. Programmes) 
6/1948 
Import Diversion Committee 7/1948 - 1950 
Edward A. Shillito [3 7], Treasury since 1936 
- Chairman of Committee on Productive Capacity 
Raw Materials Committee 1/1951 - 3/1951 
Manpower Committee from 3/1951 
C. D. Smith - Industrial Building Sub-committee 11/1949 - 1/1950 
Secretary to: Plant and Machinery Sub-committee 
from 2/1949 
Materials Committee 6/1950 - 10/1951 
investment Programmes Committee 10/1951 
Frederick W. Smith [5 1 ], Minisfty of Works, (Ministry of Aircraft Production) 
- Food Distribution Committee2 from 5/1948 
J. G. P. Spicer - C. E. P. S. member. 
Frank F. Turnbull [421, India Office since 1930 
- Chairman of Investment Programmes Committee 
Raw Materials Comnfittee 
Steel Working Group 
Herbert A. Turner [3 5 ], Treasury, (Ministry of Transport) 
- Programmes Committee 
from 11/1949 
10/1950 - 1/1951 
and 3/1951 - 6/1951 
from 3/1951 
4/1950 - 5/1950 
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F. R. Peter Vinter [3 3 ], Treasury, (Ministry of Economic Warfare and Cabinet Office) 
- Chairman of Industrial Building Sub-committee 11/1949 - 1/1950 Secretary to: Plant and Machinery Sub-committee 
from 2/1949 
Working Party on Proposed Franco-German Coal and 
Steel Authority fi7om 5/1950 
Joseph R. M. Willis [38], Inland Revenue since 1932 
- Programmes Committee 1/1949 - 1/1950 
Geoff-rey M. Wilson3 [37],, Cabinet Office, (Foreign Office) 
- Raw Materials Committee from 1/1951 
Personal infonnation comes from Who Was Who and Who's Who, 1991. The 
bulk of the information on committee membership is taken from EcQnomic Planning 1943- 
195 1. A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office, by Alford, Lowe and Rollings, 
supplemented by The Robert Hall Diaries edited by Sir Alec Caimcross. 
1 Neville Blond does not appear in any of the secondary literature but was working with 
the C. E. P. S. on coal, slurry, steel and railway wagons in June 1947, P. R. O., T 229/417, 
Principal Subiects Under InvestigatiO , 13/6/1947. 2 Only non-ministerial member of the committee apart from Robert Hall. 
3 Though Sir Geoffrey Wilson is listed by Alford, Lowe and Rollings as being a member of 
the C. E. P. S., he wrote to me in March 1995 denying this. He says that he was a member 
of the Cabinet Office and of the Treasury under the Labour Governments but had little 
contact with the C. E. P. S. 
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